



Maciej Pawłowski

# Christian migrants from South Sudan in Egipt



Warsaw 2025

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## **List of abbreviations**

CPA –Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in 2005 between the government of Sudan and rebeliants from South Sudan.

CRS –Catholic Relief Society,

EGP – Egyptian Pound

EIPR –Egiptian Initiative for Personal Rights,

FIDH –International Federation for Human Rights

GERD –Great Ethiopian Rennaissance Damn

IGAD –Intergovernmental Authority on Development,

IOM –International Organisation on Migration

NaS –National Salvation Front Paramilitary organisation operating in South Sudan and targeting members of the Equatorian ethnic groups.

PCPM – Polish Development Aid Centre. A foundation dedicated to the delivery of development aid. SPLA –Sudan People Liberation Army, Paramilitary organisation and political party operating in South Sudan, mainly composed of members of the Dinka ethnic group.

SPLA-IO –Sudan People Liberation Army in Opposition, Paramilitary organization and political party operating in

South Sudan, composed mainly of representatives of the Nuer ethnic group.

UNHCR –United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,

UNICEF –United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund,

# Introduction

Migration has been a major concern in Europe since 2015, when the European migration crisis erupted. In two years (2015-2016), 2.3 million migrants crossed the EU border illegally. There have been many videos on the Internet, some real and some made up, showing the fighting and the fighting on the Greek islands, allegedly perpetrated by immigrants from Africa and the Middle East. The fight against illegal migration has dominated the political debate across the EU, also influencing the course and outcome of the 2015-2018 parliamentary elections in Poland, among others. At that time, the societies of the so-called old EU began to take a more intensive stance on the issue of migration, and the societies of the new EU recognised that it was a problem of other countries - former colonial powers. There is also a growing belief that if you just temporarily close the border, the migrants will not show up.

The situation changed when the Polish-Belarusian border crisis began in the summer of 2021, followed by the outbreak of war in Ukraine in February 2022. The mass influx of people (not only Ukrainians) to Central European countries has shown that citizens of African and Asian countries can also be found in the new EU countries. Moreover, in Algiers, where I have been living since August 2021, my local colleagues from the so-called popular class mentioned during conversations

that they plan to fly to Belarus, and from there to get through Poland to Germany and France. They were convinced that it was an easy solution and were unaware of the dangers that lay ahead.

Poland, Romania, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia have become transit countries for migrants seeking to cross into Western Europe, as has Egypt for those dreaming of living in the EU. In the future, as the economy develops and living standards rise, Central Europe may even become a destination for migration, including for the African population. It is therefore worthwhile to look in advance both at potential migrants and at the institutions that can help them integrate. One of them is certainly the Catholic Church, which still plays an important role in the region, and its position in Africa seems even more similar to that of Europe in the first half of the 20th century. It is worth asking: Can a common religion help Africans to adjust to life in Europe? And how can the Catholic Church help? It is also worth considering how far away from us African Christians are in terms of worship, and what they have in common with us.

The purpose of this book is to answer these questions. It was originally meant to be my doctoral dissertation written under the supervision of dr hab. Karoliny Bielenin-Lenczowska from the University of Warsaw. However, by the time it was almost fully written, it was found to be too interdisciplinary for

the standards of the UW Institute of Cultural Anthropology and Ethnology of the Warsaw University. It combines anthropological and political research. But it is not 100% pure anthropology and it is too poor in theoretical terms. In the later period together with dr hab. We tried to transfer the doctoral thesis to the Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences of the Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University. We managed to obtain support in this regard from Fr. prof. Ph.D. Jan Balicki (who, incidentally, formulated the final title of the work). Unfortunately, the change in my life situation meant that I could not afford to pay for my doctoral studies. So I decided to publish it as a book. First in Poland, then abroad.

This book was written in Cairo and Algiers. In the capital of Egypt, I conducted anthropological research on the titular community. After moving to Algiers, I explored the literature on the subject, which I obtained largely thanks to the kindness of Joanna Ławniczak and Karolina Dyl from the library of the Polish Institute of International Relations.

The structure of the book is as follows. In the first chapter I describe my social position as a researcher and the theoretical concepts used in the book. The aim of the second chapter is to present the roots of the group of migrants studied and the reasons why they left their homeland. For this reason, the history of South Sudan, its ethnic, religious, and political divisions, its economic weaknesses, and its social

problems are examined. Chapter three shows what we officially know about the situation of South Sudanese migrants in Egypt: Egypt's migration policy, relations between the two countries, Egypt's social structure and the place of migrants in Egypt, as well as the problems of migrants reported by international organizations and media reports. Chapter four describes the history, mission and structure of the Catholic Church in Africa, including its activities in South Sudan and Egypt. The most important part of the book is the fifth chapter, which sums up my anthropological research. First, I'm going to share with you some observations of foreigners who have had the opportunity to live in South Sudan. What follows are the conclusions drawn from in-depth interviews with members of the community studied and from my observation of their participatory daily lives and religious practices. The conclusions will address the question of how well South Sudanese migrants are able to adapt to living conditions in Europe. And what role can the Catholic Church play in this regard? If you're intrigued by the subject, I have no choice but to invite you to read it.

# **1. Theoretical concepts and methodological assumptions**

## **1.1. Social situation of the researcher**

I found myself in Cairo in September 2020 due to my then wife's diplomatic work. She was appointed to serve as vice-consul in the consular department at the Polish Embassy in Cairo. It was her first facility. Before leaving Poland, I worked as a political analyst for southern Europe at the Polish Institute of International Affairs. I analyzed the politics of Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal. It was the job of my dreams. However, given the choice of staying in Warsaw and having sporadic contact with my wife and children, or leaving with my family and giving up my dream job, I chose the second option. This choice turned out to be painful for me. Regardless of my competences, I was only offered a job as a cashier.

At first, I decided to take the job I was offered and write political articles in my spare time. Turning my passion from a job into a hobby proved difficult to accomplish, however. I still felt unhappy. I often went for a walk alone, worrying about my present and my future. As a Catholic, I often spontaneously went to the local church and prayed in seclusion. On one of these walks, I happened to come across a group of black church activists who were preparing for

Sunday Mass by practicing the songs they were going to sing. Out of curiosity, I stayed in the church for the rest of the rehearsal. When it was over, two men approached me, as interested in me as I was in them. Turns out they're South Sudanese migrants. And it was in this, in a somewhat haphazard way, that the idea for this book was born. At first, I feared that I might be untrustworthy to my interlocutors or that they might approach me with suspicion or even hostility. It seemed to me that as a white, privileged male, I could be associated with colonial relations, be seen as a person of eminence, or simply as an unavailable member of different social class. I was also aware that all of these elements of my social status - my skin color, my background, my education, my gender - had a bearing on who I talked to, what I talked about, and how I talked about it.

My expat friends, both from the Polish embassy and from other countries, had no contact with migrants from sub-Saharan Africa. If they were interested in anyone outside the diplomatic circle, it was the Egyptians. Their observations of Egypt ended on them, and with the length of their stay, they went smoothly from fascination to disappointment. The migrants remained invisible. Expats were usually unaware of the countries of origin of black people seen on the streets of Cairo. Little was known about their relationship with the Egyptians. Occasionally, at most, someone would hire a South Sudanese housewife as a domestic helper, but at the same

time, they were not interested in getting closer to her or talking about her experiences. However, the attitude was not so much the result of the arrogance of the expatriates as of a lack of mutual understanding, probably due to different cultural competences. This has translated into negative experiences of contact with Egyptian domestic workers and transferring lessons from them to all those working in this capacity. According to my interviewees and my own observations, Egyptian women tended to establish a seemingly friendly relationship with their employers as quickly as possible by giving small gifts to emphasize their devotion and love for their employer. Egyptians often emphasize that you can like animals, but people you can only love. The ladies who cleaned our house every day told us they loved us. But the moment we became emotionally attached to them, they began to drastically reduce the quality of their work. Every positive gesture on our part motivated them to continue negotiating. When we paid the weekly rate for 4 days of work (when, for example, the fifth day was a holiday and the housekeeper's work was not needed), the worker negotiated a higher rate for the following week. Tolerance for inaccurate table cleaning resulted in, for example, inaccurate floor cleaning the next day. There are many more examples.

Fortunately, it soon became clear that my concerns about the Sudanese I had met were unfounded. Many of my contacts were pleased with my interest in them, and I quickly

gained their trust. Of course, as a white man, I was associated with the Western world, the Christian Europe, which they imagined as full of freedom and respect for human rights, as opposed to what they saw as the racist, autocratic and hypocritical Muslim world. In addition, my age (34 at the time of the study) made it easy for me to connect with both young and old people, i.e. people over 40 in the case of the study community. I also had the impression that my interviewees were pleased that I was interested in them. At the same time, contrary to my initial fears, they did not expect me to give them any financial support or help them obtain a visa. I provided such support three times of my own free will (no one asked me for it). Once, as a gesture of goodwill to the respondents, I donated EGP 100 (6 euros) to a contribution to a sick member of the community. Then people present in the church laughed that it was a "bribe" on my part. The second time, I donated EGP 400 (€24) to a school where migrant children studied. Then its Director, Mrs. Silvia Gore, wished me that God would repay me for this gesture with four times the amount of money in the future. The third time, when I was talking to the oldest person in the study and I heard about his medical history and that he needed 1,200 EGP to undergo surgery for prostate cancer, I spontaneously gave him 600 EGP (36 euros) on the condition that he not tell anyone. At first, the gifted man was surprised and asked me why I was doing this. When I told him that I was sympathetic to his plight, he accepted the money and thanked me.

Only twice have I encountered distrust. In one case, it was a young man who thought I was "spying" inside their community on someone's behalf. This is quite a common accusation among anthropologists, as it results from the fact that an outsider asks them about their private life, takes notes, films or records interviews. In the second case, it was a woman who thought I was doing some research for the UN, which she didn't trust. In time, the man's attitude changed when he got used to me and saw that I had a good relationship with his colleagues. The woman didn't trust me at all. The rest of the community, however, had a positive attitude toward me. As I wrote above, I was sometimes introduced to the faithful by church activists reading parish announcements as "a Pole writing a book on South Sudanese culture", which added to my credibility.

In the early days of my research, it was easier for me to get in touch with men and interview them. But with time, and with the help of previous interviewees, I gained access to women. It wasn't because I was shy, it was more because I was afraid. Because at first, it seemed to me that South Sudanese women, like many Egyptian women, might be afraid of contact with men or being watched and judged for their sexuality. However, it quickly turned out that this belief was wrong. The men from South Sudan I met do not control the lives and morals of their compatriots, and women are direct in contacts with men. White men are extremely attractive to

both them and Egyptian women. When I lived in Cairo, women smiled at me almost every day, asked me for a photo together, and complimented my beauty (sometimes Egyptian men did the same). The difference between Muslim women from Egypt and black migrant women, however, is that for the former, the white man is the object of forbidden dreams, impossible to fulfill due to the lack of social acceptance both for the relationship with the foreigner and for any pre-marital contacts. Black migrant women have no such restrictions from their community. If they want, they can have sex with a foreigner, date him, and even marry him. It happened to me on the street that I was accosted by black women who simply approached me, said "hi" and wanted to exchange their phone number. It even happened once that a woman approached me, handed me a piece of paper with her name and phone number, and directly offered to meet me for sexual purposes. However, in the group of women I surveyed who regularly attend church, I did not receive such proposals. The ladies talked to me in a casual way, but without the sexual overtones. The boundary between the investigator and the subject was not crossed and there was no such threat. And it would be unethical for me as a researcher to go beyond that, and it could affect the course of the study.

Two of the women I interviewed worked for me for a short time as domestic helpers. They cleaned, cooked, and cared for my children after their lessons at the international

school. Unfortunately, these experiences were not positive, although for different reasons than with the Egyptian women working in this capacity. The first respondent, a forty-year-old woman, was unpunctual and negotiated a raise after only one day of work. Moreover, she was unable to focus on performing all the required duties to which she had committed herself. We expected her to do some shopping within 8 hours, then prepare dinner, clean the apartment and take care of the children for 2 hours. Of the above activities, she only cleaned up on the first day, and only played with the children on the second day. She was just focused on one task, doing it perfectly, but forgetting about the rest. The other lady was a young student, who met all our requirements and was very sympathetic. Unfortunately, on the third day of work, she left the keys in one of the rooms and a short letter saying that "you are good people, but the work does not suit me because it is too busy and I cannot find peace of mind". Previously, when we asked her every day how her work was, she did not indicate any problems. The situation was particularly difficult for us because we found the letter late in the evening and we had to urgently organize childcare for the next day, as it was the holidays and the school was closed. Later, I met this girl many times in church, we said "good morning" and smiled at each other. The interview I later conducted with her revealed that she had experienced a lot of traumatic events as a child, including war, the death of loved ones, the loss of her home, and physical and psychological abuse at the hands of her

Egyptian employers. I'm assuming that her fear of coming forward with her objections and the way she resigned from her job were reactions learned from previous experiences.

## **1.2. Theoretical concepts**

In the context of this work, it is crucial to indicate the functions of churches in the integration of migrants, which have been indicated in the literature on the subject. Sophie Watson notes that "Christian churches in multicultural communities play the role of 'mixing' people and traditions from different cultural circles. Cultural practices performed in the church, which are based on traditional religious symbols and practices from the country of origin, may be reinterpreted, , invented, re-invented and reconfigured by migrants arriving in a new country in order to establish or stabilize identities and give them meanings in new, often uncertain, life." In turn, Ray Allen points out that religious institutions can play a bonding and/or bridging role in the integration of migrants. The binding role is to affirm national or ethnic identity by enabling immigrants to practice familiar rituals and maintain transnational bonds. The bridging role is to conceptually and practically connect migrant communities with the wider society and its culture. Interestingly, in the context of this work, the author studied communities from the South Sudanese Azande and Acholi ethnic groups attending masses

in the city of Portland (USA). In the case of the Azandi, masses in their language played a binding role in the community. In turn, the Acholi were forced to integrate into the Portland community by not attending Mass in their own language, as well as by the local parish's support for their charity, ASERELA.

The theoretical framework of this work also includes concepts that are commonly (though often incorrectly) used in public debate. Such concepts include, first of all, migration understood as territorial movements related to a relatively permanent change of place of residence. It would seem obvious that every person participating in this process is a migrant. However, for practical reasons, UNHCR recommends making a distinction between refugees and migrants. A refugee is a person "who is outside his or her country of origin because of fear of persecution, because of conflict, violence or other circumstances seriously disturbing public order, which - as a result of the above - require "international protection." They are often in such a dangerous situation that they cross national borders in search of safety in neighboring countries; thus, they are recognized internationally as "refugees", people who are entitled to assistance from other countries, UNHCR and relevant organizations. They are considered refugees precisely because it is too dangerous for them to return home and therefore they need shelter elsewhere. These are people for whom the denial of asylum has potentially fatal consequences." In turn, a migrant is a person migrating for

reasons other than a refugee. Moreover, a refugee who has been granted asylum in a given country becomes an asylum seeker. In practice, however, asylum seekers are already called migrants or refugees who have submitted an application for asylum and, in connection with its examination, have the right to temporary stay in the territory of a given country.

Other important concepts are religious culture, lived religion, syncretism and inculturation. Religious culture, according to Kamila Baraniecka-Olszewska, is religious life in the form in which it is manifested in culture, including both religion in the sense of religion and the religious identity of the individual. According to Anna Niedźwiedź, lived religion consists of individual and collective religious practices and religion as experienced by individuals and collectively. Syncretism, according to Robert Schreiter, is "the blending of two religious systems to the point where at least one of them, if not both, loses its basic structure and identity". Inculturation, in turn, as defined by Elizabeth Ezenweke and Ikechukwu Kanu, is the incorporation of Christian life and message into a specific cultural context in a way in which this experience not only finds expression through elements specific to a given culture, but becomes a principle that animates, directs and connects cultures, transforming and processing them to give them a new shape.

## 2. South Sudan

### 2.1. History

South Sudan is the youngest country in the world. It gained independence only in 2011. The history of its statehood is inextricably linked with the colonization process, before which this area was only a place of residence for various unrelated ethnic groups, and with the history of Egypt and Sudan. The lack of solidarity and sense of community between these tribes is evidenced by the fact that, at least since the 17th century, from the territory of today's Southern Sudan, representatives of some tribes kidnapped people from others in order to sell them as slaves to Arab merchants.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, in the 19th century, this area was the site of numerous escapades by Europeans and Arabs to obtain game and ivory.<sup>2</sup> In turn, from the second half of the 1950s to the present, it has also been an area of regular fighting between various armies.

Riek Machar, the current vice president of South Sudan and a scholar of its history, argues that before the 1821 Turkish-Egyptian invasion, the territory in question consisted of small kingdoms and tribal organizations that bore no

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1J. Róžański, *Ludność Bahr el Ghazal i okolic – dawny rezerwurow niewolników*, p. 149-150, W: *Bilad-as-Sudan. Rodzime kultury a Islam*, red. Waldemar Cisło, Jarosław Róžański i Maciej Ząbek, Pelplin 2018.

2P. Woodward, *Towards Two Sudans*, W: *Survival* (00396338). Apr/May 2011, Vol. 53 Issue 2, p. 5.

resemblance to present-day states.<sup>3</sup> As the Ottoman Empire weakened throughout the 19th century and the ruling dynasty's foreign debt increased, Egypt gradually moved from the Turkish to the British sphere of influence. This process turned out to be beneficial for the inhabitants of southern Sudan, because from 1863, under the influence of British public opinion, the government of this country forced Egypt to introduce subsequent decrees limiting slavery.<sup>4</sup> However, it was repealed in 1884 when the northern Sudanese rebels of Mahdi took control of the area.<sup>5</sup> However, the Mahdists were not able to take over the entire territory of today's Southern Sudan, establish effective administration there, or even impose their religion and customs on the local population. In 1892 the southernmost regions of Equatoria and Mongalla were conquered by the Belgians, and in 1896-1897 most of present-day South Sudan. came under French occupation. In turn, in 1898 the so-called The Fashoda incident, i.e. the meeting of French and British troops in this town (today's Kodok). After a year of clashes, finally in 1899, France ceded southern Sudan to Great Britain. In turn, in 1910, the Belgians withdrew from Equatoria and Mongalla. In the years 1898-1947 South Sudan. It was a British colony separate from

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3R. Machar, South Sudan: A History of Political Domination - A Case of Self-Determination, University of Pennsylvania, no date (but it's clear that before 2011 r.), [https://www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/sd\\_machar.html](https://www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/sd_machar.html)

4J. Róžański op. cit., p. 153.

5Ibidem, p. 157.

Sudan. Its inhabitants had their own passports, and traveling between the two Sudans required special permission. The British established an administration in the area based partly on the colonial army and partly on local customs and tribal institutions. Between 1915 and 1920, the following laws were introduced: restriction of access of northern traders to the southern market, the creation in 1917 of an Ecuadorian corps composed of only southerners, the recognition in 1918 of Sunday as a day off from work in the south, the establishment in 1918 of English as the official language in the south.<sup>6</sup> Slavery was finally abolished in 1924.<sup>7</sup> Since 1928, the official languages of South Sudan, along with English, have been the languages of the Dinka, Nuer, Bari, Lotuko, Szylluk and Zande ethnic groups. Between 1943 and 1946, the British gradually transferred authority to the tribal elders.<sup>8</sup> They had, among others: the power to judge the people and collect taxes.<sup>9</sup>

The decision to merge the two colonies was made during a conference in Khartoum in 1946, attended by the British, Egyptians and northern Sudanese elites. In 1947, during a similar conference in Juba, it was communicated to the South

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6C. Sefa-Nyarko, Civil War in South Sudan: Is It a Reflection of Historical Secessionist and Natural Resource Wars in "Greater Sudan"?, W: AFRICAN SECURITY 2016, VOL. 9, NO. 3, p. 196.

7M. Elgot, Slavery in South Sudan, Humanitarian Aid Relief Foundation, 27.03.2020, <https://www.hart-uk.org/blog/slavery-in-south-sudan/>

8R. Machar, op. cit.

9M. Ząbek, Przemiany i historyczne konteksty prawa w Sudanie, W: Bilal-as-Sudan ..., p. 167.

Sudanese elites, who in exchange for losing their management competences received the right to fill 13 seats in the Parliamentary Assembly of Sudan.<sup>10</sup> When, consequently, in 1953, Egypt decided to grant independence (from 1956) to Sudan covering the territory of both former colonies, riots began in various provinces of the south, which over time turned into the so-called the first Sudanese war (1955-1972). During it, approximately 500,000 people died. people, and hundreds of thousands had to leave their places of residence. First of all, the people of the south did not agree to the introduction of Sharia law on their territory.<sup>11</sup> At that time, being mostly followers of traditional religions, they did not want to be forced to adopt Muslim beliefs and customs. Initially, however, ethnic groups from the south were not interested in independence, but only in maintaining the right to religious and moral freedom. The dominant parties in this part of the country: the Liberal Party and the Communist Party of Sudan, only supported the federalization of Sudan. It was not until 1961 that South Sudanese leaders in exile in other East African countries began to promote the idea of secession. In turn, in 1963, the Anya-nya guerrilla organization was established, which centralized the resistance against the north, modeling its activities on communist national liberation

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10R. Machar, *op. cit.*

11C. Townsend, "Lord Come to Our Aid": Islamisation, Civil War, and the Pastoral Letters of the Sudan Catholic Bishops' Conference, *W: Journal of Religious History*. Jun2020, Vol. 44 Issue 2, p. 170.

movements, among others. on the Algerian National Liberation Front.<sup>12</sup> The increase in separatist sentiments was a consequence of the increasing repression of the Sudanese regime after taking power in Khartoum in 1958 as a result of a coup d'état by General Ibrahim Abboud.<sup>13</sup> Under his rule, the northern armies carried out many massacres of civilians, resumed the slave trade (war prisoners), implemented the Islamization of the education system, and also made the distribution of food dependent on conversion to Islam.<sup>14</sup> However, the southerners also massacred the Arab civilian population living in their territory.<sup>15</sup> The economic crisis in Sudan since the late 1960s and the resulting mass strikes in the north of the country contributed to the end of the war in 1972. In order to calm the public mood, in May 1969, the army led by Colonel Gaafar Nimeiri carried out a coup d'état. The new authorities initially carried out an effective offensive on the rebel camps in October 1970, and then forced their Anya-nya leader, General Joseph Lagu, to enter into peace talks. Finally, in March 1972, both sides signed a peace

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12Y. Voller, The Second-Generation Liberation Movement in Southern Sudan: Anti-Colonialism as a Set of Practices, W: Civil Wars. Mar2019, Vol. 21 Issue 1, p. 63-69.

13G. Barker, Sudan, Australia 2008, p.5.

14R. Machar, op. cit.

15C. Sefa-Nyarko, op.cit. p. 199-200.

agreement in Addis Ababa.<sup>16</sup> It gave the South autonomy in managing economic affairs and public order.<sup>17</sup>

After 11 years of peace, in 1983 the south again declared war on the north. This time, the causes of its outbreak were more complex and had been growing over the years. Firstly, in 1976, radical Muslims carried out an assassination attempt on President Nimeiri, whom they accused of excessive tolerance for dissenters. In their opinion, the separate legal system in the south was a violation of the principle of Islamic supremacy in the life of the nation. Although it was thwarted, Nimeiri changed his political course for fear of its repetition, pushing for the Islamization of the southern legal order. Its final act was the introduction of Sharia law throughout the country in September 1983.<sup>18</sup> The immediate cause of the outbreak of the war was the rebellion of the military garrison in the town of Bor in the south against the regulation requiring flogging for drinking alcohol. The rebellion then gradually spread to the rest of the country.<sup>19</sup> Islamist laws on civil procedure, commerce, criminal law, procedural evidence, the judiciary, the promotion of virtue and the zakat tax also aroused outrage. However,

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16G. Barker, op. cit., p.6.

17C. Tounsel, "Lord Come to Our Aid": Islamisation, Civil War, and the Pastoral Letters of the Sudan Catholic Bishops' Conference, W: Journal of Religious History. Jun2020, Vol. 44 Issue 2, p. 170.

18Ibidem

19M. Ząbek op.cit., p. 174.

dissatisfaction among the south's largest ethnic group, the Dinka, had been growing since at least 1981, when Nimeiri dissolved the Southern Regional Assembly. At that time, it was not shared by other ethnic groups, disgusted by the scale of Dinka domination and corruption scandals involving them.<sup>20</sup>

The economic factor also led to the outbreak of the war. In 1978, oil deposits were discovered in the Bentiu region in the south.<sup>21</sup> The government in Khartoum wanted to derive full income from its extraction, and the southerners wanted as much of it as possible to remain at their disposal. In 1980, the Sudanese government separated the oil-rich areas from the state of Bentiu and created the state of Unity, which was ultimately to be included in the administration of the north. He also began to introduce new taxes in the south. In the hope of gaining access to oil deposits, China provided support to the Sudanese government, and the US and Israel supported the rebels.<sup>22</sup>

During the civil war, the south was represented by the Sudan People Liberation Army (SPLA), founded in 1983 by former Sudanese army colonel John Garang from the Dinka ethnic group.<sup>23</sup> The group's program assumed the transformation of Sudan into a socialist country.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>20</sup>Ibidem, p. 169-172.

<sup>21</sup>G. Barker, op. cit., p. 8.

<sup>22</sup>C. Sefa-Nyarko, op. cit., p. 199-200.

<sup>23</sup>Ibidem.

<sup>24</sup>C. Tounsel, op. cit. p. 170.

Additionally, Garang advocated the construction of a federal "New Sudan", in which minorities from the South, West (Darfur) and East would have the same voting rights as the majority from the center of Sudan. These groups were to form a coalition that would govern the country instead of the then government of Sudan.<sup>25</sup> Over time, however, the SPLA abandoned both of its basic assumptions. With the fall of the Mengistu regime in 1991, SPLA lost its main protector (Ethiopia) and gradually began to seek support in the Catholic Church, whose role in ending the war will be described later in this work. This meant the need to abandon socialism in favor of Catholic social teaching.<sup>26</sup> In turn, the idea of federalism was abandoned in favor of independence after Garang's death in a plane crash in 2005. At the same time, Garang tried to maintain appropriate parity between all ethnic groups in the south, especially the two largest: Dinka and Nuer. However, the rivalry between them was so strong that during the war there were conflicts ending with massacres of one group against the other, and some of the Nuer collaborated with the north.<sup>27</sup>

The civil war lasted for years, despite changes in power in Khartoum. Even though Nimeiri was overthrown in 1985

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25P. Woodward, op. cit. p. 8.

26C. Tounsel, op. cit., p. 169.

27Toward visible future of South Sudan, International Crisis Group, Raport nr 300, Džuba/Nairobi/Bruksela, 10.02.2021 <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/south-sudan/300-toward-viable-future-south-sudan>

and political pluralism and religious freedom were restored in Sudan <sup>28</sup>, the north and south did not reach an agreement. Then, in 1989, as a result of another coup, Omar al-Bashir took power and the country returned to the policy of radical Islamization, which paradoxically led to the victory of the south in the long run. In 1992, al-Bashir's government sheltered the Saudi terrorist Osama bin Laden and his subordinates from the al-Qaeda organization<sup>29</sup>, which attracted international attention. As a result, in the 1990s, the country was subject to US, EU and UN sanctions, and in 1998, chemical plants on its territory were bombed by American planes. American sanctions were further tightened after the famous al-Qaeda attack on the World Trade Center skyscrapers in New York on September 11, 2001.<sup>30</sup>

The policy of the administration of US President George W. Bush played a key role in bringing about the end of the Second Sudanese War. In response to the expectations of his voters living in American states known as the "Bible Belt", Bush added a component of protecting Christians from the south to the current policy of sanctioning Sudan for supporting terrorism.<sup>31</sup> US diplomatic efforts have proven fruitful. In July 2002, the first meeting between al-Bashir and Garang took

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28M. Ząbek, *op. cit.* p. 175-176.

29G. Barker, *op. cit.* p. 9.

30Ibidem.

31H. Cohen, Sudan: American Policy toward the Land of Endless Conflict, *W: American Foreign Policy Interests*, 34:322–328, 2012, p. 324.

place, during which they signed the so-called the Machakos Protocol excluding the south of the country from the jurisdiction of Sharia law.<sup>32</sup> In 2004 in Kenya, the Sudanese government and southern rebels announced a ceasefire.<sup>33</sup> In turn, on January 9, 2005, the government of Sudan and the rebels from the south signed the so-called The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) assumed the conclusion of peace, the sharing of profits from the sale of oil and the holding of a referendum in 2011 on the independence of the south.<sup>34</sup> A provisional constitution was established, the south was granted autonomy, and Garang became vice president of Sudan. In addition to the United States, the United Kingdom, the African Union and Norway also contributed significantly to the CPA.<sup>35</sup> At the same time, it should be emphasized that as a result of the Second Sudanese War, approximately 2 million people died and 4 million were displaced.<sup>36</sup>

A tragic event for Southern Sudan. was the death of John Garang in a plane crash on July 30, 2005. This politician was able to minimize animosities between ethnic groups and had charisma that united the southern political elites around him. Some researchers claim that if not for his death, the country could have avoided the subsequent civil war that

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32G. Barker, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

33M. Zqbek, *op. cit.*, p. 182-183.

34G. Barker, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

35C. Sefa-Nyarko, *op. cit.*, p. 188.

36J. Dean, *Brother vs brother*, W: World (0888157X). 2/8/2014, Vol. 29 Issue 3, p. 50.

broke out in 2013.<sup>37</sup> However, it undoubtedly made it impossible to implement the concept of building a federal Sudan. Without Garang, the only option to ensure southerners' agency was independence. To this day, at least four conspiracy theories have their supporters, according to which his death was not the result of a disaster but an attack. The first one assumes that the client was the later president of Southern Sudan. Salva Kiir, who wanted to take power in the SPLA and take revenge on Garang for expelling him from the party as a result of a leadership dispute just before the signing of the CPA.<sup>38</sup> The second theory is that the Sudanese authorities were behind the attack and wanted the south to plunge into chaos and fighting between ethnic groups, which would serve the interests of the north without having to fight the south.<sup>39</sup> According to the third version, which does not exclude the first version, the attack was carried out by supporters of the secession of Southern Sudan. Garang was skeptical about independence. He argued that, first of all, it was necessary to rebuild the south economically and ensure democracy and lasting peace there. He considered it secondary whether it would be within Sudan or an independent state. The fourth version says that Garang was

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37C. Sefa-Nyarko, op. cit., p. 201.

38J. Deng, Who Killed Hero Dr John Garang?, South Sudan News Agency, 10.03.2014, <https://ssnanews.com/index.php/2014/03/10/who-killed-dr-john-garang/>

39T. Abdul-Rahemm, Killing of John Garang: Who did it?, Pambazuka News, 28.06.2007, <https://www.pambazuka.org/food-health/killing-john-garang-who-did-it>

killed by the US or British secret services. These countries allegedly wanted to create South Sudan as their new colony supplying them with oil.<sup>40</sup> The disadvantage of this theory, however, is that the country does not currently play the role that the above-mentioned countries allegedly assigned to it.

Between 2006 and 2011, the Sudanese government did nothing to convince southerners to vote to remain part of Sudan - no infrastructure investments, education and health care development programs, etc. It only gave southern politicians positions in the government forced by the CPA. Therefore, in the referendum in January 2011, as many as 99% of southern residents voted for secession.<sup>41</sup> Then on July 9, 2011, South Sudan officially gained independence, becoming the youngest country in the world. At the same time, the loss of the south caused a recession in Sudan. In 2011, the country's GDP decreased by 10%, trade by 75%, budget revenues by 50%, territory by 1/3 and population by 25%.<sup>42</sup>

Secession freed South Sudan from forced Islamization. However, it did not end the dispute with Sudan and created new problems in this field. The first of these was the mass resettlement and social degradation of people of South

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40P. Wël, Who killed dr John Garang, Džuba 2015.

41H. Cohen, op. cit., p. 326.

42L. Freeman, Sudan at the Crossroads: Sanctions Are Killing Off Africa's Breadbasket, W: Executive Intelligence Review. 7/11/2014, Vol. 41 Issue 27, p. 36.

Sudanese origin living in Sudan. In 2012, the presidents of both countries signed an agreement on 4 freedoms. On its basis, the southerners were given two months to leave Sudan. After that time, they lost their property and their civil rights in this country. Between 500,000 and 700,000 people were affected by these decisions.<sup>43</sup> Both countries, despite mediation by the African Union, have not reached an agreement on the 2,010 km border line. The border dispute concerns, among others: the oil-rich Abyei region. The South Sudanese Dinka ethnic group and the Misssareya nomads from northern Sudan live in this territory. In 2005, there was an idea to hold a separate referendum for this region, but after Southern Sudan gained independence, the government in Khartoum withdrew from it. The affiliation of the Panthou/Heglih region (other names in the south and north), located on the border of the states of Unity (South Sudan) and South Kordofan (Sudan), is also controversial. There are also oil deposits in this area. In 2012, it was briefly occupied by the South Sudanese army, but due to Sudan blocking food imports, it had to withdraw. However, the dispute has not been legally resolved to this day.<sup>44</sup>

The division of profits from the oil trade remains a contentious issue between the two countries. In 2012, they

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43S. Bantayehu, Sudan and South Sudan: an unamicable political divorce, In: Global chance, peace & sceurity 2021, VOL. 33, NO. 1, p. 70.

44S. Bantayehu, op.cit. p. 63-65.

signed a ten-year contract for the supply of this raw material via a gas pipeline from south to north and further to Port Sudan, where it is refined and packed onto ships. However, the issue of payment for its transit has not been regulated. During the peace process negotiations, Sudan wanted co-management and joint benefiting from oil exports on a 50/50 basis. However, South Sudan it preferred to have full ownership of its resources and pay Sudan for transit at international rates. However, Sudan paid as much as it saw fit. Therefore, over the last decade, South Sudan has been sent invoices to Sudan asking for higher rates for the raw material than what Sudan was paying. In return, Sudan temporarily closed the oil pipeline, which affected the economies of both countries. Ultimately, however, in 2016 and 2019, the countries successfully renegotiated the terms of the agreement, adapting it to the situation on global markets.<sup>45</sup>

After regaining independence, South Sudan was plunged into internal conflicts. In October 2011 alone, ethnic conflicts occurred in 7 of the country's 10 states, mainly caused by the lack of national regulations on property rights (cattle, land, etc.).<sup>46</sup> Initially, local disputes were resolved ad hoc and did not escalate. This was because local warlords were given positions in the army that obliged them to be loyal to

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<sup>45</sup>Ibidem, p. 66-69.

<sup>46</sup>C. Sefa-Nyarko, op. cit., p.202.

the government. The process of buying their loyalty had been ongoing since the signing of the CPA in 2005 and was financed by profits from oil sales and misappropriated development aid funds. Between 2005 and 2011, the number of paid soldiers in the south increased from 40,000 to 300,000, salaries doubled, the number of generals from 60 to 745 and it is estimated that the political elites embezzled approximately USD 4 billion.<sup>47</sup> However, when oil prices on world markets began to decline in 2012, the newly established state began to run out of money to continue "buying" peace. The inevitable reduction in employment in the army led to conflicts between the Dinka population and other ethnic groups. Vice-President Riek Machar, from the Nuer ethnic group, tried to represent the latter. He openly accused President Salva Kiir of corruption, strong-arm rule and lack of democracy. Other countries in the Horn of Africa tried in vain to stop the growing conflict.<sup>48</sup> Ultimately, in March 2013, Kiir decided to dismiss Machar. For the next half a year, both leaders fought for influence in the SPLA. Finally, on December 15, during the party's electoral congress, a shooting took place between the

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47I. Back, IGAD, Sudan, and South Sudan: Achievements and setbacks of regional mediation, In: THE JOURNAL OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA 2016, VOL. 7, NO. 2, s. 149.  
48Ibidem, p. 150.

bodyguards of both leaders, which was the symbolic beginning of the civil war.<sup>49</sup>

The most important parties in the civil war were the government and SPLA party forces, composed mainly of Dinka, and the paramilitary organization founded by Machar called the Sudan People's Liberation Army in Opposition (SPLA-IO), composed mainly of Nuer. In addition, various more or less formal militias of ethnic groups were established in individual regions, taking turns fighting and cooperating with the two main parties to the conflict. The government side was supported by Uganda and Ethiopia, and the SPLA-IO was supported by Sudan and Kenya.<sup>50</sup> The most serious clashes took place between 2013 and 2018. About 400,000 people died.<sup>51</sup> In addition, there are 200,000 internally displaced persons in South Sudan alone, whose camps are protected by Kenyan, Rwandan and Ethiopian troops. More than 3 million South Sudanese have fled to Sudan, 2 million to Uganda, and 500,000 each to Kenya and Ethiopia.<sup>52</sup>

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49Toward visible future of South Sudan, International Crisis Group, Raport no. 300, Ju-ba/Nairobi/Brussels, 10.02.2021 <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/south-sudan/300-toward-viable-future-south-sudan>

50J. Young, A Fractious Rebellion: Inside the SPLM-IO, Geneve 2015, p. 53-55.

51Toward visible future ...

52E. Kibii, South Sudan: Rebels Seek to Remove President Kiir From Power as Country Marks 10 Years of Self-Rule, The Elephant, 23.07.2021 <https://www.theelephant.info/features/2021/07/23/south-sudan-rebels-seek-to-remove-president-kiir-from-power-as-country-marks-10-years-of-self-rule/>

Other countries in the Horn of Africa and the international community are involved in achieving peace between the main parties to the conflict. In 2015, the IGAD-plus initiative was established, composed of the countries of the regional economic organization IGAD (countries of the Horn of Africa) and the African Union, the UN, the European Union, China, the USA and Norway.<sup>53</sup> Moreover, in order to force peace, many donors withdrew development aid for Southern Sudan, limiting its activity to only humanitarian aid.<sup>54</sup>

The efforts of the international community resulted in the initiation of peace talks in 2017 and the conclusion of an agreement in Addis Ababa in 2018, on the basis of which Kiir and Machar were to create a government of national unity. Ultimately, such a government was formed only in February 2020, parliamentary elections were held in 2024, and presidential elections are scheduled for 2026.<sup>55</sup> However, in its individual regions, fighting between ethnic groups formed during the war and government forces is still ongoing. Their detailed description will be made in the next section.

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53I. Back, *op. cit.*, p. 151.

54L. de Vries, *South Sudan's Civil War Will Not End with a Peace Deal*, In: *Peace Review*. Jul-Sep2017, Vol. 29 Issue 3, p. 335.

55Toward visible future ...

## **2.2. Ethnic divisions**

The information about individual ethnic groups contained in this subchapter is my report from books, scientific articles and Internet sources provided in the footnotes. The dominance of online sources of varying quality results from the small number of available scientific publications regarding the studied communities.

South Sudan is a country with very large ethnic diversity. According to Róžański, in his area there are "approx. 200 peoples, distinguished on the basis of linguistic differences. They are divided into three basic groups: Nilotes (including Dinka and Nuer), Nilo-Hamites and Sudanese (Nigerian) peoples."<sup>56</sup> The inhabitants of the country commonly claim that there are 64 tribes living in the country (they use the English word "tribe"). The Joshua Project website, which collects information on the degree of Christianization of peoples in various parts of the world, distinguishes 77 ethnic groups. However, in his classification, for example, the Dinka "tribe" is divided into 5 groups depending on the territory inhabited by a given group. 27 ethnic groups have less than 10,000 people. representatives, and 25 ethnic groups less than 100 thousand. The largest group is the Dinka, whose total number in the country is 3.8 million compared to 11.4 million of the country's total

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<sup>56</sup>J. Róžański, *op. cit.* p. 137.

population. The second largest ethnic group is the Nuer, numbering 1.4 million. 900 thousand people belong to the Azandi "tribe", 700 thousand to Bari, 500 thousand to Shilluk. In South Sudan There are also 570,000 people living there. people of Arab origin. The Acholi ethnic group is also worth mentioning, although it is not numerous in Southern Sudan itself. (81 thousand) has a large representation abroad (2 million), mainly in Uganda. Smaller groups such as the Murle (181,000) and Mundari (60,000) also play an important role in tribal competition.<sup>57</sup>



Map no 1: places of occurrence of individual ethnic groups of Southern Sudan. source: [http://www.101lasttribes.com/countries/south\\_sudan\\_map.html](http://www.101lasttribes.com/countries/south_sudan_map.html), 22.01.2022

<sup>57</sup>Portal Joshua Project, 21.12.2021., <https://m.joshuaproject.net/countries/OD#peoplegroups>

Each ethnic group has its own language. The languages of neighboring groups are usually similar and mutually understandable, e.g. the Dinka and Nuer languages. However, the languages of groups living in other parts of the country are so distant that they must use Arabic or English to communicate with each other. In the past, each group had its own beliefs, some of which have disappeared to this day, while others have survived. As shown in Map No. 1, the greatest ethnic diversity occurs in the south of the country, in the areas bordering Kenya, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. There is also considerable ethnic diversity in the north-west of the country, near the border with Sudan and the Central African Republic. For many people in Southern Sudan, especially those living in rural areas, ethnic identity is more important than belonging to a nation or state. When talking about their identity, the people I talked to during my research in Cairo always indicated what "tribe" they came from. Most of my interlocutors were people from the Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk, Bari, Azandi and Acholi "tribes", the largest ethnic groups in the country. Most of my interlocutors were negatively critical of the Dinka ethnic group, accusing them of wanting to dominate the country. Some Dinka admitted that they were right, distancing themselves from their "tribe".

The only tribe living throughout the country is the Dinka. It is a Nilotic tribe. Apart from South Sudan they also live in the area of South Kordofan state in Sudan. They appeared in

the territory of today's Southern Sudan. approx. 3000 BC  
Their language, also called Dinka, is divided into 5 dialects: Rek, Ngok, Agaar, Twic Mayardit and Bor. They use the Latin alphabet. They are considered to be among the tallest people in the world, with an average height of 183 cm. Their main occupation is animal breeding, and having a large number of cows is a source of pride for them. They also engage in farming. Dinka living in rural areas often decorate their faces by scarification. An inherent element of their culture is dancing and singing, used in various rituals.<sup>58</sup>



Photo No. 1: Duper, a man of Dinka ethnic group, from a private photo shared by the person being photographed

Photo No. 2: Deng, a Dinka ethnic man, cousin of Duper. Source: Private photo shared by the person being photographed

The second largest tribe, the Nuer, is also a Nilotic people, related to the Dinka. They live mainly in the northern part of South Sudan. They are known for their individualism,

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<sup>58</sup>Dinka Tribe: History and Culture, Only Tribal, 08.05.2017, <https://www.onlytribal.com/dinka-tribe-history-and-culture.asp>

egalitarian philosophy of life and a developed system of customary law regulating the functioning of the tribe. Like the Dinka, they breed cattle, and the number of cows they have determines the social status of individuals. The roles of women and men in the tribe are clearly separated. Men are breeders and warriors, and women take care of the house and children. However, important decisions regarding community life must be consulted by tribal elders with women. Marriage and having as many children as possible are considered to be the main goals of life for men and women. At the same time, most marriages are concluded with representatives of other tribes living in the neighborhood (Dinka, Shilluk), which are related to the Nuer. Mixed marriages are probably intended to increase the size of the tribe. Elders are democratically elected within each village. An important aspect of the tribe's culture is the obligation to be mutually hospitable and generous. In the 20th century, this people were the subject of detailed research by the famous British anthropologist Edward Evans-Pritchard.<sup>59</sup>

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59E. Evans-Pritchard, *The modes of livelihood and political institutions of Nilotic people*, Oxford 1940



Photo No 3: Nyamale, a woman from the Nuer ethnic group. Source: Private photo shared by the photographer

Photo No. 4: Simon, a man from the Nuer ethnic group. Source: private photo shared by the person photographed

The Azande are a tribe living in the southwestern part of the country near the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo. They arrived in the currently occupied territories before colonial times. At that time, they had their own kingdom, which was located in what is now Southern Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic. These people have been hunting for many centuries, and now they are mainly engaged in agriculture. An important element of their culture is subordination to older people, one of the manifestations of which is the arrangement of marriages by the parents of the future bride and groom.<sup>60</sup>

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60E. Akuel Ajou Ajou, N. Juma, Origin, culture, pride and the practice of Azande people, Juba Monitor, 21.08.2020, <https://www.jubamonitor.com/origin-culture-pride-and-the-practice-of-azande-people/>



Photo No. 5: Women from the Azande ethnic group,  
source:

<https://www.facebook.com/Zandekingdom/photos/pcb.1888162544657428/1888162451324104/> 29.12.2021

The Bari tribe lives in the southern state of Equatoria, near the capital city of Juba. They speak the Bari language, which shares a vocabulary with the languages of smaller tribes living in the same region. For this reason, Ecuatorian tribes are able to communicate with each other without major problems. The tribal aristocracy is engaged in cattle breeding. The rest are engaged in hunting, crafts or fishing. The tribe is divided into clans ruled by chiefs. Marriages are often arranged to seal friendship between families. It is very important for a woman to maintain her virginity until the wedding day. If a girl becomes pregnant, the man responsible must marry her. For Bari, it is important to determine the cause of someone's death. If, for example, a married woman dies at a young age without suffering from any previous

disease, it is generally accepted that she must have been ill-treated by her husband. Her relatives then have the right to beat him or destroy his property. However, his parents are forced to pay compensation to his wife's parents. At the same time, in case of any death of his wife, the husband must compulsorily undergo one or two years of mourning before remarrying. Also, in the event of the death of her husband, a woman must undergo a mandatory one or two-year mourning period before remarriage. An important aspect of culture is that young people show respect for older people of both sexes. The tribe has a rich tradition of oral traditions, songs and poems. The tribe often falls victim to raids by the Dinka and Mundari, whose aim is to steal cattle.<sup>61</sup>



Photo No. 6: Women from the Bari ethnic group,

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61D. Lokosang, Get to know the Bari people, The Equatorial Community and Welfare Association (ECWA), 21.12.2021. <https://ecwa.org.au/about-us/our-culture/get-to-know-the-bari-people/> 29.12.2021

source:

<https://i.pinimg.com/originals/22/d0/5a/22d05a7f20a3aad2510da6884f11429d.jpg> 29.12.2021

The Shilluks live in the north-east of the country, between the border with Sudan and the territory of the Nuer, with whom they maintain good relations. They are a Nilotic people engaged in agriculture and animal breeding. Their language is called Dhok Chollo and belongs to the Nilo-Saharan group of languages. According to legend, the tribe was founded by a certain Nyikang, who decided to separate it from the larger Luo tribe, which lived in the area between today's Sudan and South Sudan. The reason for the separation was a conflict with relatives. The tribe has a leader whose title is radh. The Shilluks believe that each radh is an incarnation of Nyikang, who was the first radh and reigned from 1537 to 1567. Each successive radh is elected for a lifetime term by the village heads, who are later subordinated to him. In the 18th century, the Shilluks controlled the territory as far as Khartoum, but were driven from there by the Egyptian-Turkish troops of Mohammed Ali. There is no arranged marriage in the Shilluk tradition. The initiative in this respect comes from lovers who then have to obtain the approval of their parents. Incest is prohibited. Divorces are very rare. Their implementation requires serious reasons, and

the divorcee's family must return the dowry she gave to her ex-husband's family (usually 10-30 cows).<sup>62</sup>



Photo No. 7: Bakhita, a woman from the Shilluk ethnic group, source: private photo shared by the person photographed

Most representatives of the Acholi tribe live in northern Uganda, but some also live in Southern Sudan. near the border with Uganda. The tribe's original place of residence was Southern Sudan, but it has been migrating to Uganda for at least 400 years. The tribe speaks its own language called Acholi and, like the Shilluks in the past, separated from the Luo tribe. It is ruled by hereditary village chiefs. In colonial times, many of them served in the British army, for which they were later persecuted in Uganda in the 1970s.<sup>63</sup>

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62SHILLUK (COLLO) PEOPLE: ANCIENT NILOTIC WARRIOR PEOPLE OF UPPER NILE IN SOUTH SUDAN, Blog Kwekudee tripdowmemorylane, 13.07.2013 <https://kwekudee-tripdownmemorylane.blogspot.com/2013/08/shilluk-collo-people-ancient-nilotic.html>

63 Acholi in Britanica, 21.12.2021, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Acholi>



Photo No. 8: Peter, a man of the Acholi ethnic group, source: Private photo shared by the person being photographed

Photo No. 9: Betty, an Acholi woman Source: private photo provided by the subject

The Murle are a small tribe living in Jonglei State. It is known primarily for the fact that it has been fighting over cattle with the Nuer tribe for centuries. This conflict may lead to the extinction of the Murle tribe in the future. Of similar importance is the nomadic Mundari tribe, which is engaged solely in cattle breeding and competes in this respect with the Dinka and Bari.<sup>64</sup>

### **2.3. Religious and political divisions**

The dominant religion in Southern Sudan. is Christianity. It is practiced by 56.7% of the population. More than half of this group are Catholics, 15% Anglicans, 25%

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64B. Feron, A-F.Tasnier, Mundari – cattle culture of South Sudan, In: Africa Geographic Stories, 28.04.2021, <https://africageographic.com/stories/the-mundari-of-south-sudan/>

members of other Protestant churches and less than 5% people declaring Christianity without belonging to any church. 34.7% of South Sudanese citizens profess traditional religions, and 8.5% follow Islam. The more numerous a tribe is, the more Christianized it is. Among the Dinka and Azandi, Christians constitute 80%, and among the Bari as much as 95%. However, Christianity is inferior to traditional religions among the Nuer (20% against 70%) and Shilluk (40% against 55%). Among ethnic groups whose population is between 30,000 and 500,000. there are both those dominated by Christianity and traditional religions. Among the smallest groups (over 30,000), traditional religions dominate, followed by Islam, which, for obvious reasons, is also the religion of Arabs living in the country.<sup>65</sup>

The nature of the relationship between Christians and Muslims is described most fully by Maciej Kurcz in his book on the capital of South Sudan, Juba.. As he observes, mosques and churches are in other parts of the city. Muslims and Christians tolerate each other, although there is some unspoken animosity between them. During the Second Sudanese War, Christians boycotted Muslim stores. However, over time, Muslim merchants specialized in selling hard-to-find goods and began to offer lower prices, thus breaking the boycott. Currently, Muslims ostentatiously work on Sunday,

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<sup>65</sup>Portal Joshua Project ...

and Christians do major shopping on Friday. ”<sup>66</sup> It also happens that Arabs providing services address their clients in Arabic, and they ostentatiously respond in English.<sup>67</sup> Professing Islam, however, does not exclude occupying a high position in the social hierarchy, as evidenced by the fact that in 2011-2013 and 2018-2019, the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Sudan. was a Muslim, Nhial Deng Nhial, from the Dinka group. However, after 2005, those mosques in the country that were most involved in the forced Islamization of the southern population in the past were closed.<sup>68</sup>

In turn, relations between Christians and followers of traditional religions are considered friendly. One reason is that their followers fought together during the Sudanese Wars against Muslims. Mutual symbiosis between these religions is also favored by the fact that many traditional beliefs are monotheistic in nature. As part of the interviews I conducted with migrants from South Sudan. living in Egypt (section 4.5), it was difficult for me to obtain accurate information about traditional religions. If someone mentioned them, they often said that it was faith in God but practiced differently, and that the followers of these religions often combined them with the

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66M. Kurcz, *Urban Now. A Human in a face of Borderlineness and Urbanisation in Juba, South Sudan*, Berlin 2021, p. 88.

67Ibidem, p.93.

68B. Willow, *The “Civilizational Project” and the southern Sudanese Islamists: between assimilation and exclusion*, In: *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 2021, VOL. 15, NO. 2, p. 228.

practice of Christianity without seeing any contradiction in it. The names of the gods in local languages simply mean the word "God", and the tenets of the faith often allow it to synchronize seamlessly with Christianity.

Political divisions in South Sudan. in fact, they are a somewhat complex version of ethnic and partly religious divisions. Political parties are, in fact, organizations seeking, through political or military combat, the greatest possible influence for the communities they represent. They do not argue about the vision of the state or convince voters with activities in the field of education or social policy, because these areas, instead of the government, are carried out by UN agencies, non-governmental organizations and religious associations. As Jędrzej Czerep points out, this trend developed during the SPLA's dominance, in line with John Garang's approach that if the world wants to help, it should take advantage of it and give up areas that they are willing to take over."<sup>69</sup>

The basic dividing line is the issue of attitude towards the Dinka domination over other ethnic groups. This problem existed long before independence. For this reason, among others, the commander of the Anya Nya movement and the governor of the South Sudanese autonomy in the years 1972-

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69J. Czerep, , Sudan i Sudan Południowy. Jedna czy dwie kultury polityczne?, PHD Thesis on The Department of the History and Social Sciences at The Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw, 2018, p. 215.

1982, Joseph Lagu, from the Madi ethnic group, convinced the Sudanese authorities to divide the south into three regions designed in such a way that none of them had Dinka advantage over the rest of the ethnic groups.<sup>70</sup> During the civil war of 1983-2005, Garang took care to maintain appropriate parity between ethnic groups, which, as previously mentioned, was maintained until 2011. After gaining independence, President Salva Kiir and his SPLA party became the full representatives of Dinka interests. The counterweight to this group is the SPLA-IO led by Riek Machar, which fought against the government in 2013-2018 and has been co-forming it since 2020. SPLA-IO consists mainly of Nuer people, although Machar tries to include representatives of other ethnic groups. At the outbreak of the civil war in 2013, the leaders of this group included 5 Nuer, 3 Mundari, 1 Bari, 1 Dinka, 1 Shilluk and Machar's wife, who is British.<sup>71</sup> Machar also held numerous meetings abroad (in Nairobi and Kampala) with the leaders of the "Ecuatorian tribes" (Bari, Madi, Mundari) to convince them to cooperate.<sup>72</sup> The effects of his actions were moderate and at the same time caused dissatisfaction among the Nuer. Some of them even decided to cooperate with the SPLA.

In addition to the Dinka and Nuer, the Shilluks are also involved in the dispute over government positions. Among

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70A. De Juan, *Devolving Ethnic Conflicts: The Role of Subgroup Identities for Institutional Intergroup Settlements*, In: *Civil Wars*. Mar2013, Vol. 15 Issue 1, p. 90.

71J. Young, *A Fractious Rebellion: Inside the SPLM-IO*, Geneve 2015, p. 22.

72Ibidem, p. 30.

these three ethnic groups, there are the largest number of people with secondary and higher education.<sup>73</sup> The Shilluks have their own militias called Agwe-lek fighting against the government in the Malakal region. Their commander is General Johnson Olony.<sup>74</sup>

In South Sudan There are also political parties that openly represent Sudan's interests and are intended to defend the rights of South Sudanese Muslims. These are the People's Congress Party and the National Congress Party, which are branches of groups with the same names operating in Sudan.<sup>75</sup> In 2012, the latter group even entered the South Sudanese government, as President Kiir wanted to improve his relations with his northern neighbor.<sup>76</sup> But often Arab businessmen do not trust politicians representing the interests of the north. They feel that their activities interfere with their ability to run a business. This is all the more so because when there is tension between the north and the south, there are pogroms against Muslims, who are not protected in any way by Sudan.<sup>77</sup>

In the state of Ecuatoria, a guerrilla group called the National Salvation Front (NaS) operates in rural areas.<sup>78</sup> It brings together representatives of various Ecuatorian ethnic

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73M. Kurcz, op. cit., p. 199-200.

74Toward visible future ...

75B. Willow, op. cit., p. 228.

76J. Young, op. cit., p. 15.

77M. Kurcz, op. cit., p. 222.

78National Salvation Front website, <https://www.nassouthsudan.com/>

groups, and its commander is General Thomas Cirillo from the Bari ethnic group. In 2020, in the Vatican, NaS signed a cease-fire agreement with the government.<sup>79</sup>

There are also smaller paramilitary groups operating in different parts of the country, fighting against the government and often against each other. These are the South Sudan Democratic Alliance, the South Sudan United Front, the South Sudan Opposition Alliance. Interestingly, there was also an anti-government Dinka militia in the country called SPLA-IO Denga Gaia (formerly associated with Machar). As of 2020, these organisations are the main perpetrators of politically motivated armed actions in the country.<sup>80</sup>

The ethnic, religious and political divisions mentioned in the previous paragraphs are most pronounced in rural areas, where the majority of the population lives. However, in Southern Sudan there is also a division into urban and rural populations, which differ in terms of their religion, customs and attachment to ethnicity. Over the last 30 years, traditional beliefs in cities have been almost completely replaced by Christianity, which is associated with the Western way of life.<sup>81</sup> Despite historical events, the urban population is also forced to

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<sup>79</sup>Toward visible future ...

<sup>80</sup>D. Watson, Last Man Standing: An Analysis of South Sudan's elongated peace process, Acleddata.com, 08.11.2019, <https://acleddata.com/2019/11/08/last-man-standing-an-analysis-of-south-sudans-elongated-peace-process/>

<sup>81</sup>M. Kurcz, op. cit., p. 219.

interact more with Arabs and other Muslims who play an important role in the trade and services sector. What is even more important, ethnic divisions in cities are being replaced by other networks of dependencies. This is because cities, as Maciej Kurcz wrote in the context of Juba, are places of mass migration of rural people from various ethnic groups, who can count on only very modest support from their relatives in their area.<sup>82</sup> At the same time, bonds of friendship, solidarity and intimate relationships are established in schools and churches across ethnic lines. Similarly, in neighborly relations, especially between entrepreneurial women, where education and social status play a greater role than ethnicity.<sup>83</sup>

## **2.4. Economy and natural resources**

More than half a century of armed conflicts have prevented Southern Sudan from building a modern free market economy. According to the logic of the war economy, the guerrillas controlling the described area (Anyanya, then SPLA) gathered resources to carry out military actions and weaken the enemy, without taking any action to develop the well-being of the inhabitants. Many of their activities led to the impoverishment of the local community and the devastation of the economy, such as the destruction of road and gas infrastructure or the displacement of the local

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<sup>82</sup>Ibidem, p. 53.

<sup>83</sup>Ibidem, p. 176.

population, leading to a decrease in the area of arable land.<sup>84</sup> Moreover, in the 1980s the SPLA introduced restrictions on private trade, which were lifted in 1991 when the entire sector was dominated by its members.<sup>85</sup>

In the years 2005-2011, the military elites were unable to take advantage of the prosperity on the oil market and foreign investments to create the foundations for building the economy of the future state. An example of the waste of funds allocated by donors is the issue of creating a unified state army. In the years 2006-2010, the USA allocated between USD 150 and 300 million for this purpose.. However, instead of creating an arms industry or centralizing and professionalizing military structures, the government allocated these funds to high salaries and privileges for local warlords and their families, as well as maintaining an excessive number of positions in the army.<sup>86</sup> The consumption of state revenues by the army, despite the decline in oil prices on world markets in 2011, led to an economic crisis, which was manifested, among others, by hyperinflation lasting until 2017. At its peak in 2015, it reached as much as 549%.<sup>87</sup> However, before the government began reducing military

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84T. Edward, *Moving Towards Market: Cash, commodification and conflict in South Sudan*, Londyn 2019, p. 66.

85Ibidem, p. 53.

86J. Craze, *The politics of numbers, On Security Sector Reform in South Sudan, 2005-2020*, Akobo (Sudan Pd.) p London School of Economics Report, London 2021, p. 28-30.

87T. Edward, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

spending, it first stopped paying teachers in rural schools, which led to the closure of many of them.<sup>88</sup> Despite these experiences, the government of South Sudan still allocates approximately 45% of the state budget and 13.8% of GDP to military spending.<sup>89</sup> In order to understand how great a waste of public funds this is, it is worth recalling that NATO member states struggling with external threats from Russia and international terrorist organizations are obliged to allocate 2% of GDP for this purpose.

The painful economic process that took place in Southern Sudan. in recent years, as a result of the civil war, there has been a transformation from household food self-sufficiency to their dependence on the market system. In 2014, most citizens produced food for their own needs, and a minority bought it. In 2019, these proportions reversed, constituting the culmination of the approximately 150-year-long process of losing food independence in the territory in question. In the 19th century, farms produced enough grain to feed the entire population of the country and also meet the needs of the north of Sudan (as part of forced supplies). In the first half of the 20th century, the country sometimes imported some grain, and sometimes had a surplus. However, there were periods of famine resulting from the colonizers'

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88A. Diing et. al., *South Sudan: Youth, violence and livelihoods*, Rift Valley Institute, London 2021, p. 20.

89K. Madut, *Militarism and Political Conformism in Sudan and South Sudan*, In: *Peace Review*. Jan-Mar2020, Vol. 32 Issue 1, p. 65-66.

policy, the worst of which occurred in 1941-1942, when grain from Equatoria was forcibly exported to feed British soldiers on the fronts of World War II. Colonists usually solved this problem by buying grain from merchants in northern Sudan and distributing it to starving southerners. Back to the '70s. South Sudan has mostly had small surpluses in grain production. Now the government is forced to import grain from Sudan and Uganda. This is due to the fact that displaced families are forced to abandon their small-acre farms and seek employment in the city or on large-acre farms as farm workers. As a result, the percentage of households at risk of hunger increased from 33% to 66% between 2011 and 2018.<sup>90</sup>

Taking place in today's Southern Sudan. However, the wars had not only a negative impact on the country's economic development. They accelerated two important economic processes: the popularization of money as a means of payment and urbanization. Money and the market system appeared in the discussed area only in the 19th century. Previously, only barter exchange existed, which is still present in rural areas, among others. in the form of payments in cows for individual services.<sup>91</sup> The colonizers introduced money into the area in question, paying wages in it and forcing the population to pay taxes with it, which in turn forced them to

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<sup>90</sup>T. Edward, *op. cit.*, p. 5-18.

<sup>91</sup>*Ibidem.*

start growing cotton for sale.<sup>92</sup> However, the effectiveness of these measures was limited. Even in the 1960s, especially during the famine, food was the main means of payment. It was only the second Sudanese war (1983-2005) that really popularized cash circulation, and due to displacements, the population lost access to agricultural land and the ability to breed cattle. Moreover, Sudanese (northern) soldiers fighting in the south and SPLA guerrillas staying outside their places of residence did not have access to goods that could be the subject of barter and received wages in cash.<sup>93</sup> In 2009, in some regions of the south, 85% of the population used cash, although there were still areas of the country where this rate was only 30%.<sup>94</sup> In addition, the Government of the DRC has provided financial assistance to the Government of the DRC to finance the displacement of civilians in the DRC. Displacement has also resulted in a migration of people from the countryside to the cities. For example, the population of the capital city of Juba has increased from 115,000 to 500,000 between 1994 and 2021.<sup>95</sup> However, the urban population is still only 20%, which is not conducive to the development of industry and trade.<sup>96</sup>

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92Ibidem, p. 50.

93Ibidem.

94Ibidem, p. 32.

95M. Kurcz, op. cit., p. 54-55.

96CIA Factbook, South Sudan, 29.12.2021, <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/south-sudan/#people-and-society>

South Sudan is one of the poorest countries in the world. Its GDP in 2020 was only USD 4.07 billion <sup>97</sup> By comparison, Poland's GDP during this period was \$594.16 billion <sup>98</sup>, and Egypt USD 363.1 billion <sup>99</sup> The country is struggling with high unemployment (38.6%) and 8% inflation.<sup>100</sup> Trade of South Sudan. amounts to only USD 3.46 billion, including exports of USD 1.81 billion and imports of USD 1.65 billion. The country exports almost exclusively crude oil (94.6%) and to a much lesser extent gold (2.8%) and fodder crops (1.7%). As much as 88.3% of South Sudanese exports go to China. Other important recipients are the United Arab Emirates, the USA and India. The country imports cars and other vehicles (27.8%), machinery (10.7%), electrical equipment and electronics (8.3%), food (4.4%), plastics (4.1%), clothes ( 4%) and iron (3.1%). The main suppliers supplying the South Sudanese market are the United Arab Emirates (37%), China (18%) and Kenya (18%), and to a

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97World data atlas – South Sudan – Economy, Knoema.com, 29.12.2021.

<https://knoema.com/atlas/South-Sudan/GDP#:~:text=South%20Sudan%20-%20Gross%20domestic%20product%20in%20current,ending%20at%204.07%20billion%20US%20dollars%20in%202020.>

98GDP of Poland 2020, trading economics.com, 29.12.2021

<https://tradingeconomics.com/poland/gdp>

99GDP of Egypt 2020, trading economics.com, 29.12.2021,

<https://tradingeconomics.com/egypt/gdp>

100CIA Factbook, op. cit. <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/south-sudan/#economy>

lesser extent also Switzerland (3.8%), the Netherlands (3.5%) and the USA (3, 3%).<sup>101</sup>

According to government data, the country has deposits not only of oil, but also of iron, gold, silver, copper, aluminum, coal, uranium, chromium, zinc mica, diamonds, quartz and tungsten.<sup>102</sup> However, it is oil that generates most of the state budget's revenues, and its extraction is the subject of most foreign direct investments, which amounted to USD 18 million in 2020. Due to the civil war and political instability of the country, only companies from countries with a high risk tolerance, i.e. : China (The China National Petroleum Corporation), Russia (Zarubezneft, Gazprom and Rosneft), India (Oil and National Gas Corporation), Malaysia (Petronas) and Nigeria (Nigerian Energy, Sahara group). The only large investment not related to the energy and fuel sector are coffee plantations belonging to the international concern Nestle's Nespresso.<sup>103</sup> According to BP's estimates, South Sudan's oil reserves amount to 1.5 billion barrels, giving this country the third largest volume in Africa after Nigeria and Angola.<sup>104</sup> At the same time, largely due to war activities and the related concerns of investors, this raw material is currently extracted

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
101South Sudan country profile, OEC data, 2019,  
<https://oec.world/en/profile/country/ssd/>

102South Sudan government website, 20.10.2021, <http://www.goss-online.org/cgi-sys/>

103South Sudan investing – FDI in figures, Lloyds Bank, 29.12.2021,  
<https://www.lloydsbanktrade.com/en/market-potential/south-sudan/investing>

104Oil and Gas reserves in South Sudan, Fortune of Africa, 29.12.2021,  
<https://fortuneofafrica.com/southsudan/oil-and-gas-reserves-in-south-sudan-2/>

from less than 50% of discovered deposits. During the civil war, the country managed to build gas pipelines leading to Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia, so that transit would take place not only through the territory of Sudan.<sup>105</sup>



Map no 2: The oil field in South Sudan as of 2021.  
Source: <https://www.southsudanlicensinground.com/>, 28.01.2022.

The second source of income for Southern Sudan after oil is development aid. In the years 2011-2019, the country received USD 13.9 billion in this respect.<sup>106</sup> In 2019 alone, funds worth USD 1.855 billion were distributed in its territory, which constitutes approximately 45% of its GDP. According to

<sup>105</sup>South Sudan Government website., op. cit.

<sup>106</sup>Net official development assistance and official aid received (current US\$) – South Sudan, World Bank, 30.12.2021,  
<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD?locations=SS>

data for 2018-2019, aid came mainly from: the USA (USD 621.6 million), Great Britain (USD 233.8 million), Germany (USD 140.1 million), UNICEF (USD 107.7 million), EU institutions (USD 85 million), Norway (USD 72.6 million), the Netherlands (USD 58.8 million), the International Development Association (USD 52.3 million), Canada (USD 48.6 million USD) and Sweden (USD 47.1 million). As much as 55% of the funds allocated to South Sudan. constituted humanitarian aid (including feeding the population). 10% of these funds were allocated to the development of health care, 5% to education, 4% to the development of production, 2% to the expansion of economic infrastructure, and the remaining 24% to program management, multidisciplinary projects and other unspecified activities in the field of the development of the social infrastructure .<sup>107</sup> As in the case of many other countries in the Global South, especially those with undeveloped state structures, part of the development aid funds are taken over by local authorities and wasted, and access or lack of access to it generates social inequalities. As Maciej Ząbek notes, "the activities of international organizations (...) focus mainly on easier humanitarian aid, not the more difficult development aid, which is assumed to be long-term, and concerns primarily the capital. However,

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107Interactive summary charts by aid (ODA) recipients – South Sudan, Aid at a glance charts, OECD, 30.12.2021, [https://public.tableau.com/views/OECDDACaidataglancebyrecipient\\_new/Recipients?:embed=y&:display\\_count=yes&:showTabs=y&:toolbar=no?&:showVizHome=no](https://public.tableau.com/views/OECDDACaidataglancebyrecipient_new/Recipients?:embed=y&:display_count=yes&:showTabs=y&:toolbar=no?&:showVizHome=no)

the number and offer of assistance of those organizations that, despite everything, undertake to solve problems in the deep provinces are very insufficient.”<sup>108</sup>

South Sudan has a certain potential which, if properly used, could support the economic development of this country. Firstly, it has a young population and high population growth, which is an important element in building the internal market and developing domestic consumption. As many as 93% of the population is under 55 years old, and the average age is 18. The fertility rate is 5.43 children per woman.<sup>109</sup> The government has also introduced certain incentives for investors. The first is relatively low taxes. Sales tax is 18%, personal income taxes are 5% to 20%, and employee social security contributions are 17%. In turn, dividends and shares in companies are taxed at 10%. The process of registering a company is also relatively short (13 days) compared to other Sub-Saharan African countries (21 days on average).<sup>110</sup> Moreover, according to information provided on the website of the government of South Sudan. the state guarantees foreign investors the ability to conduct business activities without restrictions in all sectors of the economy except the postal sector. It also ensures that they will not fall victim to expropriation, their intellectual property rights will be

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108M. Ząbek, *Uchodźcy w Afryce. Etnologia przemocy i cierpienia*, Warszawa 2018, s. 296.

109CIA Factbook, op. cit. <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/south-sudan/#people-and-society>

110South Sudan: Investing (...) Llyods Bank op. cit.

protected and they will be able to lease the land for up to 99 years.<sup>111</sup>

Unfortunately, the state also creates structural barriers to economic development. Due to insufficient investment in education, 65.5% of the population is illiterate.<sup>112</sup> Due to the lack of social policy, the purchasing power of the population is limited - as many as 51% of citizens live below the poverty scale.<sup>113</sup> In turn, corruption and lack of transparency of financial transactions, along with unfinished hostilities and devastated road infrastructure, effectively discourage potential investors. In 2021, the country ranked last (180th) in the international corruption ranking conducted by Transparency International.<sup>114</sup> The country also took 185th place (out of 190 countries) in the Doing Business 2020 ranking conducted by the World Bank.<sup>115</sup>

## **2.5. Social problems**

The main reasons for emigration from South Sudan are the country's social problems. The most important of them

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111Strona rządu Sudanu Pd., op. cit. <http://www.goss-online.org/cgi-sys/>

112CIA Factbook, South Sudan, op. cit. <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/south-sudan/#people-and-society>

113South Sudan Government website, op. cit. <http://www.goss-online.org/cgi-sys/>

114Corruption Perception Index 2021, Transparency International, 29.01.2021, [https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021?fbclid=IwAR0ZGDnJwZ1M\\_i1Eqpu5NOiiw8lsdQRAayUCGritv19ktqyj3cS-qknh6Gk](https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021?fbclid=IwAR0ZGDnJwZ1M_i1Eqpu5NOiiw8lsdQRAayUCGritv19ktqyj3cS-qknh6Gk)

115Doing Business Rank 2020, World Bank, 30.12.2021, [https://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/pdf/db2020/Doing-Business-2020\\_rankings.pdf](https://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/pdf/db2020/Doing-Business-2020_rankings.pdf)

include: violence, lack of a stable place of residence due to forced mobility and displacement, hunger, difficulties in finding permanent employment, limited access and low quality of public services, and family disintegration. These problems are largely a consequence of the civil war and the weakness of the country's economy. However, they partly result from factors occurring simultaneously and independently of military operations, such as pastoral culture or traditional tribal customs. Some of the social problems that will be described below, such as cattle fights, have existed in the discussed territory for hundreds of years. At the same time, new difficulties appear in cities, which are an inherent effect of urbanization and the transformation of the economy from an agro-pastoral economy based on traditional customs to a free market economy based on statutory law. At this point, I must also point out that in this subchapter I made extensive use of the content contained in the book by Dr. Hab. Maciej Kurcz "How to survive in an African city? Man towards borderland and urbanization processes in a South Sudanese city" (Katowice 2012). I received a scan of this book from the author himself, who turned out to be an extremely kind man. The strong inspiration from his book in this section results from three reasons. First of all, both Polish and foreign literature lacks items dealing with the social problems of South Sudan. Secondly, its content explains many of the behaviors of the South Sudanese community in Cairo that I did not understand as an observer. Thirdly, this book is an

outstanding work - one of the most interesting I have ever read in my life.

The country's biggest problem, forcing the population to migrate, is the high level of violence. Its most obvious examples are warfare and the accompanying crimes committed against civilians. Since the end of the 1980s, it has become common to recruit children into partisan units, as well as to kill them in order to prevent them from joining enemy units. Maciej Ząbek notes, already in the years 1989-1991, "younger children played a service role (in the army - MP), cleaned weapons, disarmed explosives or spread messages. "Slightly older ones (over 10 years old) took part in the fighting."<sup>116</sup> Women also often became soldiers. Moreover, the fact that some of them took over this role justified the rapes and murders committed by partisan units on women belonging to "enemy tribes".<sup>117</sup> However, military operations never covered the territory of the entire country. Initially, they took place only in three states that were oil producing areas: Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile. Over time, they also moved to the Lakes, Warrap and Western, Eastern and Central Equatoria states. Even at its peak, hostilities did not cover more than 50% of the country's territory. Since the signing of the peace agreement between government forces and the SPLA-IO in 2018, the area covered by fighting has been

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<sup>116</sup>M. Ząbek, *Uchodźcy w Afryce*, op. cit., p. 210.

<sup>117</sup>*Ibidem*, p. 212.

significantly reduced. Currently, there are still regular clashes in the Lakes and Warrap states, where two groups are fighting each other as part of the Dinka (conflict within the power camp). In Western Equatoria, local warlords compete with each other, and in the years 2013-2018, they regularly switched from the government to the SPLA-IO and vice versa. However, in Jonglei state, since 2019, local Dinka and Nuer militias have been jointly attacking the Murle, receiving support from anti-government militias. From time to time, sporadic clashes also occur in various parts of the country between the political and military organizations listed in subsection 2.2. Some of the fighting is part of the local community's self-defense against brutal disarmament campaigns carried out by government forces. In order to provide themselves with funds to continue the fight, partisan units also commit robberies against civilians. From 2013 to July 31, 2021, 60,000 people died as a result of the civil war. people, most in 2014 (11 thousand) and in 2017 (8.5 thousand). Since 2018, the annual number of deaths has not exceeded 4.5 thousand. Government forces killed approximately 21,000, organized opposition troops killed 15,000, local politically organized militias killed approximately 5,000, and local ethnic militias killed 19,000. people. In addition, in the years 2013-2017, approximately 262,000 murders were committed during the war. acts of sexual violence. The perpetrators of most of them were government forces (146,000), to a lesser extent opposition forces (46,000)

and local political militias (51,000), and the least of them were local ethnic militias (18,000).<sup>118</sup>

Starting from 2018, violence committed by government and opposition forces and local political militias has gradually ceased. Ethnic militias have become the dominant group of perpetrators, committing murders but resorting to sexual violence much less frequently than government and opposition forces. The government does not control most of the provincial territory for fear of provoking another violent conflict. Therefore, he does not interfere in disputes between ethnic groups as long as they do not threaten his power. At the same time, it does not matter to the authorities whether civilians die in the conflict or not. The problem of local fighting also results, to a large extent, from the strong militarization of society, which is the result of over half a century of wars.<sup>119</sup> For young men, the easiest way to achieve prosperity seems to be to acquire combat skills and join the army, paramilitary units or common gangs. Many conflicts at the local level are fights over cows, sanctioned by at least several hundred years of tradition - a custom popular in most pastoral societies. However, unlike before 1955, they are now fought with firearms rather than spears and bows. This is the nature of

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118D. Watson, Surface tension: 'Communal' violence and elite ambitions in South Sudan, In: Acledata.com, 19.08.2021, <https://acleddata.com/2021/08/19/surface-tension-communal-violence-and-elite-ambitions-in-south-sudan/?fbclid=IwAR2GQs0-LgbaaExYW5ZD8WFMHyQi2jOXmXj9lt9C4NnS5uCghmgZIL830J0>

119Ibidem.

many clashes between the Nuer and the Dinka, between both of these ethnic groups and the Murle, between the Dinka and the Mundari, and finally between individual Dinka villages. Up to 100 people can die during a single invasion. It is not uncommon for national politicians to use these local rivalries as proxy wars against their opponents from other ethnic groups. This was the case, for example, in 1991, when Riek Machar, as part of a personal conflict with John Garang, persuaded Nuer militias to commit a Dinka massacre in Bor province, promising the perpetrators a generous reward in cows. The local fights between the Nuer and Dinka did not bother them, even though they had a common enemy in the form of the Sudanese government during the Second Sudanese War.<sup>120</sup> Cows constitute in South Sudan. a traditional means of payment in which payments are made, among others: dowry from the groom to his in-laws. Unlike money, it is little susceptible to inflation. Having a large number of them is a symbol of wealth and a source of pride. Often, a cow, as an animal providing food (meat, milk), is of greater value than human life. Moreover, under customary law, instead of the "eye for an eye" principle, a system of remuneration (in money, cows, etc.) for killing someone's loved ones is used. On the one hand, this system protects

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120H. Wild, J. Madut Jok & R. Patel, The militarization of cattle raiding in South Sudan: how a traditional practice became a tool for political violence, In: Journal of International Humanitarian Action volume 3, article 2, 02.08.2018, <https://jhumanitarianaction.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/s41018-018-0030-y>

against an endless spiral of retaliation, but on the other hand, it weakens the mental barrier that prevents an individual from committing murder.<sup>121</sup>

An important factor generating migration is the lack of stability in terms of place of residence. As of 2013, as many as 4 million (out of 11 million total population) citizens of South Sudan. were victims of forced displacement.<sup>122</sup> The perpetrators were both government and opposition forces as well as local political and ethnic militias. Exiling the enemy from his place of residence is a traditional way of humiliating him and marking his victory. At the same time, it is worth emphasizing that the reason for the creation of many ethnic militias was the need to protect their villages against displacement. This process was also carried out during the Sudanese wars, and in the 1990s, the Sudanese government displaced the inhabitants of the south from areas with oil deposits.<sup>123</sup> People forced to leave their places of residence in this way go abroad (Uganda, Dr. Congo, Kenya, Sudan, Egypt), go to centers for internally displaced persons or migrate to cities. Another problem is the lack of transparent

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<sup>121</sup>Ibidem.

<sup>122</sup>South Sudan, Operation data portal, UNHCR, 17.01.2022, <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/country/ssd#:~:text=Since%20the%20outbreak%20of%20conflict%20in%20December%202013%2C,world%E2%80%99s%20third%20largest%20refugee%20crisis.%20Funding%20%282021%29%20%24224%2C400%2C000>

<sup>123</sup>D. Watson, Surface tension (...), op. cit. South Sudan, Operation data portal, UNHCR, dostę: 17.01.2022, <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/country/ssd#:~:text=Since%20the%20outbreak%20of%20conflict%20in%20December%202013%2C,world%E2%80%99s%20third%20largest%20refugee%20crisis.%20Funding%20%282021%29%20%24224%2C400%2C000>

regulations regarding property rights. People returning to the country from abroad are often unable to get their homes back because they do not have documents confirming that they are their property. The property deeds are almost exclusively held by former collaborators who were granted plots of land in exchange for "merits" by the Sudanese government. South Sudan authorities they do not respect these acts and confiscate their properties and hand them over to people from the SPLA and the Dinka ethnic group. In the capital city of Juba, there is competition for land between people from Bari, who consider themselves the owners of the city by tradition, and representing the Dinka government administration.<sup>124</sup> Additionally, in the capital, as in other cities, there is no spatial planning. Despite overpopulation, single-family houses still dominate there. Low supply of apartments results in high rents and lack of tenant rights. This in turn leads to three main solutions. People with family in the city move in and only gain the right to a roof over their heads (without food and financial support). The rest illegally inhabit empty buildings or camp in tents. Some "squatters" secretly or forcefully occupy rooms in schools, churches and public administration buildings.<sup>125</sup>

The civil war and economic crisis have led to a humanitarian crisis. At the beginning of 2021, as many as 6.35 million people (out of 9.28 million total population) were

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<sup>124</sup>M. Kurcz, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

<sup>125</sup>*Ibidem*, p. 60-67.

at risk of hunger.<sup>126</sup> As part of the World Hunger Index, the country was classified, together with Burundi, Syria and Comoros, in the group of countries where the situation is alarming. Approximately 10% of children in the country die due to malnutrition. 5 years of age, 22% suffer from dwarfism and 31% are underweight.<sup>127</sup> The degradation of agriculture as a result of displacements makes the country dependent on imported food. In turn, backward road infrastructure generates high transport costs, which makes imported goods extremely expensive. According to estimates by the Borgen Project organization, a resident of Southern Sudan. has to spend a whopping \$321.7 on food that costs a New Yorker \$1.2<sup>128</sup> According to Maciej Kurcz, in most homes in Juba, adults eat only lunch, and children eat dinner and breakfast. Meat is eaten once a month.<sup>129</sup> The quality and variety of food consumed depends on the availability of food products, which limits the possibilities for a healthy and balanced diet. The situation in other parts of the country is even more difficult. The only way a society can survive is by receiving foreign humanitarian aid. However, this is only a temporary solution.

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126Hunger crisis in South Sudan: More than half the population threatened, In: Sovereign Order of Malta, 27.01.2021, <https://www.orderofmalta.int/2021/01/27/hunger-crisis-south-sudan-more-half-population-threatened/#:~:text=Hunger%20crisis%20in%20South%20Sudan%3A%20More%20than%20half,of%20the%20population%20will%20not%20have%20enough%20food.>

127South Sudan, W: Global Hunger Index, 19.01.2022, <https://www.globalhungerindex.org/south-sudan.html>

128Top 10 facts about hunger in South Sudan, In: Borgen Project, 19.01.2022, <https://borgenproject.org/top-10-facts-about-hunger-in-south-sudan/>

129M. Kurcz, op. cit., p. 126.

Without a lasting peace and investment in road infrastructure and agriculture, the plight of the South Sudanese people will continue to be tragic.

People of South Sudan they have limited access to public services and their quality is often low. Schools and health care facilities operate mainly in cities. In addition, due to the poorly developed road infrastructure, the army and the police are unable to ensure the safety of residents of rural areas. There are only a few paved roads in Juba itself, and almost none outside the city. There is no public transport in the capital and most buildings lack electricity.<sup>130</sup> Outside cities, there are also difficulties in access to water. The government administration shows no interest in solving these problems, leaving them to the responsibility of aid organizations and religious associations. Politicians and officials often do not have sufficient competences to create and implement programs that improve the quality of and access to public services.

The civil war led to the disintegration of families, thus making it easier for individuals to decide to leave the country. The lack of a permanent place of residence and frequent forced migrations within the country create an atmosphere of temporariness, which also affects marital relationships. As a result of displacements and escapes from hostilities, men often stay in different parts of the country than their wives

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<sup>130</sup>Ibidem, p. 81-90.

and children. In new places they create new relationships (often also marriages) and forget about the previous ones. What is particularly important, they do not send money to families, leaving women alone with the challenge of supporting children and caring for the elderly. This type of behavior on the part of men is facilitated by the tradition-sanctioned social consent to polygamy. A man can have as many wives as he can afford. Representatives of the establishment have as many as a dozen of them. Marriage is regulated by customary law and constitutes a kind of contract between families. Women usually accept this situation, taking on their own role not only in the relationship, but also in the division of household duties. The first wife participates in negotiations regarding her husband's subsequent marriages and is treated with great respect by subsequent ones. In her husband's absence, she has the final say in the family. She treats the other wives more as a relief from household chores than as competition for her husband's favor. Over the years, as a result of raising children together, very strong bonds develop between these women.<sup>131</sup> Moreover, parents often prefer their daughter to live in a polygamous marriage with a wealthy man rather than be the only wife of a poor man. This is largely due to very pragmatic and selfish reasons on their part. In this way, they want to obtain a significant dowry from their future son-in-law and pass on to him the costs of their

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<sup>131</sup>Ibidem, p. 110-113.

daughter's education and the maintenance of her potential illegitimate children. For this reason, the worse the socio-economic situation of a country, the younger the age of marriage for women and the higher it is for men. Currently, 15-year-olds are considered ready for marriage. On the other hand, this situation protects girls from being abandoned by their parents. By doing so, they would deprive themselves of dowry income paid in cows, other livestock, money or food. It is mainly boys who are abandoned, potentially generating future costs in the form of paying a dowry.<sup>132</sup> For this reason, many orphaned boys aged 8-13 live on the streets of cities, working as bootblacks or cleaners, or operating in gangs.<sup>133</sup> They form quasi-families with other orphans their age. Sometimes they are also taken in by Muslim communities in exchange for conversion to Islam. At the same time, the institution of dowry has an impact on the rare occurrence of divorces. When this happens, the woman's family is forced to return everything they received from her son-in-law.<sup>134</sup>

On the other hand, the customary laws of ethnic groups provide few grounds for a man to divorce. These include a woman's infertility, adultery, or an attempt to poison another wife. Therefore, divorce usually does not occur and, despite the actual separation, the couple is still formally married. A casual approach to sexuality also contributes to the

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<sup>132</sup>Ibidem, p.115.

<sup>133</sup>Ibidem, p. 137.

<sup>134</sup>Ibidem, p. 121.

breakdown of families. Sex on the first date is common. It occurs especially between people who met in hotel bars. At the same time, single mothers usually receive support from their parents, but have little chance of getting married.<sup>135</sup>

Another important factor encouraging emigration is the difficulty of finding a stable job that provides basic support for the family. Of course, in South Sudan, there are also wealthy people whose financial conditions are comparable to the privileged social classes of the Global North. However, this is a very narrow group of military commanders, managers, senior officials and businessmen with ties to the government. Dinka and partly Nuer and Shilluk people work in public administration, and to a lesser extent Bari and Mundari. For most residents of Southern Sudan, and even the capital city of Juba, such work is unavailable. People in managerial positions earn several thousand dollars a month, have company apartments and company cars. Managers employ their relatives in real or fictitious jobs. The second important employer is aid organizations. NGOs are very important for the local economy: they support small business, organize vocational training, and help in setting up a company. Their employees' salaries are paid regularly and allow them to secure the most important life needs.<sup>136</sup> The wealth ends with these two groups. Another one, lower-level public sector

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<sup>135</sup>*Ibidem*, p. 127.

<sup>136</sup>*Ibidem*, p. 170.

employees (teachers, doctors and nurses, policemen), experience only prestige. Their salaries are low and paid irregularly. However, people respect them because of their service to the community and give them money or food as a thank you. It is also the best organized social group, and many of its representatives are charitable. It is also a group that occurs mainly in cities, free from ethnic dependencies and with a large participation of women.<sup>137</sup> In addition, there is a certain group of small entrepreneurs in the city, largely composed of Arabs. Most city residents work in odd jobs. Men mainly work on construction sites, as security guards or parcel deliverers. Women sell food from home gardens (as a cheap alternative to expensive imported food), home-made alcohol (beer, date moonshine), run cheap eateries or engage in prostitution. Teenagers are taxi drivers. Odd jobs performed by children, e.g. as shoe shine boys, also have an important share in the household budget.<sup>138</sup> In the countryside, people are engaged in extensive agriculture and cattle breeding. However, small farms and small livestock usually do not allow them to survive the entire year without experiencing hunger.

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<sup>137</sup>Ibidem, p. 174-176.

<sup>138</sup>Ibidem, p. 155-181.

## **3. South Sudanese migrants in Egypt**

### **3.1. Egypt's migration policy**

Egypt has been a country of exile for decades. Before the 1952 coup d'état led by local officers led by Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egyptian cities had a strong cosmopolitan character. Many people lived there, including: British, Italians, Greeks and Jews. The new authorities decided to break with post-colonial dependence on Great Britain and build their independence in the spirit of socialism and pan-Arabism. Deprived of their positions and privileges, foreigners began to leave the country en masse. The second wave of emigration took place in the 1970s, when Copts, concerned about the increasing Islamization of their customs, began to leave for Europe and North America. At the same time, intense migration within the country continued. Rural residents began to move en masse to cities. During the 20th century, Cairo's population increased from 590,000 to up to 20 million<sup>139</sup> However, increasingly overpopulated cities were unable to meet the aspirations of their new inhabitants, which is why the phenomenon of mass economic emigration of Egyptians abroad emerged. Before 2011, its main destination was Libya,

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139 G. Tsourpas, Egypt: Migration and Diaspora Politics in an Emerging Transit Country, Migration Policy Institute, 08.08.2018, <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/egypt-migration-and-diaspora-politics-emerging-transit-country>

which was then the richest country in North Africa and had numerous oil fields, the exploitation of which was not sufficient for its population of only 6 million. The number of Egyptians working in this country before 2011 is estimated at 330,000. – 1.5 million.<sup>140</sup> The discrepancies in estimates result from the fact that the work of Egyptian workers in Libya was often not registered, and the border between the two countries was not tightly protected at that time. However, as a result of the outbreak of the Libyan Civil War, the Egyptians were forced to return to Egypt and the border between the countries was sealed. The rule of the Muslim Brotherhood led by President Muhammad Morsi in 2011-2013 increased the emigration of Copts to the USA, Canada and the EU. In turn, the 2013 coup d'état by Abdel Fatah el-Sisi forced Muslim Brotherhood activists to flee to Turkey and Qatar. Since 2014, European Union member states have become an increasingly popular migration destination for Egyptians. In the years 2014-2019, the number of visa applications to Schengen countries increased from 157,000. up to 203 thousand During the period under study, most Egyptians applied, usually with positive results, for visas to France (50-64 thousand applications), Germany (27-40 thousand), Italy (15-22 thousand) and Spain (11-15 thousand). ). The migration wave in 2020 was temporarily stopped by the Covid-19

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<sup>140</sup>Egyptian Migration to Libya, IOM, 2012, <https://reliefweb.int>.

pandemic.<sup>141</sup> However, the largest Egyptian diaspora still resides in Arab countries (approx. 6 million emigrants), mainly in Saudi Arabia (2.9 million). According to the outstanding Egyptian demographer Ayman Zohry, Egyptians returning from Saudi Arabia often bring with them local customs such as Wahhabism or women covering their entire bodies by wearing the so-called niqabs.<sup>142</sup> This was also confirmed by my observations, e.g. from watching Egyptian films, and conversations, which showed that until the mid-1970s, morals in this country were much more liberal than today. Friends who wear hijabs often told me that their mothers wore mini skirts when they were their age. According to my interlocutors, the change in customs was to a large extent the result of the belief among working-class Egyptians that the discovery of oil in the Persian Gulf countries was a reward from God for following the principles of Islam. Therefore, the Egyptians' copying of Saudi customs is an attempt to beg God for prosperity. The example of Egypt was an element of a broader trend in the Arab world (e.g. the White Revolution in Iran) manifesting itself in the departure of large social groups from liberal, "Western" moral patterns in favor of religious conservatism. Interestingly, this process was almost completely opposite to the countries of Western Europe and

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141 2020 Country-Specific Schengen Visa Statistics, Schengen Visa Info, <https://statistics.schengenvisainfo.com>.

142A. Zohry, Migration and development in Egypt, Berlin 2007, p. 51-52.

North America that were experiencing a sexual revolution in the 1960s and 1970s.

The Egyptian authorities institutionally support the emigration of their citizens because it is beneficial to the country's economy. Firstly, it is a way to reduce the scale of unemployment, and secondly, it generates funds from direct cash transfers. Their total in 2021 amounted to USD 31 billion, or approximately 11% of Egypt's GDP.<sup>143</sup> The right to emigrate is enshrined in the Constitution. Moreover, in accordance with The Emigration and Sponsoring Egyptian Abroad Law No. 111 of 1983, the main objectives of the country's migration policy are: encouraging emigration as a decision conducive to maintaining balance in the labor market, combating illegal migration, maximizing the economic benefits of migration, and guaranteeing the well-being of emigrants in the countries of residence and meeting the demand for work in countries receiving Egyptian citizens. Pursuant to Articles 4 and 5 of this Act, there is an interministerial committee for emigration whose task is to create courses and information programs for potential emigrants. In accordance with Article 3 (1) of the 1983 law,

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143Remittances from Egyptians abroad up to \$31.5 billion in 2021: Central Bank of Egypt, Al Ahram, 14.03.2022, <https://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/3/12/462825/Business/Economy/Remittances-from-Egyptians-abroad-up-to--billion-i.aspx#:~:text=The%20Central%20Bank%20of%20Egypt%20%28CBE%29%20said%20on,6.4%20percent%2C%20compared%20to%20%2429.6%20billion%20in%202020.?msclkid=87e90bfc51311ec9a9187f37261762c>

Egyptians living abroad are entitled to dual citizenship. Under Article 15, investments in the country by Egyptians living abroad are subject to the same facilitations as foreign investments. In addition, pursuant to Article 4 (1) of the Agreement, public sector employees who decide to emigrate are entitled to unpaid leave for a maximum of two years. If they decide to return after this time, the employer is obliged to accept them for the same or similar position. The Egyptian authorities are also trying to increase the number of positive visa decisions issued by consulates of the so-called Global North.

At the same time, Egypt is an immigration country and a host country for refugees and economic migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East. According to the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there are currently 6 million immigrants in the country.<sup>144</sup> The dominant group among them are citizens of Sudan and South Sudan. Their total number is 0.7-4 million, and their subsequent waves settled in Egypt during the civil wars in 1955-1972, 1983-2005 and 2013-2020. Until 1995, they could travel to Egypt without a visa. Previously, during the Israeli-Arab wars in 1948, 1956 and 1967, Egypt accepted refugees from Palestine. In the

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<sup>144</sup>Egypt proudly hosts 6 million migrants, refugees: Foreign Ministry, Al Ahram, 18.12.2021, <https://english.ahram.org.eg/News/446665.aspx?msclid=382ace89b51811ec820ad9cbf9a0c4af>

years 1977-1979, 1991-1992 and 1998-2000, Ethiopians and Eritreans fleeing civil wars arrived in the country. In 1991, Egypt accepted many refugees from Somalia, and in 2011-2013 from Syria.<sup>145</sup>

In 1980, Egypt ratified the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. However, it does not have its own legislation regulating this issue, leaving the responsibility for granting refugee status to UNHCR.<sup>146</sup> This issue is regulated by the Memorandum of Understanding concluded between this agency and the Government of Egypt in 1954. Persons who register with the UNHCR office as seeking refugee status theoretically gain the right to move freely throughout Egyptian territory. In practice, the implementation of this right is impossible due to the restrictions applicable to all citizens and migrants in this respect (the need to obtain passes, e.g. on the Sinai Peninsula, ubiquitous army and police posts).

People who obtain refugee status may also apply for relocation to another country. They also have the right to legal aid, job search support, free public education and health care. They also receive a cash benefit of 400 Egyptian pounds (approx. PLN 100) per month for each household member,

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145S. Sanderson, Sub-Saharan migrants in Egypt subject to increasing abuse and violence, InfoMigrants, 2 stycznia 2020 r., [www.infomigrants.net](http://www.infomigrants.net).

146A. Zohry, op. cit., p. 31.

which is paid by the World Food Program.<sup>147</sup> However, these benefits are available to a relatively small group of South Sudanese citizens, as only about 20 000 of them have refugee status.<sup>148</sup>

Egypt is also a transit country for migrants wanting to get to the EU. Some of them have had such a plan from the very beginning, and some decide to do it as a result of disappointment with life in Egypt. This country is part of the Northern (Central Mediterranean) and Sinai (Eastern Mediterranean) routes. The first one runs from Somalia through Ethiopia, Sudan, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and the Mediterranean Sea to Malta and Italy. The second one from Somalia and Eritrea reaches through Sudan, Egypt, Israel, Syria and Turkey to Greece and Cyprus. In the years 1977-2007, the Sinai route was of major importance. However, after Hamas took power in the Gaza Strip, Egypt sealed the border with Israel, which led to the increasing importance of the northern route. Due to the civil war in Libya, Egypt is the last large country on this route that is able to control the flow of people through its own territory.<sup>149</sup>

An important goal of Egypt's migration policy is to counteract irregular migration on the Northern and Sinai

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147UNCHR Egyptp 12.04.2022, <https://www.unhcr.org/eg/>

148Refugee context in Egypt, UNHCR Egypt, p 28.04.2022, <https://www.unhcr.org/eg/about-us/refugee-context-in-egypt>

149K. Marchand, J. Reinold, R. Diaz e Silva, Study on Migration Routes in the East and Horn of Africa, Maastrich 2017.

routes. Firstly, in this way Egypt reduces its costs associated with accepting migrants. Secondly, it is a way to justify, both to Egyptian citizens and foreign partners, the exercise of authoritarian rule in the country. In its propaganda, Egypt considers controlling migration flows as a way to counteract terrorist threats. Egypt's restrictive security policy includes navy control of the Mediterranean coast, monitoring of borders by drones, and maintaining a dense network of police stations and military checkpoints throughout the country. I remember them from my trips to Egypt, during which it was necessary, among other things, to: obtaining special passes to stay in border areas, and there was a ban on staying on beaches on the Mediterranean Sea after sunset. My attention was also drawn to the fact that the only employees at the gas stations of the state-owned concern Watanya were soldiers performing compulsory military service.

Egypt is an important partner of the EU in combating irregular migration. Since 2001, the country has been bound by an association agreement with the EU. Even before the so-called During the 2015 "migration crisis", he cooperated with Italy in turning away migrant boats and readmitting them. In 2015, it also signed a cooperation agreement in this area with Greece and Cyprus. Then, in 2016 and 2017, it concluded such agreements with Germany.<sup>150</sup> Their provisions are quite

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<sup>150</sup>Security cooperation Agreement between Egypt and Germany, Egyptian Institute for Studies, 17.04.2017 r., <https://en.eipss-eg.org>.

similar and assume intelligence cooperation, exchange of information, training of Egyptian services by the services of EU Member States and joint information campaigns to make migrants aware of the risks associated with illegally entering the EU territory. Egypt also participated in the summit of EU and African countries, which took place in November 2015 in La Valletta and was devoted to the migration crisis. It was then agreed that activities to combat irregular migration would be implemented under the European Neighborhood Policy. The European Trust Fund for Africa was also established, under which countries on this continent, including Egypt, received development assistance aimed at eliminating the root causes of migration. However, Egypt did not want to accept funds from this fund for a long time because they were conditional on respect for human rights.<sup>151</sup> At the same time, EU cooperation with Egypt in counteracting irregular migration is one of the elements that has led to a reduction in the number of "illegal" crossings of the EU border. In the years 2015-2018, on the Central-Mediterranean and Eastern-Mediterranean routes, it decreased from over 1 million to only 83,000.<sup>152</sup>

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151M.Pawłowski, Wpływ pomocy rozwojowej UE na politykę migracyjną Egiptu, PISM Strategic File, 15.12.2021.

152Own study based by the FRONTEX data,

### **3.2. Relations between Egypt and South Sudan**

The history of Egypt's influence on South Sudan began long before the latter country gained independence. After Sudan gained independence in 1956, Egypt tried to intensify cooperation with the south of the country, hoping that this would allow for the future reunification of the two countries. Egyptian President Abdel Gamal Nasser conducted numerous propaganda campaigns promoting this idea in the south. He believed that the economically backward south, due to dissatisfaction with the rule of the north, would be inclined to turn to Egypt. This was to be helped by, among others: Egyptian investments in South Sudanese infrastructure.<sup>153</sup> At the same time, the governments of Sudan and Egypt established a joint study scholarship program for southern youth. As part of it, they could study at Cairo's Al-Azhar University. The hidden maximum goal of the project was the Islamization of the southern elites, and the minimum goal was to reduce the resentment among them against Muslims.<sup>154</sup> Then, beginning with the outbreak of the Second Sudanese Civil War in 1983, the migration of southern Sudanese to Egypt began to increase.<sup>155</sup> Until 1995, this was facilitated by visa-free travel between Egypt and Sudan, but it was

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153Y. Voller, *The Second-Generation Liberation Movement in Southern Sudan: Anti-Colonialism as a Set of Practices*, W: Civil Wars. Marzec 2019, Vol. 21 Issue 1, p. 65.

154W. Berridge, *op. cit.*, p. 222.

155A. Zohry, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

abolished as part of Egypt's response to the failed assassination attempt on then-president Hosni Mubarak in Khartoum. Moreover, after the overthrow of the Egyptian-backed Nimeiri regime in 1989, the authorities in Cairo began to strengthen their relations with the rebels from the south.<sup>156</sup> At the same time, in the context of migration, it should be mentioned that since 1992, children and young people from Sudan and other Sub-Saharan African countries (since 2011 also South Sudan) have the right to free education in Egyptian public schools and universities.<sup>157</sup>

Egypt played an important role in South Sudan gaining independence and made efforts to stabilize the situation in the newly established state. He acted as a mediator in the conclusion of a peace treaty between the Sudanese government and the SPLA, which paved the way for the creation of South Sudan. A symbolic expression of Egyptian support was Mubarak's acceptance of John Garang's visit to Cairo in 2005. Then, in the years 2005-2011, as part of development assistance, he carried out works in the area in question, including the removal of aquatic plants impeding the navigability of the White Nile, the construction of medical

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156Sudan - Egypt Relations, Global Security, 12.04.2022, <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/sudan/forrel-eg.htm>

157Eu-Egypt migration cooperation: where are human rights?, Raport Euromed rights, 15.07.2019, <https://euromedrights.org/publication/eu-egypt-migration-cooperation-where-are-human-rights/>

clinics, a power plant and a university.<sup>158</sup> Since 2011, Egyptian troops have been participating in the UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan.<sup>159</sup>

Good relations with South Sudan are intended to help Egypt reduce the influence of Sudan and Ethiopia in the region. Egypt is in dispute with Sudan over the territory of the so-called Halaib Triangle. It is an area rich in water, vegetation and game, and there are oil deposits off its coast in the Red Sea. In the years 1956-1992 it was controlled by Sudan, and since 1992 it has been under Egyptian occupation. To maintain this state, it is in Egypt's interest to weaken Sudan internally. The arena of competition between both countries is, among others, South Sudan. During the main phase of the South Sudanese civil war in 2013-2020, Egypt supported the SPLA and President Kiir, and Sudan supported the opposition SPLM-IO led by Riek Machar. Additionally, Sudan accuses Egypt of financing the activities of Darfur separatists.<sup>160</sup> In turn, the bone of contention in Egypt's relations with Ethiopia is the issue of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). The Ethiopian government built it taking advantage of the confusion in Egypt in connection with the events of the so-

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158Sudan - Egypt Relations, op. cit.

159United Nations Mission in South Sudan, 12.04.2022, <https://unmiss.unmissions.org/military>

160S. Allison, Do Egypt and Sudan have anything in common anymore?, The Institute for Security Studies, 09.06.2017, <https://issafrica.org/amp/iss-today/do-egypt-and-sudan-have-anything-in-common-anymore>

called Arab Spring in 2011-2013. Its purpose is to increase water resources and electricity production in Ethiopia, as it serves as a large hydroelectric power plant. The issue of filling it during the rainy season is controversial. If it proceeds too intensively, Egypt may be deprived of a significant amount of water resources.<sup>161</sup> In order to put pressure on Ethiopia in 2020, the Egyptian government asked the South Sudanese authorities for permission to install a military base in the border town of Pagak. On June 3, 2020, Ethiopian media reported that the government of South Sudan had approved the request of the Egyptian side.<sup>162</sup>

However, a day later, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of South Sudan denied this information.<sup>163</sup> At the same time, representatives of this country, together with activists from Egypt and Sudan, created an initiative in April 2021 called “Women of the Nile Basin” to lobby for a peaceful solution to the GERD filling issue.<sup>164</sup>

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161J, Czerep, Tama Wielkiego Odrodzenia w Etiopii – konflikt o Nil bliski rozwiązania, Biuletyn PISM nr 49/2020, 18.03.2020.

162South Sudan agrees to Egyptian request for military base near Pagak, ECADF Ethiopian News & Opinions, 03.06.2020, <https://ecadforum.com/2020/06/03/south-sudan-agrees-to-egyptian-request-for-military-base-near-pagak/#:~:text=%E2%80%9CThe%20government%20of%20the%20Republic%20of%20South%20Sudan,country%2C%E2%80%9D%20the%20official%20said%20on%20condition%20of%20anonymity>.

163F. Tih, South Sudan denies allowing Egyptian base on its land, Anadolu Agency, 04.06.2020, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/south-sudan-denies-allowing-egyptian-base-on-its-land/1864633>

164Al Masry Al Youm, ‘Women of the Nile Basin’ – A feminine initiative on the GERD dispute, Egypt Independent, 11.04.2021, <https://www.egyptindependent.com/women-of-the-nile-basin-a-feminine-initiative-on-the-gerd-dispute/>

Economic cooperation between the two countries is not intensive. In 2020, South Sudanese exports to Egypt amounted to only 402,000. USD (0.047% of total exports), and imports from this country 305 thousand. USD (0.028% of the total). South Sudan exports mineral resources, including crude oil, to Egypt, and imports mainly food.<sup>165</sup>

### **3.3. Migrants in the social structure of Egypt**

For most of their history, the Egyptians were a feudal society, the consequences of which are still visible today. In ancient Egypt, there were 6 classes, within which there were additional subclasses. The first class was the Pharaoh and his immediate family. A rung below him was his chief advisor, who was often also the high priest. The third class consisted of the aristocracy and clergy. Next in line were scribes and soldiers. The penultimate class were craftsmen, and at the very bottom of the social hierarchy were peasants and slaves.<sup>166</sup> This division, with some modifications, survived the times of the Ottoman Empire. During the period of British colonialism, the British governor was more important than the king, and the members of the aristocracy were, in fact, the numerous Europeans living in the country. On the one hand, the British tried to use traditional elites to maintain social

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<sup>165</sup>South Sudan, The Observatory of Economic Complexity, 12.04.2022, <https://oec.world/en/profile/country/ssd/>

<sup>166</sup>Egyptian Social Classes and Society, History on the net, November 2000, <https://www.historyonthenet.com/the-egyptians-society>

order, and on the other hand, they enabled social advancement through a military career. Most of the officers who took power in the country in 1952 and carried out its decolonization were people from lower social classes who owed their position to the British colonizers. For example, the president of Egypt from 1954 to 1970, Gamal Abdel Nasser, was the son of a postal clerk.

The only period in history when the social structure flattened was the above-mentioned period of Nasserism. The Suez Canal was nationalized, the country was intensively industrialized and urbanized, and the assets of 600 of the richest families were confiscated. In addition, a progressive tax system, free public education and a guarantee of employment in public administration for university graduates were established.<sup>167</sup> This policy also resulted in a massive influx of rural people into the cities, breaking the traditional patronage system in the provinces.<sup>168</sup>

After Nasser's death, his successor Anwar Sadat (1970-1981) decided to abandon the socialist model in favor of an oligarchic, formally capitalist system in which economic power is exercised by military elites and foreign investors.<sup>169</sup> This

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167Nasser's Egypt and Arab nationalism, Socialism Today April 2011, <http://socialismtoday.org/archive/147/nasser.html>

168P. Fargues, From Demographic Explosion to Social Rupture, W: Arab Society. Class, Gender, Power & Development, red. N. Hopkins, S. Eddin Ibrahim, Kair 1997, p. 77.

169N. Hopkins, Small Farmer Households and Agricultural Sustainability in Egypt, W: Arab Society ..., p. 306.

model, leading to increased social inequality, was established by Hosni Mubarak, who ruled from 1981 to 2011. An attempt to change it were the events of the Arab Spring, which led to the overthrow of the above-mentioned. dictator. However, President Muhammad Morsi, elected in his place, instead of eliminating social inequalities, only tried to replace the ruling elite of the country with members of the Muslim Brotherhood organization. Following the coup d'état in 2013, the new President Abdel Fatah el-Sisi introduced policies that consolidated military power and maintained social inequalities. In 2020, according to the Egyptian Statistical Office, as many as 29.7% of citizens lived in poverty (a daily income of \$1.3).<sup>170</sup> Moreover, approximately 50% of the economically active population works in the informal sector.<sup>171</sup>

According to the classification of Ahmed M. Badawy from the Arab Center for Research and Studies, modern Egypt is inhabited by 6 social classes: the central managing class, the local managing middle class, the stable middle class, the poor middle class, the working class and the underclass. Households that spend between 100 and 1,000 Egyptian

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170CAPMAS :Poverty rates in Egypt decline to 29.7% within year, State Information Service, 19.10.2021, <https://www.sis.gov.eg/Story/159611/CAPMAS-Poverty-rates-in-Egypt-decline-to-29.7%25-within-year?lang=en-us>

171N. Abul-Ezz, Egypt's massive informal economy: Transitioning to formality, Ahram online, 23.09.2021, <https://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/50/1202/423530/AIAhram-Weekly/Economy/Egypt-s-massive-informal-economy-Transitioning-to-f.aspx#:~:text=Egypt%27s%20massive%20informal%20economy%3A%20Transitioning%20to%20formality%20Nahla,sectors%20such%20as%20construction%2C%20blacksmithing%2C%20plumbing%2C%20and%20carpentry>

pounds (\$ 6-63) per day on consumption are considered to be stable middle class.<sup>172</sup> In turn, according to economist Hani Tawfik, the middle class in Egypt includes people earning more than 5,000 Egyptian pounds (\$ 313) per month, which means that 65% of the population is not below this level.<sup>173</sup>

My fieldwork in Egypt shows that class divisions in this country are much more complex than the experts described above indicate. The classification given by Badawy is best suited to the urban population, with the exception of Cairo, where additional divisions can be made within each class. However, in rural areas, which in Egypt are mainly located in oases, class divisions are hardly noticeable. At the same time, however, women are more dependent on men. Women living in rural areas leave their homes less often, cover their bodies more often (in the Siwa oasis even their eyes) and work less often. I draw the following conclusions based on research I conducted in Egypt, living in the Maadi district for 11 months with my ex-wife and two school-age children. In addition to my own observations from conversations and long-term stays in the places described below, I spent time in the company of other expats from Europe and had informal conversations with them.

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172Am I a Middle Class in Egypt?, Money Up, 30.04.2020,

<http://www.mymoneyup.com/?p=635>

173G. Nassar, Eye on the middle class, Ahram online, 20.06.2018,

<https://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContentP/4/302994/Opinion/Eye-on-the-middle-class.aspx>

During my research in Egypt, I visited two oases: Siwa and Tunis Village in the Fayoum province, and the village of Saqqara near Giza and several villages whose names I do not remember, located on the Sinai Peninsula. In the case of Saqqara, Tunis Village and the villages in Sinai, the class division was similar: the people living there could, according to superficial observation, be assigned to the working class (farmers), the poor middle class (small entrepreneurs, policemen, craftsmen) and individual representatives of the stable middle class (owners of guesthouses and restaurants). In the case of the Siwa oasis, the stable middle class had a much larger representation than in the case of the two oases mentioned above. According to the information I obtained from the guide, this oasis was also inhabited by wealthy people who could be classified as so-called local managing middle class, but they do not show their wealth outside. The higher economic status of Siwa's inhabitants results from a combination of two factors: a relatively developed local economy and low population. In this one inhabited by approx. 17 thousand inhabitants, the settlement has three plants producing mineral water sold throughout the country, a company extracting road salt exported in large quantities to Europe, and numerous hotels and restaurants (the town is very popular with tourists due to its beautiful landscapes). Moreover, due to the proximity of the Libyan border, smuggling is an important branch of the local informal economy. Consumer goods from Libya (food, alcohol,

cigarettes) are cheaper because they are not taxed. In turn, Egypt is a source of access to innovative products such as laptops and mobile phones for relatively wealthy Libyans from the east of the country.

During my stay in Egypt, apart from strictly field research, I also conducted observations in Alexandria, Marsa Matruh, Fayoum, Suez, Luxor and Aswan, as well as resorts on the Red Sea: Hurghada and Dahab. I noticed all of the above. social classes except the highest (central ruling class). At the same time, however, the representation of the so-called the underclass of beggars and homeless people was relatively small, and practically non-existent in resorts, as they are not allowed to enter them.

A real case study of social stratification is the Cairo agglomeration, which is inhabited by over 20 million people, i.e. 1/5 of the country's population. Formally, it consists of two governorates separated by the Nile River. On its eastern side is the Cairo Governorate, and on the left is Giza. The governorates are divided into separate cities and districts, the largest of which is Cairo. In fact, in terms of urban planning, it is one whole, and districts are no different from cities. Their boundaries are not clearly marked. Residents call the entire agglomeration (Giza and Cairo) Cairo, and the cities within them de facto serve as districts, so I will call them that in the rest of this subchapter. Residents rarely leave their neighborhoods, often not knowing other parts of Cairo. The

place of residence is inextricably linked to their socio-economic status.<sup>174</sup>

The most luxurious districts of Cairo are: Kathameya, 6th October City, Beverly Hills, Obour City are part of the so-called New Cairo. Their construction began 30 years ago and continues to this day. It is inhabited by the central management class, i.e. wealthy Egyptians, often high-ranking military officers who are also owners of the largest companies in the country. These companies were often originally owned by the military and were later privatized. Their new owners bought them for almost nothing, as a reward for their loyalty to the president. Extremely wealthy foreigners sometimes live in these districts, but they are a minority there. Several times, as part of social visits, e.g. birthday parties of my children's friends from the international school, I had the opportunity to visit residences located on their premises. The scale of their wealth makes a huge impression on a person living permanently in Europe. In their area, the standard is a house of several hundred meters, a large swimming pool, a garden of several hectares, and sometimes even a private golf course. In addition to the owners, servants live in these residences: cleaners, cooks, and gardeners. These include both Egyptians

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<sup>174</sup>M. El-Husseinya, K. Kesseiba, Challenges of Social Sustainability in Neo-liberal Cairo: Re-questioning the role of public space, ASIA Pacific International Conference on Environment-Behaviour Studies, Mercure Le Sphinx Cairo Hotel, Giza, Egypt, 31 October 2 November 2012, p. 799.

from lower social classes and migrants from Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. These districts are fenced with long walls and security guards stand at the entrance gates. Only residents, their guests and buses transporting children from there to international schools are allowed into their area. The economy of these districts is usually limited to the existence of a few shopping malls and restaurants. There are no small private shops in their area. There is also little space for running or walking the dog. Residents live in isolation from their neighbors.<sup>175</sup>

The next level is districts of high prestige but heterogeneous in terms of class: Maadi and Zamalek. They are known for being inhabited by diplomats and expats working in international companies who do not represent the financial level of the central management class, but due to their prestige in Egyptian society they cannot be described as the local management class either. Zamalek, located on the island of the same name, is inhabited mostly by diplomats without children. It is a convenient place for them because most of the embassies are located there. There are also restaurants and nightlife nearby. Expats usually live in apartments with an area of approximately 100-200 m<sup>2</sup> in apartment blocks. However, the district is very crowded, there is smog and dust in the air, and there is a lot of noise.

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<sup>175</sup>Ibidem, p. 797-799.

Diplomats and employees of international companies who have children prefer to choose Maadi, 12 km away from Zamalek. There is a lot of artificially irrigated vegetation (which is a luxury in Egypt) and most of the international schools are located there. Luxury apartments with an area of 200-300 m<sup>2</sup> are also available in estates called "compounds". Compounds have the shape of courtyards-wells, are fenced, equipped with underground parking lots and a common yard, often with a swimming pool. In addition to expats, Egyptians from the local management middle class also live in the compounds. These are representatives of management staff in large Egyptian companies, high-ranking officials or simply people who live by renting apartments to expats.

From my experience living in Compound, the relationships between Egyptians and foreigners living there are full of neighborly conflicts. These are often arguments about money. Apartment owners do not want to cover the costs of repairs in their apartments, even if they agreed to do so in the lease agreement. The second area of conflict is the attitude of expat children to play.

Egyptians expect that, like Egyptian children from wealthy families, they will spend all day at home in front of a computer or laptop and not make any noise. It is worth adding that wealthy Egyptians often do not have knowledge about children's needs and behaviors, because their children are often at school all day, attending extracurricular activities or

under the care of nannies. In turn, expats believe that since they have rented an apartment with a shared garden and swimming pool, their children have the right to play there. These situations usually remain unresolved. My expat neighbors have learned to ignore Egyptians based on their negative experiences. At first I tried to talk to them. Over time, however, I noticed that any attempts at dialogue and negotiation on my part were perceived as my weakness. Dissatisfied neighbors never came to see me personally. They always sent a caretaker who gave me orders to calm down the children. The more I tried to be conciliatory, the more arrogant the caretaker's tone became. Any concessions on my part were an excuse to make further demands. Once, when I arrogantly replied that I would not meet the neighbors' requirements, the situation changed. Instead of visits from the caretaker, I started receiving calls from the owners. After ignoring them, the neighbors' complaints ended. One of my neighbors even came to me and said that she did not want to have any conflicts with me and asked for forgiveness if I felt offended by her.

In addition to expats and wealthy Egyptians, Maadi and Zamalek are also inhabited by representatives of other social classes (apart from the central ruling class). In Zamalek, social differences are marked by the buildings inhabited, while in Maadi by individual categories of streets, which have their own numerical names. Streets from numbers 10 to 25 are

considered the most prestigious. The further away from them, the wealth of the inhabitants decreases. An interesting example is 9 Street, which runs along the entire district. There are restaurants, shops and nightclubs on its premises. The closer to the south, the more exclusive these places are, and the further north, the more modest they are. At its northern end there is a housing estate inhabited by representatives of the working class and migrants from the Horn of Africa, and a bazaar is located between the buildings. Most expats are unaware of the existence of this place, even though it is located only 2 km from the establishments they regularly visit. I will describe this enclave in detail in the section on the life and religious practice of migrants.

The districts of Mokattam, 5 Settlements and Sheikh Zayed City are also interesting. It is inhabited by Egyptians from the local management class and stable middle class: wealthy entrepreneurs, doctors, psychologists, freelancers, academics, executives in large national companies and Egyptian employees of multinational corporations. Unlike Maadi and Zamalek, the presence of people from lower social classes in these districts is very limited. Living in their area is a fulfillment of the aspirations of wealthier residents to isolate themselves from the poor in Cairo. These districts are home to elegant shopping malls and restaurants. An interesting example of combining modernity with tradition is Sheikh Zayed City. It is a town in the Giza Governorate, built by

investors from the United Arab Emirates. There are modern buildings on its territory, but at the entrance there is a monument to the founder of the emirates, Sheikh Zayed, dressed in shepherd's robes and holding a staff. In appearance, he resembles the biblical Moses more than a person who died less than 20 years ago.<sup>176</sup>



Photo No. 10: Sheikh Zayed Monument in Cairo,

Source:<https://www.dubaipost.ae/en/short-n-eazy/around-the-world/cairo-pays-tribute-to-late-sheikh-zayed-2017-02-26-1.508>,  
03.03.2023

The rest of the Cairo agglomeration consists of either over a hundred-year-old buildings in its historic center or huge

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176M. Pawłowski, Przenieśmy sobie stolicę, TVN24 premium, 18.12.2021, <https://tvn24.pl/premium/egipt-rozpoczyna-sie-przeprowadzka-do-nowej-administracyjnej-stolicy-5530213>

estates of illegal construction. It is inhabited by representatives of all social classes, from the poor middle class down. Most illegal construction works look the same. These are approximately 10-story unplastered red brick buildings. They make up the majority of Giza's architecture, but are also present in other parts of the metropolitan area. Their inhabitants are often descendants of migrants from the provinces who moved there to find work in better parts of the city. A good example is the Imbaba district, located in the immediate vicinity of Zamalku. The impetus for the creation of such districts was the failure of the policy of building new towns in the 1970s. In the 20th century by President Sadat. It involved the construction of new settlements in desert areas. The error in its implementation was that they were not equipped with the necessary social and transport infrastructure and large workplaces were not located on their territory. As a result, instead of migrating there, Egyptians preferred to move to Cairo and arbitrarily build housing blocks there, despite the fact that this has been prohibited since 1966.<sup>177</sup> Unauthorized construction constitute 80% of the buildings built in Cairo in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. Even though their construction is illegal, they have owners who sell or rent apartments in them to new tenants.<sup>178</sup> As many as 17

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177M. Sèjourné, *The history of Informal Settlements, W: Cairo's Informal Areas. Between Urban Challenges and hidden potentials. Facts. Voices. Visions*, red. R.Kipper, M. Fischer, Kair 2009, p. 17-19.

178E. Piffero, *Beyond rules and regulations: The growth of informal Cairo*, Ibidem p. 21-22.

million Egyptians and numerous migrants from Sub-Saharan African countries live in this type of buildings throughout the country.<sup>179</sup>

The underclass mentioned in Bahrawy's classification are beggars and other people who do not have a stable income and often live on the streets. They can be found in most districts of Cairo. The higher the status of a district, the fewer there are. In luxurious, walled districts, there are no such buildings at all. Sometimes they ask for money directly, but they usually use other strategies, such as small sales of products such as tissues. These people receive donations from other Egyptians during the month of Ramadan, when religious Muslims are obliged to give alms. The rest of the year, however, they are ignored. Sometimes foreigners also support them, though usually in the form of individual contributions. Usually, a donation to one beggar leads to more beggars. This social group is dominated by Egyptians, especially women and children. Migrants tend to be resistant to this kind of activity. Perhaps they fear violence from the Egyptians or the police. I was unable to obtain data confirming the relationship between religion and class in Egypt. However, it seems to me that such a correlation does not exist. While living in Cairo, I came across the opinion that Copts play a dominant role in the financial sector and the country's economy. This thesis is

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179D. Shehayeb. Advantages of living in informal areas, *Ibidem* p. 35.

difficult to verify. However, you can find isolated examples of representatives of this denomination having great economic power. It should be noted here, among others: Yousef Boutros Ghali, Minister of Finance from 2004 to 2011, Mounir Fakhra Abdel Nour, Minister of Industry and Investment from 2013 to 2015, and billionaire Naguib Sawiris. In contrast, it should be added that the district dominated by Copts is the so-called Garbage City, an area located on Mount Mokattam (near the district of the same name), to which most of the waste from the Cairo agglomeration is transported and then recycled there. Most of its inhabitants certainly cannot be described as wealthy, and their living conditions arouse sympathy among foreigners visiting the area due to the ubiquitous garbage, dirt and unpleasant smell. However, in relation to the general Egyptian population, they cannot be classified as poor because their work gives them regular income sufficient to meet their basic living needs. In the Garbage City, there are also private schools for local children financed by foreign sponsors. I also heard from my friends who are Egyptian Muslims that Copts have a reputation for honesty and good professionals. At the same time, I was cheated by the administrator of the building where I lived, who was a Copt, regarding the costs of repairs in the apartment. In turn, the Coptic plumber repaired the shower in my bathroom incorrectly and ignored my complaint. Of course, I also had similar situations with Muslims, and generally being deceived in financial matters was my everyday experience during my stay in Egypt. Perhaps this is part of the

specificity of life in exile, although during my later stay in Algeria I had many fewer such experiences.

Social standing in Egypt is largely inherited. Social mobility is limited in many ways. First, jobs are usually obtained through family connections. Secondly, friendships in adult life are often a consequence of social contacts from school. Therefore, providing children with a good network of contacts requires paying for their education in international schools. In the most expensive of them, a trimester of study costs up to \$5,000. Thirdly, it is common among wealthy Egyptians to isolate themselves from people whose social status is lower than them. This is not written down anywhere, but the Egyptians speak about it directly. In arguments or negotiations (which are often not much different from quarrels), they regularly try to dominate the other party by exposing their family connections.

Racism is pervasive in society, which I will discuss based on reports from international organizations in the next section. I experienced this while living in Egypt. Due to my research, I often spent time in places where whites are a minority. At times I felt treated like a celebrity, e.g. when moving in public spaces dominated by the poor middle and working classes, I was asked to pose for group photos. Both women and men often complimented my beauty. Once, a local salesman even suggested that I open a joint YouTube channel in which I would appear solely because I was a white

European. On the other hand, conversations and observations revealed arrogant and disrespectful treatment of black people by local shopkeepers. In turn, diplomats from Sub-Saharan African countries driving their cars are often perceived by Egyptians (even policemen) as chauffeurs. I heard the story of a black consul who, when parked in an unauthorized place, was asked by a policeman to call his "patron".

The Nubians, who make up about 3% of the country's population and are from the south, are often not treated by other Egyptians as members of the same nation. In the media, they are often presented only as performers of the lowest-paid professions, such as porters, which further hinders their social and professional advancement.<sup>180</sup> During my 11 months in Egypt, I never met any Nubian or other black person who performed intellectual work, even if they were qualified to do so. During my first month in Cairo, I used a Nubian taxi driver who spoke fluent English and French. He regularly talked about how "white" Egyptians were dishonest and that he preferred working with foreigners. At the same time, however, I must add that although he was very helpful and honest for a long time, I gave up his services after a month because

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1800. Gaweesh, Egyptian media: a catalyst for racism against Nubians, Media diversity, 12.04.2021, <https://www.media-diversity.org/egyptian-media-a-catalyst-for-racism-against-nubians/#:~:text=Today%20Nubians%20form%20only%203%25%20of%20the%20total,de mands%2C%20we%20have%20rights.%20Nubians%20sacrificed%20a%20lot.>

when he gained my trust, he began to inflate the prices of the services offered. In the case of Egyptians with the Arabic genotype, however, such actions appeared already at the first service. Of course, I am still aware of my particular position as a white privileged migrant and I am describing here my own, individual experiences and not representative research data. I also heard the opinion that Nubians do not maintain contacts with black people from other countries because they feel a similar superiority towards them as "white" Egyptians feel towards them. Once, during a joking conversation, I called a black janitor "the boss from Sudan", he looked at me with sad eyes and said that he was Egyptian. I then had the impression that by attributing "Sudanese-ness" to it, I had unconsciously lowered its prestige.

Social position in Egypt is also determined by access to sports and recreational infrastructure. There are no widely accessible public parks, soccer fields, or other sports facilities in Egyptian cities. Beaches usually belong to hotels and only their guests are allowed there. During my entire stay in Egypt, I saw only one public beach and it was located in the immediate vicinity of the highway, in a place where the construction of any building was technically impossible. There are literally several parks in the Cairo metropolitan area, and entry to them is charged. Egyptian elites and some expats enroll their children in clubs where membership can cost up to \$200 USD per month (clubs have their own reputation, the

higher it is, the more expensive the membership). Within the walls and guarded clubs, there are restaurants, children's playgrounds and sports facilities. Representatives of the so-called stable middle class people like to spend time in the Family Park outside the city. It is an amusement park with lots of attractions such as a ferris wheel, a wild river, a roller coaster, etc. Admission costs 100 EGP per person (approx. \$6.25) and additionally, using each attraction inside involves a fee of 10-20 EGP. The poor middle class visits Al-Azhar Park, a beautiful and impressive garden with natural grass, palm trees, a large children's playground and two restaurants. Admission costs EGP 20 per person (\$1.25). Working-class people visit other, less well-kept parks, such as the Imbaba, which cost about 10 EGP (approx. \$0.65) for each person. Children of people who can't afford regular visits to these parks have to play in the street. In the Maadi district, it was common for migrants from the Horn of Africa to spend their time in 10-square-meter huts. In their territory, adults sat and talked, and children played and even played soccer.

The luxury of Cairo is access to fresh air, vegetation, and electricity. There are a lot of irrigated trees and lawns in upscale neighborhoods. It makes for a lot less smog. Plants also dissipate exhaust fumes, reducing and sometimes even eliminating the smog that is found in high concentrations in poor neighborhoods. The electricity is supplied by means of electromagnetic cards that are recharged at the kiosk. At the

end of the recharging state, the electricity is switched off. My family of four consumed approximately 1,000 Egyptian pounds (\$60) of electricity per month. A worker usually earned 5,000 Egyptian pounds a month, and migrants earned even less. However, there is some kind of equality in access to clean water and the Internet, because the status of these services is equally poor for all residents of Egypt.

As I mentioned in the subsection on migration policy in Egypt, the Egyptian authorities do not provide accurate statistics on migrants living in the country. Even their total number is only an estimate. The UNHCR data, on the other hand, only covers refugees, who make up maybe five percent of all migrants. Moreover, there is no data on the position of migrants in the social structure of the country and their exact place of residence. I can only rely on my own observations on this matter. The main findings are that migrants live almost exclusively in Cairo.

The Lebanese are faring the best financially among migrants from Africa and the Middle East. They run their own restaurants, hairdressing and beauty salons, and stores selling products from their countries. The Lebanese, as Christians and the most liberal nation in the Middle East and known for its exceptionally tasty cuisine, are also gaining clientele among wealthy expats. For example, in a Lebanese hairdressing salon in the Maadi district, the washing and head massage of male clients after haircuts was performed by

women, while the male hairdressers performed their service faster and without excessive touching of the client's body. For comparison, in salons run by Egyptians, hairdressers, in addition to the basic service, even forcibly washed and massaged their clients' heads several times, put masks on their faces and massaged their chests with a device similar in appearance to an iron. For European heterosexual men (including me), such an action could be perceived as too bodily intimate. Hence, both me and my European colleagues preferred the Lebanese salon. From conversations with southern Sudanese, I know that they also found such physical contact between men uncomfortable. I assume that for this reason and economic reasons, hairdressing services were provided to them by their wives, sisters or mothers.

Syrian migrants often fall into Egypt's stable middle or lower middle class, running or working in restaurants, kebab bars and shops selling Syrian products. However, people who come from Sub-Saharan Africa or Asia belong to the working class. Some of them sell products from their countries at the bazaar, most of them work occasionally as domestic helpers or other types of manual workers, often receiving irregular remuneration. Among my Egyptian and expat friends (including from Latvia, Russia, Spain, Ukraine, Armenia, France and Italy) there was a belief that the best domestic helpers were Filipinas and the rates for their work were the highest (approx. 5,000-6,000 EGP per month, i.e. \$300-400).

This was due to the fact that they speak English and are considered conscientious, hard-working, multi-tasking and honest. People from Sub-Saharan Africa were assessed second. The costs of their services were usually around 2,000-4,000 EGP per month. The advantage of people from these countries was knowledge of English, accurate performance of individual tasks and honesty. The disadvantages included the lack of multitasking and the possibility of resigning from work without notice. For example, a person employed to clean, take care of children and cook would choose one activity and focus on it perfectly, neglecting the others. The cost of domestic help from Egypt was similar to the rates charged by people from Sub-Saharan Africa (EGP 2,000-4,000). However, the quality of services was rated worse. Egyptian women had a reputation for multitasking, but after a short period of intense work, the quality of their services consistently decreased and their salary expectations increased. Egyptian women usually did not know English, they provided multimedia equipment to children against their parents' wishes, and they only cleaned thoroughly in visible places. Obtaining a raise as a result of negotiations did not motivate them to work more carefully, but only to further negotiations. For this reason, they usually lost their jobs after a few months or sometimes weeks. Due to the fact that domestic help work in Egypt is provided without a contract and without legal protection <sup>181</sup>, the

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<sup>181</sup>More info in the sub-chapter 4.4.

dismissal of such a person depends solely on the decision of the employer. In the case of expat work, domestic helpers did their work during certain hours and then returned to their homes. In the homes of wealthy Egyptians, they had the status of servants - they lived with their employer 6 days a week, performing the tasks assigned to them.

### **3.4. The situation of migrants in Egypt according to the reports from international organizations and media analysis**

Egypt is the subject of intense interest from international organizations monitoring human rights violations. However, reports by organizations such as Human Rights Watch devote most of their attention to the actions of the Egyptian authorities towards the opposition and human rights activists. The issue of migrants' rights, if it is raised at all, is a marginal part of the report. They mainly describe violations by the authorities, but ignore the issues of violations of migrants' rights by Egyptian society. However, this phenomenon exists, has a quite significant scale and a long-standing "tradition", as evidenced by scientific research conducted in 2000-2001 by Elizabeth Coker and two reports by non-governmental organizations from 2007 and 2018, which I will discuss in this subchapter. Cases of racist behavior by Egyptians towards migrants, especially black people, are from time to time described on portals dealing with migration issues and in the media of the migrants' countries of origin.

In 2000-2001, British journalist Elizabeth Coker conducted in-depth interviews with 30 South Sudanese migrants living in Cairo. These conversations showed that as black Christians of African rather than Arab customs, they felt alienated in Egyptian society. They could not cultivate their culture because large gatherings, singing and dancing were not tolerated by the Egyptians who rented them apartments. In most cases, they were also not formally recognized as refugees. They were also hurt by accusations from Egyptians who considered them only economic migrants who ignored their strong patriotic feelings. While walking on the street, they were afraid of being attacked by the Egyptians. Educated southern Sudanese could not find jobs commensurate with their level of qualifications. Men usually performed odd manual labor. For women, the only possible employment was as domestic help, which was associated with numerous dangers and various forms of abuse. They also did not trust the Egyptian health service and trusted only clinics run by the Catholic Church. They were afraid to go to an Egyptian hospital for fear of losing their organs. They claimed that Egyptian doctors were illegally removing organs from black people during various medical procedures. However, these stories did not concern the respondents' immediate environment and, according to the author of the article, were difficult to verify. At the same time, her interlocutors did not

report the crimes they were victims of because they did not trust the Egyptian police to defend them.<sup>182</sup>

In 2007, the Egyptian Initiative for Human Rights (EIPR) and the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) prepared a report for the UN describing cases of violations of migrants' rights in Egypt. It was then indicated that foreigners looking for work in this country had to, in accordance with the 2006 decree, undergo mandatory HIV/AIDS tests. At the same time, in accordance with Art. 4 of the Labor Law of 2003, labor law provisions do not apply to persons performing work as domestic help, popular among migrants. Any written agreement requires the approval of the Ministry of Labour and Human Resources. So even if an employer wanted to sign a domestic help contract, the prospect of confronting the Egyptian bureaucracy would discourage them from doing so. In the absence of legal protection, people doing this kind of work were often subjected to physical and psychological violence by their employers, especially if they lived in their homes. Their passports were confiscated in order to prevent them from moving around and giving evidence to the police. They were forced to do their work without rest or days off. The report also indicated that black people were victims of street attacks during that period, during which they were

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182E. M. Coker, *Dislocated Identity and the Fragmented Body: Discourses of Resistance among Southern Sudanese Refugees in Cairo*, *Journal of Refugee Studies* Vol. 17, No. 4<sup>a</sup>Oxford University Press 2004, p. 402-414.

beaten and insulted. One of the doctors quoted in the report stated that he treated a black beating victim at least once a month. Moreover, black people were detained by the police solely because of their skin color, and then taken to police stations, where they were subjected to physical and mental violence. The legal basis for this type of detention was to be the provisions of the state of emergency in force in the country since 1981. The report also recalls the brutal police action of December 30, 2005 against 1,500 Sudanese camping in protest in front of the UNHCR headquarters. 2,000 police officers then surrounded the protesters, then used a water cannon on them and started beating them. As a result of police actions, 27 people died.<sup>183</sup> In 2020, I talked to an Egyptian Arabic teacher about this event. In her opinion, the police action was approved by the Egyptian society, which was outraged that the protesters drank alcohol and had sex in the tents they had set up. However, the authors of the report note the positive fact that in 2006 a ban on racial discrimination appeared in Egyptian legislation.<sup>184</sup> However, as successive reports have shown, this law remains a blank slate unless a specific case of discrimination is reported by media.

A 2018 report by the Global Detention Project indicates that the legal situation of migrants in Egypt has deteriorated

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<sup>183</sup>Egypt: Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. Alternatywny Raport organizacji pozarządowych EIPR i FIDH dla komitetu ONZ ds. Ochrony praw pracujących migrantów i ich rodzin, kwiecień 2007, p. 4-10.

<sup>184</sup>Ibidem, p.10.

over the years. Since 2013, the army has been authorized to detain migrants in cases of: attempting to cross the border without the authorities' consent, for identification purposes, staying in the country without permission, to prevent escape, for disregarding the order to leave the country, during the asylum process. Detainees do not have the legal right to: information about detention, legal advice, access to asylum procedures, or appeal against unlawful detention (they had such a right until 2011). In addition, military courts gained the right to try them. Jails and other places of detention are usually overcrowded (20-60 people in a cell of 16-30 m<sup>2</sup>), there are no regulations specifying the maximum length of pre-trial detention (without a court sentence) or reports specifying how long it lasts on average. Migrants and refugees are often imprisoned together with criminals. UNHCR is not allowed into detention centers, even when refugees or asylum seekers are detained. Moreover, as a result of arrests of migrants, approximately 3,800 minors were deprived of contact with their parents in 2018.<sup>185</sup>

Limited information on violations of migrants' rights was provided in the 2021 summaries of the human rights situation in Egypt prepared by the Freedom House Foundation and Amnesty International. In the 2021 World Freedom Rankings, Freedom House awarded Egypt 18 out of 100 points. One of

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<sup>185</sup>Immigration detention in Egypt: military tribunals, human rights abuses, abysmal conditions and EU partner, Raport Krajowy organizacji Global Detention Project, 2018.

the elements of the justification was the information that migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, as well as refugees from Syria, are exposed to forced physical work, including sexual work.<sup>186</sup> Amnesty International, in turn, pointed out that in 2021, dozens of migrants illegally entering Egyptian territory were detained. They were detained in inhumane conditions without a court verdict and without a date for leaving detention. Additionally, in the last quarter of 2021, Egyptian authorities forced back 40 Eritreans who had been detained since October 2019.<sup>187</sup>

In January 2020, the InfoMigrant website published an article summarizing research by journalists from the Associated Press (AP) on this topic. They interviewed 24 migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa who admitted that they had been victims of racist insults and/or sexual harassment in the 3 months preceding the interview. Migrants were most often called "slaves" or "niggers" (Arab. Samara). Four children were pelted with stones. Two women were walking their children to school when they were surrounded by a group of Egyptian teenagers who called them names and tried to

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186Egypt, Freedom in the World 2021, Freedom House, 01.05.2022,

<https://freedomhouse.org/country/egypt/freedom-world/2021>

187Egypt 2021, Amnesty International, 01.05.2022,

<https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/middle-east-and-north-africa/egypt/report-egypt/#:~:text=EGYPT%202021%20The%20rights%20to%20freedom%20of%20expression,p,roseutions%20and%20inclusion%20on%20a%20%E2%80%9Clist%20of%20terrorists%E2%80%9D.>

undress them. Another two women admitted that they had been sexually harassed by their employers who employed them as cleaners. However, they could not file a police report because they had not finalized the process of legalizing their stay in Egypt. In turn, one man who is a political refugee from Ethiopia admitted that he manages to get a job only because he is paid twice as much as Egyptians. The text quotes Shirley de Leon from the International Organization for Migration (IOM), who admitted that as the cost of living and youth unemployment increased in Egypt in 2019, the number of racist attacks increased, especially by young Egyptian men. on black women. Attia Essawi, an expert on African affairs at the Cairo Al-Ahram Policy Center, was quoted as saying that it would take many years to eradicate racism from Egypt because for centuries, social position in society was closely linked to skin color. However, the authors also provide positive signals, such as President Sisi's strong condemnation of racist incidents and the 2018 sentencing to 7 years in prison of a man who beat a black teacher from a refugee school.<sup>188</sup>

Reports of violence against black migrants also appear from time to time in the Egyptian and South Sudanese media. In May 2021, the Egyptian website El-Shai published an article explaining the circumstances of the publication on the TikTok

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188S. Sanderson, Sub-Saharan migrants in Egypt subject to increasing abuse and violence, InfoMigrant, 06.01.2020, <https://www.infomigrants.net/ar/post/21862/subsaharan-migrants-in-egypt-subject-to-increasing-abuse-and-violence>

platform of a recording in which an Egyptian teenager beats and forces his peer from South Sudan to wash dishes and insults himself. The recording has been viewed by over 170,000 people and thus attracted the attention of the public, including President Sisi, who condemned it and promised to punish the Egyptian teenager. The author of the article explains that a boy from southern Sudan was kidnapped by a group of Egyptians when he defended his cousins. Despite his efforts, the men raped the girls and shaved their heads.<sup>189</sup> In turn, in the years 2019-2021, the South Sudanese website Hot in Juba published articles about the kidnapping of black migrants by an Egyptian gang harvesting organs, the imprisonment and forced sex of a woman from South Sudan, and the kidnapping of a student from this country by Egyptians.<sup>190</sup> Egyptian violence against black people rarely appears in the media, and most Egyptians deny its occurrence. However, my interlocutors from South Sudan indicated that this is a common phenomenon. I will discuss this issue in more detail in the section on the daily life of the migrants.

## 4. Catholic Church in Africa

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189R. El-Sayed, Full Story of the South Sudanese Boy who was Kidnapped in Egypt: Abuse, Rape, and Humiliation all for Tik-Tok videos, El-Shai.com, 01.05.2021, <https://www.el-shai.com/full-story-south-sudanese-boy-kidnapped-in-egypt/>

190Egypt denies stealing of South Sudanese human organs, Hot in Juba, 28 czerwca 2019 r., <https://hotinjuba.com>; S. Sudanese women are being kidnapped as sex slaves in Egypt, Hot in Juba, 18 listopada 2019 r., <https://hotinjuba.com>; South Sudanese student allegedly kidnapped in Egypt, Hot in Juba, 17.12.2019, <https://hotinjuba.com>.

## **4.1. History, mission and structure of the Catholic Church in Africa**

Despite its proximity to the Holy Land, Christianity reached Africa slowly and with interruptions. The first wave of evangelization affected only North Africa and Ethiopia. In the 1st century AD, the Church was established in Egypt, and soon thereafter in other countries in the region. In the 3rd century AD, there were already two important Christian centers in northern Africa: Alexandria, associated with Byzantium, and Carthage, under the influence of Rome.<sup>191</sup> The leading figures of the Alexandrian school were Origen, Saint. Anastasius and Saint Cyril, and the Carthaginian school of St. Augustine, Tertullian and St. Cyprian. The activity in Ethiopia was provided by St. Frumencius.<sup>192</sup> As a result of the Arab conquest in 7<sup>th</sup> century Christianity lost its influence in the region. By the 13th century, the Church was completely liquidated in what is now Tunisia and Algeria. The local population was Islamized due to economic coercion (special taxes for dissenters).<sup>193</sup> It was caused also due to the insufficient adaptation of the Church to local conditions. The

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191M. Bogusiak, *Charakterystyka misji i działalności Kościoła Katolickiego w Afryce Północnej*, p. 1 31.01.2022, [https://www.academia.edu/41886229/Charakterystyka\\_misji\\_i\\_dzia%C5%82alno%C5%9Bci\\_Ko%C5%9Bcio%C5%82a\\_katolickiego\\_w\\_Afryce\\_P%C3%B3%C5%82nocnej](https://www.academia.edu/41886229/Charakterystyka_misji_i_dzia%C5%82alno%C5%9Bci_Ko%C5%9Bcio%C5%82a_katolickiego_w_Afryce_P%C3%B3%C5%82nocnej),

192Apostolic Adhoration of Jan Paul II, *Ecclesia in Africa*, Rome 2000  
[https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/pl/apost\\_exhortations/documents/hf\\_jp-ii\\_exh\\_14091995\\_ecclesia-in-africa.html#m2](https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/pl/apost_exhortations/documents/hf_jp-ii_exh_14091995_ecclesia-in-africa.html#m2)

193M. Bogusiak, *op. cit.*, p. 8-9.

Church did not translate the Bible into Berber or Phoenician, and did not introduce elements of local culture into the liturgy.<sup>194</sup> The situation was different in Egypt and Ethiopia, where ancient Christian churches have survived to this day. The translation of the Bible into the Coptic and Gyyz languages and the so-called inculturation, that is, the adoption of elements of the local culture, among others, into the liturgy, created a attachment to Christianity.<sup>195</sup> Then in the 13th century, St. Francis of Assisi attempted to evangelize Morocco and Egypt, but his actions ended with moderate success. The Franciscan Order did not attract crowds, but it developed a concept of harmonious coexistence with the Muslim authorities, thanks to which its mission has continued uninterruptedly since then to this day. From the very beginning, the Franciscans also advocated teaching Christian theology in Arabic.<sup>196</sup>

The second wave of evangelization of Africa took place in the 15th and 16th centuries, when Portuguese missionaries reached the areas of today's Benin, St. Thomas, Angola, Mozambique and Madagascar.<sup>197</sup> However, even then the local Church did not take any significant actions in the field of inculturation, nor did it seek to expand its activities deeper

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194J. Róžański, Kościół katolicki w dialogu z tradycyjnymi religiami afrykańskimi, Pelplin 2020, p. 31.

195Ibidem, p. 32.

196M. Bogusiak, op. cit., p. 8-9.

197 Ecclesia in Africa ..., op. cit.

into the continent. He was more interested in pursuing his own economic self-interest and providing himself with a convenient stopover during his journey to India. A notable exception was the Italian Capuchin order, which, while conducting missionary activity in today's Angola and Congo, tried to learn the languages, customs and mentality of the local peoples.<sup>198</sup>

The third, and most vigorous, wave of evangelization in Africa took place in the 19th and 20th centuries.<sup>199</sup> For a long time, however, it was mainly an element supporting the colonial expansion of Western powers. Missionaries, convinced of the civilizational superiority of Europe over Africa, carried out their service with the conviction of the need to educate local peoples in Western fashion, striving to eradicate their traditional cultures.<sup>200</sup> Pope Pius XII's encyclical "Evangelii Praecones" was the first to change this way of thinking. Although still written in a tone of superiority to the peoples of Africa, it called for an end to the suppression of the Christian values of traditional African cultures.<sup>201</sup> Pius XII stated, among others: that "the Church, while encouraging people to adopt a higher culture and a better lifestyle inspired by Christianity, cannot cut down a flourishing forest by the roots.

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198J. Róžański, op. cit., sp. 32.

199 Ecclesia in Africa ..., op. cit.

200J. Róžański, op. cit., p s. 33-34.

201Ibidem, p. 42-43.

Rather, it is to sow good seed in the wild soil, so that it may produce an even more fruitful harvest."<sup>202</sup>

The Second Vatican Council marked a turning point in the Catholic Church's approach to Africa. At that time, he officially began to work for interfaith dialogue, allowed the possibility of salvation for followers of other religions, and allowed the adaptation of elements of traditional rites of non-Christian religions into the liturgy. He also recognized that all men are witnesses to the so-called natural revelation of creation and that there are good and true gifts from God to their followers in religions other than Christendom, and that the Catholic Church should defend these values.<sup>203</sup> Undoubtedly, the most important achievement of the Second Vatican Council for inculturation was the introduction of local languages into the liturgy from 1963.<sup>204</sup> However, as Klaudia Wilk points out, "the council documents emphasize respect for local cultures, but at the same time emphasize the need to remove from them elements that are difficult to reconcile with Christian doctrine at the level of social disciplines."<sup>205</sup> On this

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202Evangelii Praecones, Encyclical of Pope Pius XII, 02.06.1951, [https://www.vatican.va/content/pius-xii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf\\_p-xii\\_enc\\_02061951\\_evangelii-praecones.html](https://www.vatican.va/content/pius-xii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xii_enc_02061951_evangelii-praecones.html)

203Ibidem, p. 44-50.

204A. Niedźwiedź, Tożsamości wśród katolickiej społeczności w centralnej części Ghany, W: Problemy współczesnej Afryki. Szanse i wyzwania na przyszłość, red. K. Jarecka-Stępień, J. Kościółek, Kraków 2012, p. 106.

205K. Wilk, Od inkulturacji do afrochrześcijaństwa Proces kształtowania się tożsamości religijnej we współczesnej Afryce, In: Problemy współczesnej Afryki. Szanse i wyzwania na przyszłość, red. K. Jarecka-Stępień, Warsaw 2013. , p. 151.

basis, the Church accepts, for example, getting married in traditional African costumes and accompanied by local music, but cannot accept, among others, polygamy as inconsistent with Christian morality.<sup>206</sup>

Pope John Paul II did very important work for the inculturation of Christianity in Africa. In the years 1980-2000, he made pilgrimages to 42 African countries, during which he repeatedly discussed the cultural and religious heritage of Africa. During them, he met with representatives of traditional African religions, with whom he even prayed together as part of the World Day of Prayer in Assisi on October 27, 1986. In 1994, he organized the Synod on Africa, the summary of which was the Apostolic Exhortation *Ecclesia in Africa* of 2000<sup>207</sup> In this document, John Paul II stated explicitly that "inculturation is the path to full evangelization and one of the most important challenges facing the Church on a continent on the threshold of the third millennium".<sup>208</sup>

Successive Popes: Benedict XVI and Francis continued their pilgrimages to African countries. Benedict XVI organized the Second Special Assembly of the Synod of Bishops on Africa, under the theme "The Church in Africa at the Service of Reconciliation, Justice and Peace: 'You are the salt of the earth... You are the light of the world'". In addition, in 2011,

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<sup>206</sup>Ibidem, p. 153.

<sup>207</sup>J. Róžański, op. cit., p. 56-57.

<sup>208</sup>*Ecclesia in Africa* ..., op. cit.

in Benin, he proclaimed the synodal summary of the Adoration Africae Munus. In turn, Francis declared his adoration of Evangelii Gaudium in 2013.<sup>209</sup>

The basic document defining the mission of the Catholic Church in Africa is the above-mentioned document. Exhortation *Ecclesia in Africa*. The tasks that John Paul II indicates to be carried out by the church community can be divided into strictly religious and socio-political ones.

The strictly religious ones include: baptizing as many Africans as possible, familiarizing millions of people with the Gospel, inculturation of religious rituals, encouraging priestly vocations among the indigenous African population, ensuring celibacy by local priests, promoting the institution of the diaconate (fulfilling some of the clerical tasks by people secular) and implementing joint initiatives with other Christian Churches.

The socio-political challenges must be divided into those addressed to national authorities and international organisations and those relating to individual African societies.

Within the first group, the Catholic Church is to strive to: seek decisions to ensure justice, peace and protection of human rights, condemn corruption and support democracy and political pluralism as the values that best ensure peace

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209 J. Róžański, op. cit, p. 57-59.

and protect human dignity. The church is also expected to promote the conversion of military regimes to civilian ones, mediate between parties to armed conflicts, criticize the arms trade, and support initiatives to combat the HIV/ AIDS epidemic. The church is also expected to encourage wealthy nations to help poor nations solve their social and economic problems and to lobby the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank for debt relief for African nations.

The socio-economic tasks relating to society include: promoting Christian morality (including indissolubility of marriages, fidelity, responsibility for raising children), forming lay animators of faith and encouraging them to play important roles in society (in politics, school, security services , public administration, media, business), promoting the culture of dialogue and reconciliation and eliminating ethnic animosities. Education is to be an important field of activity of the Church, including primarily the literacy of the population and then increasing its competences through studies in Catholic schools and universities. The Church is also to be active in providing medical assistance to Africans. Important aspects of its activities include eradicating customs that harm women's dignity and influencing the mass media.<sup>210</sup>

The Adoration Africae Munus adds new elements to the idea expressed in Ecclesia in Africa. It emphasizes that the

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210 Ecclesia in Africa ..., op. cit.

Church should promote the adoption of legislation in successive countries banning abortion and the death penalty, and the establishment of an independent judiciary and rehabilitation programs for prisoners. It focuses heavily on criticism of excessive and unjust social stratification and calls on the leaders of the Global North countries to develop a more equitable course of globalization processes than the current one. The church is also expected to be at the forefront of the fight against the over-exploitation of Africa's natural resources, which leads to environmental pollution and desertification. It is also intended to promote the abolition of repressive anti-immigrant laws in many countries and to protect the rights of migrants. Moreover, through dialogue with other religions, it is to build peace on the African continent.<sup>211</sup>

The Exhortation *Evangelii Gaudium* has a more universal message than *Ecclesia in Africa* in *Africae Munus*. However, it also refers to the problems of African countries. What distinguishes the ideas expressed therein from those contained in the two above-mentioned documents is the clear criticism of the neoliberal economic model as exclusionary and leading to an increase in poverty and social inequality. Moreover, it recognizes consumerism as the greatest threat to Christianity. It also emphasizes the leading role of women in

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211 *Africae Munus*, 2011, [https://www.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/pl/apost\\_exhortations/documents/hf\\_ben-xvi\\_exh\\_20111119\\_africae-munus.html](https://www.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/pl/apost_exhortations/documents/hf_ben-xvi_exh_20111119_africae-munus.html)

church communities and calls for increasing their participation in decision-making in church circles.<sup>212</sup>

The issue of education in Uganda should be mentioned as an important example of the social activity of the Catholic Church in Africa. Many of my interlocutors from South Sudan, emphasized that education in Uganda is considered the best in the Horn of Africa region and relatively affordable. Some of them even sent their children to Ugandan schools. The Ministry of Education and Sports of Uganda has been implementing a program for years under which there is to be 1 school in each parish, 1 secondary school in each commune, and 1 vocational school in each region. As a result, in the 2016/2017 school year, 1.5 million people attended junior high school, which is impressive considering that the country's total population is 50 million. The Catholic Church runs 10% of primary schools and 13% of junior high schools. Most of them are located in areas with poor transport access. Some of them receive state subsidies, and some are financed exclusively from church funds. It is worth emphasizing that Uganda has one of the largest networks of Catholic schools in the world.<sup>213</sup>

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212 *Evangelii gaudium*, 2013

[https://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/pl/apost\\_exhortations/documents/papa-francesco\\_esortazione-ap\\_20131124\\_evangelii-gaudium.html](https://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/pl/apost_exhortations/documents/papa-francesco_esortazione-ap_20131124_evangelii-gaudium.html)

213Q. Wodon, re New Secondary Schools Built Where They are Needed Most in Uganda? Comparing Catholic with Public and Other Private Schools, In: *The Review of Faith & International Affairs*, 18:2, p. 44-46.

The challenge of the Catholic Church in Africa is to convince the local population to accept the principles of Christian faith and morals and to understand the realities that contradict the African tradition. The first example is polygamy, unacceptable from the point of view of the social teaching of the Church, but widely practiced in Africa, as well as the indissolubility of marriage. According to Anna Niedźwiedź, such moral standards are incomprehensible and alien to Africans, at the same time constituting an obstacle to their receiving the sacraments, especially Holy Communion.<sup>214</sup>

Another problematic aspect of preaching Christianity in Africa is presenting the Western concept of a person as an independent individual and morally responsible for his or her actions. In traditional African thought, it is defined more as a part of the community and an element of the relationship with God and the universe.<sup>215</sup>

In many African cultures, the Christian distinction between the sacred and the profane is also difficult to understand. Many traditional African religions do not divide the world into temporal and eternal, but into visible and invisible. As Klaudia Wilk points out, "such homogeneity of the cosmos in the light of African beliefs lies in the ontological understanding of the world as a multi-form manifestation of "force" (...) which in religious studies is called [derived from

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214A. Niedźwiedź, op. cit., p. 108.

215Ibidem, p. 112.

the Melanesian language - note: MP] in the word mana. Mana (...) is used for both good and evil purposes, so it has no moral value. On the one hand, mana ensures success, happiness or wealth, on the other hand, inappropriate use of divine power can lead to harmful results. It is therefore difficult to connect this concept with ethical principles and the concept of grace in Christianity."<sup>216</sup> In the face of the above-mentioned discrepancies, a serious competition for the Catholic Church over recent decades has become a new religious movement called "Afro-Christianity", which is a synthesis of Christian beliefs with traditional morality and spirituality found in Africa.<sup>217</sup> Despite the relatively short history of evangelization in most of the African continent, the church structure there is quite developed. The basic body that unites it is the Symposium of the Episcopal Conferences of Africa and Madagascar, which brings together 10 Episcopal Conferences, each of which is divided into archdioceses and dioceses. In total, there are 97 archdioceses and several hundred dioceses in Africa.<sup>218</sup> In addition, there are numerous religious missions.

## **4.2. The Catholic Church in South Sudan**

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<sup>216</sup>K. Wilk, op. cit., p. 154.

<sup>217</sup>Ibidem, p. 156.

<sup>218</sup>Structured view of dioceses in Africa, In: Catholic-hierarchy.org, 01.02.2022, <http://www.catholic-hierarchy.org/diocese/qview5.html>

The first Catholic missionaries arrived in what is now South Sudan in 1842.<sup>219</sup> In the 19th century, missionary work in this area was mainly undertaken by the Comboni order, founded by the Italian missionary Daniel Comboni, who from 1858 served in various African countries. Many of the missionaries died of tropical diseases, but they still managed to begin evangelizing the Dinka, Bari and Moro ethnic groups.<sup>220</sup> Until the mid-20th century, progress in promoting Catholicism among the South Sudanese population was considered moderate. In 1956, the number of people baptized by the Catholic Church was only about 170,000.<sup>221</sup> During colonial times, the British used Christian missions to minimize their welfare, education and health costs and to use their activities to build a positive image of Europeans.<sup>222</sup> For this reason, the Catholic Church was then perceived as a tool in the hands of the colonizers, which resulted in reluctance to adopt the new religion, especially among representatives of the two largest ethnic groups: Dinka and Nuer.<sup>223</sup>

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219B. Elisha Sawe, Beliefs in South Sudan, In: World Atlas, 25.04.2017,

<https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/religious-beliefs-in-south-sudan.html>

220A. Wheeler, Christianity in Sudan, In: Dictionary of African Christian Biography, dostę: 09.02.2022, <https://dacb.org/histories/sudan-christianity/>

221C. Tounsel, "Lord Come to Our Aid": Islamisation, Civil War, and the Pastoral Letters of the Sudan Catholic Bishops' Conference, In: Journal of Religious History. Jun2020, Vol. 44 Issue 2, p. 171.

222J. Agensky, Who governs? Religion and order in postcolonial Africa, In: Third World Quarterly. Apr2020, Vol. 41 Issue 4, p. 592.

223M. Kurcz, op. cit., p. 223-224.

A radical change in the perception of the Church by the black population of the south occurred when Sudan gained independence in 1956. The policy of forced Islamization and Arabization pursued by its authorities meant that the followers of traditional religions and Christians began to have a common enemy.<sup>224</sup> Unlike Protestant communities, in 1957 the Catholic Church did not accept state supremacy over the schools it ran. Then he led a Christian protest against changing the day off from Sunday to Friday.<sup>225</sup> He also began to support the Anja Nja resistance movement in South Sudan and, unlike the authorities, did not force the local population to give up their culture, while showing tolerance for traditional religions.<sup>226</sup>

Repression by the Sudanese authorities led to the cooperation of all Christian communities operating in the south of Sudan. In 1964, the Sudanese government expelled all missionaries in the south. In order to regain the right to conduct activities in the discussed area, the Sudanese Council of Churches was established in 1965 in the capital of Sudan, Khartoum, with the task of coordinating the work of all Christian organizations for peace and the defense of human rights in Sudan.<sup>227</sup>

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<sup>224</sup>Ibidem.

<sup>225</sup>C. Tounsel, op. cit., p. 172.

<sup>226</sup>M. Kurcz, op. cit., p. 223-224.

<sup>227</sup>C. Tounsel, op. cit., p. 172.

The end of the First Sudanese War and the achievement of autonomy by the south in 1972 enabled missionaries to return to the area and begin their activities on a larger scale than before. In 1976, the Holy See established the Sudanese Bishops' Conference, divided into two dioceses: one in the north and the other in the south of the country.<sup>228</sup> In the 1970s, also accelerated the process of evangelization of the Dinka ethnic group. Its representatives began to notice the benefits of having educated relatives, and conversion to Christianity created opportunities to obtain church support in acquiring education, often without even having to migrate to the cities.<sup>229</sup>

The mass adoption of Christianity by the southern population occurred during the Second Sudanese War (1983-2005). This process was the result of many social factors that had a common source in the difficult reality of war. Firstly, as a result of mass migrations, the structures of traditional religions, often practiced only in a narrow territory, have disintegrated.<sup>230</sup> Migrants have lost contact with, among others, with shamans and local temples. Many of them fled to the fighting-free north <sup>231</sup>, where their beliefs were not

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228Ibidem, p. 173.

229J. Zink, *Women and Religion in Sudan's Civil War: Singing through Conflict*, W: Studies in World Christianity. Apr2017, Vol. 23 Issue 1, p. 70.

230M. Kurcz, op. cit., p. 224.

231W. Berridge, *The "Civilizational Project" and the southern Sudanese Islamists: between assimilation and exclusion*, W: JOURNAL OF EASTERN AFRICAN STUDIES 2021, VOL. 15, NO. 2, p. 221.

practiced. Secondly, in the 1980s, many representatives of the dominant Dinka ethnic group found shelter in refugee camps in Ethiopia, where various Christian communities played an important role in organizing social life.<sup>232</sup> Thirdly, in the 1980s and 1990s, churches were the only institutions operating in the south of Sudan. They provided moral support and humanitarian aid to the population.<sup>233</sup> Fourthly, the war forced SPLA soldiers to leave the cities, conduct guerrilla activities and hide in the countryside. Many of them were people who obtained their education thanks to the support of the Catholic Church. In a natural way, as social leaders, they became animators of Catholicism in their villages.<sup>234</sup>

South Sudanese women played a significant role in the mass conversion to Christianity. The increase in cattle prices during the war prevented them from making sacrifices to traditional gods, which excluded them from participating in prayers for the life and health of their loved ones. Over time, however, they noticed that they could pray in Christian temples without having to make sacrifices. Over time, the number of women regularly attending church began to grow, and due to the shortage of men caused by the war, they began to play the role of leaders and animators. They also composed church songs, which was of particular importance given the

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232J. Zink, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

233J. Dean, *Brother vs brother*, W: World (0888157X). 2/8/2014, Vol. 29 Issue 3, p. 53.

234J. Zink, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

widespread illiteracy that prevented the faithful from reading the Holy Scripture. The Church created a new space for their self-realization and supported their emancipation. Young women no longer felt that their only calling was to serve their husbands and children. Now they felt important and needed, serving God and the local community. Moreover, in church communities they had the same right to vote as men, which, especially in the case of the Dinka, was a revolutionary thing. Women living in internally displaced persons camps also organized demonstrations combined with religious songs in the intention of achieving peace and solving various current problems. When fighting broke out between men of their ethnic groups, they prayed for it to stop. After one of a series of such demonstrations, the cholera epidemic ended in the country. Many women in South Sudan believes that the 2005 peace process is the result of God answering their prayers.<sup>235</sup>

Tounsel points out that his political activity undoubtedly played a key role in the public perception of the Catholic Church. During the second Sudanese war, he and other Christian communities made numerous efforts to promote peace. One method was the Sudanese Council of Churches' letters to the Sudanese authorities. In the first of these, dated October 1983, it called for peaceful dialogue to promote national harmony and the abandonment of violence. In a

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235J. Zink, *op. cit.*, p. 68-77.

letter dated April 1985, she condemned the imposition of Sharia law on all citizens, but also praised the government for its ceasefire. In 1987, it supported President Sadiq al-Mahdi's peace plan, which later turned out to be unrealized. In 1988, it asked the Prime Minister to immediately establish peace or resign. In 1991, she demanded respect for religious freedom. These letters were read to the faithful during masses, and the war during sermons was compared to the persecution of Christians described in the Bible.<sup>236</sup> In addition, in 1999, through mediation, the Catholic Church forced the Nuer and Dinka to conclude an "intertribal" peace<sup>237</sup>, and then was a promoter and participant of the Sudanese peace process in 2003-2005.<sup>238</sup> At the same time, during the Second Sudanese War, the Catholic Church de facto led the diplomacy of the southern insurgents.<sup>239</sup>

Currently, the Catholic Church in South Sudan is a member of the Sudanese Bishops' Conference. There is one archdiocese in the country with its seat in the capital, Juba, which is subordinate to 6 dioceses located in the country.<sup>240</sup> In addition, the Juba Solidarity Office with South Sudan, established by 170 different Christian communities and run on

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236C. Tounsel, op. cit. p. 176-179.

237I. Back, IGAD, Sudan, and South Sudan: Achievements and setbacks of regional mediation, W: THE JOURNAL OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA 2016, VOL. 7, NO. 2, s. 146.

238C. Tounsel, op. cit., p. 182.

239J. Paul, Free at last, W: U.S. Catholic. Dec2011, Vol. 76 Issue 12, p28-32, p. 31.

240Catholic dioceses in the Republic of South Sudan, W: GCatholic.org, 10.02.2022, <http://www.gcatholic.org/dioceses/country/SS-type.htm#dioc>

their behalf by the Catholic Church, has a main task of bringing volunteers to the country to train nurses, teachers and clergy.<sup>241</sup> In February 2023 South Sudan was visited by Pope Francis and Justin Welby – The Archbishop of Canterbury. It was the first visit of both heads of Catholic and Anglican Church in the history of the country.

The Catholic Church still plays an important role in the country's politics. In 2011, he supervised the process of monitoring the fair course of the independence referendum.<sup>242</sup> Since the outbreak of the civil war in 2013, it has been in dialogue with the country's authorities and has been trying to end it. In 2014, Catholic and Protestant leaders from the Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups issued a joint appeal for peace and reconciliation.<sup>243</sup> In 2020, clergy were mediators during the ceasefire talks held in Rome between Thomas Cirillo's National Salvation Front and the government.<sup>244</sup> The main cathedral in Juba is the venue for speeches by politicians, where important events for the national political scene often begin. Furthermore, politicians emphasize their religiousness, as Christianity is considered to be synonymous with patriotism.<sup>245</sup> President Salva Kiir often presents himself in his

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241J. Paul, op. cit., p. 28-30.

242Ibidem.

243J. Dean, op. cit., p. 51-53.

244 Toward visible future ..., op. cit., <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/south-sudan/300-toward-viable-future-south-sudan>

245M. Kurcz, op. cit., p. 223-224.

propaganda as a modern-day equivalent of the biblical Joshua, who is supposed to ensure religious freedom for the country.<sup>246</sup>

The Catholic Church plays a very important role in the social life of South Sudan. As Maciej Kurcz writes, it is "a multifunctional super-organization in which social bonds are created and civil society is formed. Social organizations are being established in the Church, it is a huge space for women's activity (...) The Church gives women space for self-fulfillment (...) and they feel responsible to take care of the Christianity of their families."<sup>247</sup> There are many informal associations within parishes dealing with religious and social issues such as education, charity, and maternal counselling.<sup>248</sup> Many migrants in their new place of residence get their first job thanks to the support of the Church.<sup>249</sup> Moreover, UN agencies entrust the Catholic Church with the implementation of many of their humanitarian aid projects.<sup>250</sup> Priests enjoy a high degree of social authority. They are recognized as incorruptible, unselfish, and unselfish in their service to God and to the community.<sup>251</sup> An important function of the Church is also to provide people with entertainment in the form of

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246J. James, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

247M. Kurcz, *op. cit.*, p. 228.

248Ibidem, p. 113.

249Ibidem, p. 226.

250J. Agensky, *op. cit.*, p. 592.

251M. Kurcz, *op. cit.* p. 219.

organizing events related to, among others: with various holidays.<sup>252</sup> Sunday masses are also often an opportunity to establish intimate relationships.<sup>253</sup>

Despite its strong position in society, the Catholic Church has a moderate influence on the family life and customs of the inhabitants of South Sudan. This influence is greater in cities than in villages, because Christianity serves the urban population to distinguish themselves from rural residents who profess traditional religions.<sup>254</sup> Also, the Church's message regarding replacing tribalism by building national identity and universal solidarity finds more fertile ground in the city, where economic processes create new interpersonal relationships.<sup>255</sup> However, both in the city and in the countryside, polygamy and premarital sex, condemned by the Church, are still common phenomena, as well as the practice of paying a dowry to future in-laws in exchange for consent to marry their daughter, which is inconsistent with the spirit of Christianity. Due to polygamy and wedding costs, church weddings are also not very popular.<sup>256</sup>

For the people of South Sudan, as well as for other Africans, the spiritual and integration aspect of the Church is a very important aspect. Due to the ethnic diversity of African

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<sup>252</sup>*Ibidem*, p. 229.

<sup>253</sup>*Ibidem*, p. 116.

<sup>254</sup>*Ibidem*, p. 227.

<sup>255</sup>*Ibidem*, p. 219.

<sup>256</sup>*Ibidem*, p. 108-120.

countries, religion is more credible for their inhabitants than the state in the process of uniting the population. Moreover, the idea of forgiveness, which is the axiological basis of Christianity, is what allows Africans to come to terms with helplessness in the face of the enormity of the violence they experience and continue to live surrounded by people/ethnic groups who are its perpetrators.<sup>257</sup>

### **4.3. The Catholic Church in Egypt**

Egypt is a very important country for the history of Christianity. Many biblical stories took place on its territory, traces of which are still used today as part of the tourist promotion of this country. The Prophet Joseph was sold by his brothers to Egypt, where he became Pharaoh's advisor. Moses was raised by the daughter of an Egyptian ruler, and then led the chosen people out of that country, crossing the Red Sea and then wandering for 40 years in the Sinai Peninsula. Mary, Joseph and baby Jesus were also supposed to be hiding in Egypt after escaping from the massacre of infants organized by King Herod. One great tourist attraction in Cairo is the Fustat district, where there is a well commemorating the place where Pharaoh's daughter was supposed to find the basket with baby Moses. A few hundred meters away there is a church built in the place where the Holy Family was supposed

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257A. Arabome, *The Sacrifice of Africa and the Midwives of a New Church and a New Africa*, W: Modern Theology. Apr2014, Vol. 30 Issue 2, p. 409-413.

to be hiding. In turn, on the Sinai Peninsula, in the town of Saint Catherine, a tourist attraction is the mountain where Moses supposedly received the 10 commandments from God. At its foot, an Orthodox monastery of Greek tradition was built, and on its top there are symbolic temples of three great monotheistic religions - Christianity, Judaism and Islam - which are not places for worship.

The Christianization of Egypt began in the 1st century AD, and already in the 3rd century Alexandria was the seat of one of the most important religious schools in the world at that time.<sup>258</sup> In the 2nd century AD, Egyptian missionaries began the work of Christianizing Libya, and at the beginning of the 4th century, there were already 9 ecclesiastical provinces and a hundred dioceses in both countries. Then, in 451, during the Council of Chalcedon, a schism occurred, which created the Coptic Orthodox Church, which still has a strong influence in Egypt. However, the development of Christianity in this country was stopped by the Arab invasion in 640. Muslim rulers over the next decades Islamized the country by imposing high taxes on people who did not profess their religion, as a result of which, over the years, only a wealthy minority remained in Christianity.<sup>259</sup> To this day, Egyptians still believe that the Copts have great economic

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258M. Bogusiak, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

259Ibidem, p. 6-8.

power, which I already discussed in more detail in the section on the social structure of this country.

The Catholic Church appeared in Egypt in 1219 thanks to the visit of Saint. Francis of Assisi at the court of Sultan Melek-el-Kamel. Although his mission did not lead to the re-Christianization of the country, it created conditions for the peaceful coexistence of Catholicism and Islam, enabling the activity of the Church in this country. Franciscan missionaries operate in Egypt to this day, but for many centuries their mission was limited to the pastoral care of foreigners and slaves.<sup>260</sup>

Currently, 90% of Egyptian society are Muslims, mainly Sunni. The remaining 10% are Christians, mainly Copts.<sup>261</sup> The number of Catholics is approximately 200,000.<sup>262</sup> There are 15 dioceses in Egypt.<sup>263</sup> In the capital city of Cairo, with a population of over 20 million, there are seven Catholic parishes.<sup>264</sup> During my research, I conducted observations while participating in Holy Masses in the parish of St. Joseph in the Zamalek district and in the parish of the Holy Family in

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<sup>260</sup>Ibidem, p. 8-9.

<sup>261</sup>Hasło: Egipt, W: CIA Factbook, p 05.03.2022, <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/egypt/#people-and-society>

<sup>262</sup>M. Bogusiak, op. cit., p. 10.

<sup>263</sup>Egypt-current dioceses, W: The Hierarchy of the Catholic Church Current and historical information about its bishops and dioceses, p 05.03.2022, <http://catholic-hierarchy.org/country/deg2.html>

<sup>264</sup>Catholic churches in Cairo – Egypt, W: Catholic directory, p 05.03.2022, <https://www.catholicdirectory.com/egypt/cairo>

the Maadi district, and I conducted interviews and informal conversations with the faithful who came there.

In the parish of St. Józefa's parish priest at that time was Father John from Kenya. One evening mass was celebrated in the parish every day, each time in a different language. I attended masses in French, Italian, English and Arabic. In the first three cases, mainly expats were present in the church, which is not surprising due to the fact that Zamalek is the district where most embassies are located. The Arabic-language mass was attended by Egyptians and individual representatives of other Arab nations. Attendance at those services was low. There were fewer than 20 people in the church each time. The parish had a school that taught Islam in a critical way, even suggesting that Christianity was superior to Islam. Catechesis for children was also organized in French and English. You could play football and billiards in the parish garden. The pool table was most often occupied by black parishioners and seminarians. In turn, children coming for catechesis played on the football field from time to time.

In the parish of the Holy Family in the Maadi district, masses were celebrated by priests from Egypt, Italy, France, Nigeria and Southern Sudan. From Monday to Saturday and on Sunday evening, services for expatriates were held in English, Spanish, French and Italian. They were usually attended by about 30-40 people. On Sunday morning, masses were celebrated for Filipinos, Koreans, Nigerians (in English in all three

cases), southern Sudanese (in English and Arabic) and Senegalese (in French). For each of these masses, the church was completely filled. At masses for people from South Sudan. It even happened that approximately twice as many people than in the church stayed in the church garden and watched the service via a large screen. The division into masses for expats and economic migrants corresponds to the characteristics of the Maadi district, one part of which is inhabited by employees of embassies, international organizations and wealthy Egyptians, and the other by unprivileged migrants and poor Egyptians. I will present a detailed description of the Maadi district in the section on the social structure of Egypt, and the functioning of the parish of St. Family I will discuss in the next chapter.

## **5. Daily life and religious practice of South Sudanese migrants**

### **5.1. Characteristics of the research**

I carried out research on the community of South Sudanese migrants living in Egypt and attending masses in the Catholic Church from January to August 2021. The research consisted of structured and casual interviews with

the faithful from the parish of St. Families in the Maadi district, participant observation of their religious practices and places important to their everyday life: school, bazaar, nightclub, sample apartment. I also interviewed people who were not members of this community but had knowledge and observations about it.

The core of research consisted of 29 in-depth interviews with migrants and migrants from South Sudan. The aim of the interviews was to learn about their everyday life and the influence that faith and the Catholic Church exert on them. Interviews were conducted in English because most interlocutors were fluent in it. Sometimes I used the expressions I know from Arabic. In one case, the interview was conducted entirely in Arabic, and the role of a translator from Arabic to English was played by a colleague. Each interview had a specific introductory structure - I asked questions about the interviewee's personal data and life history, his relationship with the Catholic Church, attitude towards Egyptians and Muslims, moral issues, passions, aspirations and migration plans. Additionally, the interlocutors had space for stories about their lives or views that were not included in the questionnaire and which they wanted to share with me. They concerned, among others information on the activities of UN and other aid organizations, socio-political problems, culture and history of South Sudan and the relationship between ethnic groups. Anyway, our meetings

were often held in places conducive to informal conversations, mainly in the church garden, sometimes in bars and restaurants, twice in my apartment. If the migrants expressed interest in my life, I also told them about themselves, but such situations were rare. I often got the impression that the very fact that I want to listen to them gives them pleasure.

Among my interviewees were 15 women and 14 men. My youngest interviewee was 17 years old, and the oldest interviewee was 57. Eleven were under 30, nine were between 30 and 40, eight were between 41 and 50, and one was over 50. Seven were from Bari, six from Shilluk, five from Nuer, two from Azandi and Dinka, one from Aczoli, and six from other minorities. Twenty-three came to Egypt after the outbreak of the South Sudanese civil war in 2013, including 15 in the five years before the survey. Six came to Egypt between 1998 and 2011, during the Second Sudanese War. However, only 15 of my interlocutors had a documented refugee status, the rest came to Egypt from areas not covered by fights or to study. While maintaining a balance between the number of women and men was intended on my part, the age and ethnic structure of the interlocutors is the result of a chance. Often, after the person's appearance, I was unable to determine his age. I learned to recognize someone's ethnicity after its physical characteristics after completing half of the interviews. I just talked to people who were willing to do so. Sometimes they were people who were standing next to me

in the church and I shyly accosted them, sometimes they were people who out of curiosity began to talk to me. Over time, they were more and more often recommended by my previous interlocutors. Most of my interlocutors were poor people who remained from occasional work. Even if they had permanent employment of their salary were small (e.g. the school's headmaster earning about \$200 per month, which in Egypt only allows for a very modest maintenance for one person). However, they were often people with secondary education who knew English, Arabic and the language of their ethnic group. Most of them did not have refugee status. Some came to Egypt recently, others even 20 years ago. Among the youngest people, there were those who left South Sudan as small children and did not remember much from this country. I established friendly relationships with some of my interlocutors, which are still maintained today via Facebook. Thanks to the kindness of one of them - Edmond Edwin - I was able to use the account of the wedding of a South Sudanese couple in my research.

I conducted the vast majority of interviews in the church of the Holy Family (21). I conducted three interviews at a school where my interlocutors worked, three in restaurants and bars and two in the building (compound) in which I lived. Generally, however, my interlocutors most often talked in a church garden, where they felt free and safe. The place of interviews also resulted from the quite obvious fact that I met

the interlocutors during the masses for migrants from South Sudan. They took place every Sunday at 11 o'clock, lasted 2 hours, and after their completion for the next 2 hours of southern Sudans talked to each other in the church garden. Participating in mass was also an element of my research - participant observation. I made field notes from six masses: 3 ordinary, 1 with baptism, 1 with confirmation, and Palm Sunday. It happened several times that I was introduced during parish announcements as "Mr. Maciej from Poland, who is fascinated by our culture and is writing a book about us." Mrs. Silvia Gore, who read the advertisements, provided information about me spontaneously as a reaction to seeing me. Her announcements made me credible in the eyes of potential interlocutors and built trust among this community.

The interviews also provided an introduction to other places important to the daily lives of migrants. They gave me the opportunity to meet and visit the Innovation Academy run by Mr. Silvia Gore and P. Longino, where children from migrant families study and where teachers from sub-Saharan Africa work. I also learned from one of the interlocutors about the ACE Club - a British pub that caters to both South Sudanese migrants and expats living in the Maadi district, and where Egyptians are barred from entering.

I obtained some information useful for the implementation of research thanks to accidental conversations with people not belonging to the examined

community and thanks to so-called serendipity (see Herzfeld 2012), which causes the researcher to enter previously unplanned paths and topics, following people and their stories. My ex-wife's Egyptian female Arabic language teacher led me to the bazaar, where migrants and Egyptians from lower social classes were shopping. The lady cleaning from the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Cairo, being a Muslim from South Sudan, at my request on the day of payment gave me some information about her relationships between Christians and Muslims. In turn, my Egyptian friend, who works in the consulate of one of the European countries, explained to me during a meeting over a beer the reasons for discrimination against southern Sudanese by Egyptians. Moreover, one night in August, while walking, I accidentally met a guy from Ethiopia and a girl from Eritrea, who started a nice chat with me. As a result of this conversation, I went with them to an apartment in which an older woman from South Sudan in her apartment led a hideaway. Visitors to guests sold hashish and moonshine from dates poured into plastic cups. A pair of migrants who led me there also rented a room from her for an hour and bought condoms. I made field notes and photographs from all these visits and conversations.

The implementation of my research was favored by the fact that despite the duration of Covid-19 pandemic in Egypt, no anti-pandemic restrictions were enforced. The movement of the population was not limited in any way (which is difficult to imagine in 20 million Cairo), social distance was not in force, even wearing masks in practice was voluntary.

## **5.2. Observations of foreigners in South Sudan**

In order to supplement the Sudan Pd. And understanding migrants from this country living in Egypt, I decided to talk to Poles who had the opportunity to visit the country of their origin. Ultimately, I interviewed two people, former volunteers of Salesian missionary volunteering Alicja Kopeć and Łukasz Strzeszewski, who told me their observations from staying in the largest cities of this country - Jubie and Wau. In addition, I consulted these observations with dr. Wojciech Wilk, president of the Polish Development Assistance Center, who shared information with me about the inhabitants of rural areas in the north of the country. In this section I would like to present the observations of my interlocutors about the living situation of the Sudan residents, the impact of war on their daily functioning and social problems they notice. I will also cite their observations about the relationship of southern Sudanians with people of Arabic origin, because I believe that they may affect their decisions from the selection of Egypt as a country of immigration and

their opinions on the activities of the Catholic Church in Sudan. Organizations thanks to which they found themselves in Sudan.

The Salesian Missionary Volunteers - The Youth of the World is a charitable organization closely linked to the Catholic Church (Salesian Order) founded in 1997. Its volunteers are lay people who support the work of religious for the benefit of the local population in 43 countries in Africa, South America, Asia and Europe (Ukraine and Lithuania). Their activities are based on medical, food and educational support for the poor and excluded. The organization's goal is to restore these people's dignity so that they can take responsibility for themselves, their families and the communities in which they live.<sup>265</sup>

Łukasz Strzeszewski stayed in the capital of Sudan. Dżubie, in the Gumbo district as a volunteer in the period from September 2019 to February 2020, as part of volunteering, he was a computer science teacher at a local school. During the mission he had contact mainly from Bari and less with Dinka and Nuerami. He was dealing mainly with the urban population, in his opinion a better educated, more open to the world and less "superstitious" than the rural population. As he notes, even representatives considered extremely aggressive,

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265Nasza misja, Salezjański Wolontariat Misyjny – Młodzi Świata, 23.01.2022, <https://swm.pl/nasza-misja/>

the ethnic group Dinka in the city behave in a non -conflict way. In his opinion, the differences between urban and rural populations result primarily from less (or sometimes no) access to education in rural areas and from their limited contact of people living in the countryside with other people resulting from the lack of road infrastructure and transport between villages. At the same time, however, he emphasizes that his contact with the local community was limited to people working and studying at school.

Strzeszewski's observation shows that people in Juba are afraid that war may break out in the city at any moment, even though it is not actually happening. He was also involved in the recruitment and dispatch of troops to the DRC. The sound of a grenade launcher was heard in the area, causing the population to hide in the school building. Eventually, it turned out that in a nearby village, there was a dispute between two military commanders over the ownership of land, which led to a short battle in which one soldier was killed. According to the interviewer, most of the military clashes are in the nature of robberies in the countryside (cattle theft), and in the cities the situation is stable. The same is true of crime. He says it's rare in the city. There's a lot of theft in the workplace. He once witnessed police intervention to protect a would-be rapist from being lynched by the local community. Crime is the domain of rural areas, which, due to the lack of road infrastructure, the police are unable to reach on time.

The most commonly used methods are raids on villages to steal cattle. Railroad tracks carrying imported goods are also frequently robbed. The prevalence of firearms among the rural population contributes to the brutality of the raids.

According to Strzeszewski, Juba's economy is very underdeveloped for a capital city. There are only two large industrial plants (one of them produces mineral water). Small trade dominates in the city. The vast majority of goods available on the market are imported from Uganda, which is due to the fact that the only asphalt road in the city leads to the border with this country. The further away from Juba, the more and more expensive goods imported from Uganda are, although the inhabitants of these areas are much poorer than the inhabitants of the capital. This is due to transport costs. A journey between the two largest cities Juba and Wau takes from 3 days to 3 weeks (in the rainy season), although they are only 600 km of distance. You can travel around the country by plane, but most citizens cannot afford it. There is also a lack of electrical infrastructure, although it has been built by Chinese companies in recent years. In cities, electricity is generated from generators, in villages usually no one has these devices. During his stay, the city lacked water and sewage systems, although the first elements of this type of infrastructure were being built. Water was delivered to houses in tankers. At that time, in Juba there were single 3-4

storey blocks, although most of the inhabitants lived in clay huts with a latrine and small plots of land nearby.

Strzeszewski in Džuba did not notice clearly malnourished people. The standard of diet of residents was eating two daytime meals composed of Maniok, millet or rice. The meat was a meal consumed on special occasions. In his opinion, food problems result from the fact that there is no developed agricultural culture in the country. This is partly due to poor agricultural education and partly from the mentality of the local population. Some ethnic groups (e.g. Dinka) consider working on the role as derogating their dignity, as opposed to the breeding of live inventory, which is considered ennobled.

The interlocutor also noted the presence of wealthy people in Juba. They live in houses of brick, painted in bright colors, with high fences, and luxurious cars, sometimes even Ferraris and Lamborghinis. In his opinion, this social class includes owners of restaurants and supermarkets, people who do business with foreign entities, employees of aid organizations and officials whose income is most likely to come from corruption. However, these do not include teachers, who often do not receive salaries for many months, or policemen, who are forced to beg for food from drivers passing by from Uganda.

Strzeszewski did not notice any animosity between black people and the Arab population in Džuba. In his opinion, relations between Muslims and Christians are correct.

The inhabitants with whom the interlocutor came across were regularly practicing Catholics and in his opinion they warned the customs resulting from Catholic social science. They lived in marriage, although during the entire duration of their stay in Džuba (5 months) only one wedding took place in the parish. He also did not meet with cases of polygamy or juvenile marriages.

Religious communities play an important role in the life of the local community. The Salesians and the Comboni. The clergy are highly respected. Even the president of the country has to take his position into account. There is little typical parish clergy relative to the religious, although there is a growing number of priests of South Sudanese origin. The Salesians are handing out meals to the children. In the Gumbo district, they run two primary schools (for 3,000 children), a secondary school, a vocational school, a health centre (free for all in need), a support centre for women and a camp for internally displaced persons. In the district of Tonya, for example, there is a radio broadcasting station.

The church is the foundation of the social life of the village and the settlement. According to Strzeszewski, in smaller towns there are no discos or pubs, so church

ceremonies are the main source of entertainment. There's free food, there's dancing, you can meet friends, you can meet new people. A culture festival is regularly organized, where ethnic groups present their dances, music and costumes.<sup>266</sup>

Alicja Kopeć was a volunteer in Wau, South Sudan's second largest city, from August 2019 to March 2020 working as a physical education teacher in a local school. During her mission, she encountered mainly Dinka and Nuer people, as well as individuals from other ethnic groups whose names she cannot remember. Dinka's representatives are rated as aggressive. Its members are often self-righteous and overly wise. A woman in this group is to serve a man, e.g. when a man drops something, a woman is to raise it. In turn, the Nuer are in the opinion of Kopeć more peace and open to other people. The interlocutor assesses them as gentle people. Dinka and Nuers compete with each other, although at a school where she taught their relationships were correct. Residents of South Sudan He assesses as a tendency to be late and reluctant to intensively work, especially to perform several activities at once. In her opinion, they are also introverted people and not very willing to make new friends. However, when they manage to make them, they can be very

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<sup>266</sup>Field note from the Conversation with Łukasz Streszewski- former Salesian voluntary in South Sudan, 25.05.2021.

friendly. They show honest gratitude for every, even the smallest help they get or even for being in their company.

The civil war had a great impact on the functioning of the city. During his stay in it, which in Wau itself did not take place, but they took place in its surroundings. There were often rumors that the fights would start soon. Many residents expressed concerns about their lives and cited their traumatic memories. Almost everyone had someone in their family who died in the war. Physical and sexual violence and petty crime (theft) were also common in the city. People don't treat fights or rape as crimes. They are a tolerated part of everyday life. Many beatings were fatal. There were often family disputes and avenging of wrongs from previous generations.

According to Kopeć, the economic development of WAU is at an even lower level than in the case of Juba. The goods of local production are only peanuts, mango and peanut butter. The rest of the goods available on the market comes from imports from China, India or Egypt. Dry climate and soil condition does not allow too many species of plants to grow. It also affects the food habits of the inhabitants. They commonly consume 2 meals a day. The basis of the diet are: Kassawa, Moringa leaves and other shrubs, beans, various types of vegetable slings and ash cake. The determinant of wealth is the frequency of eating rice. The poultry or goat meat is occasionally consumed.

There is a small group of wealthy people in Wau. They have cars and 2-3-story brick houses with colorful facades. Most of these people are officials whose prosperity probably comes from the corruption that is common in Wau. Some wealthy people also own hotels, of which there are many in the city. In other social groups, almost exclusively women work. There is a very high level of unemployment among men and, according to my interlocutor, these people do not try to change it.

Kopeć points out that in Wau the main language of communication is Arabic, and trade is dominated by Arabs, including Egyptians. He assesses their relations with the city's inhabitants as very good. Southern Sudans value their entrepreneurship and kindness. Most of the population of this part of Sudan He emigrates mainly to Egypt. Emigrant people are required to send financial messages to relatives who remain in the country. Even sending the amount of USD 100 is a significant support for the household budget. The inhabitants of Wau usually claim that they do not get such help, but according to Kopeć they are probably not honest declarations.

The interlocutor noticed in WAU the occurrence of some racism between black people. People with brighter complexion (e.g. brown skin) are taken for Ethiopians and treated worse by the local population. Men consider mulattoes physically

attractive and want to have sex adventures with them, but only black women take their wives.

The inhabitants of Wau have a strong resentment to the Sudians from the North (Muslims). They don't talk about it directly, but they are afraid of them and they blame them for the harm they caused them during many years of civil wars before 2011.

According to Kopeć, religion is very important to the inhabitants of Wau, because it explains to them phenomena that they cannot understand on their own. They look for life tips in the words of the Holy Scripture and in the sermons of priests. The power of the church's message is supported by the public education system, which, according to the interlocutor, does not teach independent thinking but relies on authorities.

The Catholic Church organizes material help and integrates the local people. For example, Salesian missionary volunteering collects money in Poland for meals and buying clothes for children from Sudan PD. In the areas of the churches there are camps for internal refugees (fucked up from the fighting areas). Priests order local casual work. The church also organizes festivals and sports activities.

In villages, traditional religions have a great influence on people's lives. The rural population is convinced that the God worshiped in these religions and in Christianity is the

same person. Therefore, they often practice Catholicism and shamanism at the same time. The priest is their spiritual guardian, and the shaman is a person who, thanks to contact with God, has the power to heal and help in matters of everyday life. In turn, the urban population is moving away from shamanic practices.

Despite the large percentage of Catholics in society, Catholic moral norms are not widely practiced, according to my interlocutor,. There are very few church marriages. Traditional marriages that are a contract between the parents of the spouses dominate, whose inseparable element is the payment of a dowry to the family of his wife (cows, chickens, money). Acceptance of parents is a necessary condition for marriage. To a large extent, cohabitation is common for this. A man and a woman live with each other, bring up children together and wait for the moment when their parents agree to form their relationship. This often happens when they already have three or four children. Polygamy is common among men. Kopeć during your stay in Sudan south. She met only 2 monogamous marriages. There are men who have even 30 wives, but do not care at all. The interlocutor did not meet marriages among children, but he is aware that this problem is occurring. She heard that there are a lot of girls in the early years of age in hospitals who treat the injury of the reproductive organs acquired during the wedding night. In addition, prostitution is legal, and husbands often reveal their

wives and abuse alcohol, which is favored by a large number of bars.<sup>267</sup>

The opinions of Strzeszewski and Kopec regarding economic development and social problems occurring in South Sudan coincide with the content presented on the website of the Salesian Missionary Volunteer Service. However, their opinion about the population and culture of this country is purely subjective. The institution they worked for does not publish this type of observations.<sup>268</sup>

South Sudan is a country dependent on development aid. Due to the above, I wanted to contact the person responsible for delivering it. I interviewed Dr. Wojciech Wilk - president of the Polish Center for International Aid. It is a non-governmental organization existing since 2006, whose statutory activity is to provide humanitarian, development and rescue assistance to people affected by armed conflicts and natural disasters. In addition to helping those affected, these activities are also intended to build a positive image of Poland in the world. The foundation's activities are financed mainly from the "Polish Aid" program, but also from other subsidies from the state budget and EU and UN funds. So far, the organization has operated in 5 African, 4 Asian, 2 European

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<sup>267</sup>Field note from the conversation with Alicja Kopec - former Salesian voluntary in South Sudan, 10.05.2021.

<sup>268</sup><https://swm.pl/kraj/sudan-poludniowy/> information about Sout Sudan of Salesian Voluntariat website 27.03.2023.

and 1 South American countries.<sup>269</sup> Moreover, in the fall of 2021, the PCPM rescue team provided assistance to refugees on the Polish-Belarusian border.<sup>270</sup> The Foundation has been carrying out missions in South Sudan since the country's independence in 2011. These include building lighting systems for health centres, training local firefighters and organising food transport and feeding points for the population.<sup>271</sup>

Dr. Wojciech Wilk stayed in rural areas in the Bahr-Al-Ghazal province in today's Southern Sudan. in the years 2004-2006 and later episodically in the years 2010-2012. At the same time, since 2017, the Polish Center for Development Assistance Foundation, which he runs, has been running a feeding point for the local population, and therefore he has current information on the situation there, which has not changed significantly despite the passage of time.

The interlocutor had contact almost exclusively with the dominant in the country Dinka and sporadic with Luo, whose representatives live in Aweil-Cueter in an enclave surrounded by the villages of Dinka. The autonomy of the Luo group is respected by Dink, but this is an exception to the rule. Generally, Dinka is a warrior shepherd group seeking to

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269O PCPM, In: Polskie Centrum Pomocy Rozwojowej, 24.01.2022, <https://pcpm.org.pl/polskie-centrum-pomocy-miedzynarodowej>

270Kryzys humanitarny na polsko-białoruskiej granicy. Medycy z PCPM ruszają z pomocą. W: Polskie Centrum Pomocy Rozwojowej, 24.01.2022, <https://pcpm.org.pl/kryzys-humanitarny-na-polsko-bialoruskiej-granicy-medycy-z-pcpm-ruszaja-z-pomoca.html>

271Raport Merytoryczny Fundacji Polskie Centrum Pomocy Rozwojowej za 2020 r., p. 4.

dominate other ethnic groups in the country. Young people Dinka make robberies on the villages of other ethnic groups because there is no other way to get food. The organization of seizures is facilitated by the widespread availability of weapons resulting from many years of civil wars.

During Wilk's first stay in the area in question, partisans from the SPLA were in power there. They did not have any resources of their own, so those belonging to aid organizations, among others, expecting their employees to be driven to different places. Currently, the local authority already has its own vehicles, buildings and revenues, and carries out certain tasks in the field of ensuring public safety. However, it leaves all other public services to non-governmental organizations and religious organizations. Often, its representatives create artificial barriers to the activities of these organizations in order to demonstrate their agency.

The humanitarian aid delivered to the country benefits not only those in need, but also local elites. Delivering food to those in need requires prior distribution of some of it, e.g. to soldiers stationed at check-points on the roads (otherwise they will not let the car pass).

Dr. Wilk described the economic policy of the South Sudanese authorities as a "war economy". This means that the years of civil war have meant that the ruling elites can

only function in war conditions. They do not have the competence to take on peacetime challenges such as economic development or social welfare. That is why they are doing everything to prolong the war. During it, it is easier to explain to people that there is poverty by blaming the enemy instead of explaining their incompetence.

At the time when the interlocutor stayed in the southern part of Sudan, the people associated great hopes for independence. Unfortunately, politicians failed these hopes because they caused a civil war in 2013. Instead of solving socio-economic problems. In addition, the war led to the suspension of oil exports and cattle exports remained the only important sector of the economy. As a result of many years of wars in the country, most paved roads and bridges were destroyed.

In the villages where the interlocutor stayed, there were mainly clay huts with roofs from thatched roofs. Usually a number of huts were surrounded by a fence - the whole area was called "boom". The wealthiest people in the area lived in a few brick houses and had their own cars.

According to Wilk, the life cycle of rural inhabitants is determined by the times of day and seasons of the year. In September, the harvest takes place, during which people celebrate the opportunity to eat more food, making up - as Wilk says - after months of hunger. In the following months,

the accumulated supplies are consumed. These end in May at the latest and that's when hunger begins. People only eat leaves, grass, roots, rhizomes, etc. In the period from May to September, many children under 5 years of age die because they do not have the opportunity to eat high-quality and balanced meals.

Polygamy is common in the countryside. The governor of the province of Bahr-al-Ghazal, with whom Dr. Wilk was in contact, had 82 wives. Teenage marriage is also common. According to the interviewer, they do not view early marriage as a drama of life because they have few other opportunities for self-fulfillment. They are usually unable to take up gainful employment, and their education ends in the eighth grade of primary school. Alternatively, they may delay marriage by attending secondary school, but due to the cost and necessity of commuting to the city, this is a privilege for few rural dwellers. The marriage also has an economic justification, since the groom pays the bride's parents a dowry. Between 2004 and 2006, it was 30 to 40 cows, and at that time, one cow cost \$300.

Dr. Wilk did not observe any animosity in the relations between the black population and the Arabs, who dominated among the merchants visiting the region. The relationship between Arab merchants and black buyers of goods was one of interdependence. Without buyers, merchants would not earn income. Without the goods sold by merchants, the food

problems of the local population would be even more serious. This is probably why, according to my interlocutor, their mutual relations were not characterized by hostility or racism. The interlocutor had contact with the clergy due to the fact that a child feeding center run by the PCPM foundation operates near the Catholic mission in Gordhim in the Aweil East province in the Northern Bahr El-Ghazal region. During his stay and years of cooperation, he noticed that the Catholic Church plays two important roles in the life of local communities. First, it organizes social assistance. There are schools and hospitals run next to churches, the standard of which is much higher than that of such facilities administered by the state. Secondly, the Church teaches people Christian morality, making them aware, among other things, that violence is wrong. According to Dr. Wilk, however, he is not sufficiently involved in combating polygamy, which is common.<sup>272</sup>

Of course, the reports of Poles who visited South Sudan were subjective and I do not treat them as representative. However, they indicated some important elements of the life of the local population. As foreigners, they had the opportunity to notice and describe many elements of South Sudanese reality that may be too obvious for the local population to highlight in their stories. At the same time, their observations

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<sup>272</sup>Field note of the conversation with z dr Wojciech Wilk – CEO of the PCPM Foundation – , 23.11.2021.

are more illustrative than the reports of international organizations.

### **5.3. Religious practice and the role of the Catholic Church in the social life of migrants**

Based on participation in a dozen or so masses between January and June 2021 and notes taken from six of them, I will try to synthesize certain recurring phenomena of the religious practice of the studied community. In turn, based on the interviews conducted, I will describe topics related to South Sudanese spirituality. In this section I will describe both issues. I will start with ceremonial and ritual matters, and then I will move on to the approach of my research partners to the issue of faith and the role of the Church in their lives.

For Catholic migrants from South Sudan, it is very important to take part in the Sunday Mass. This requires that they overcome the adversities resulting from the fact that in Egypt as a Muslim country, the working week lasts until Sunday until Thursday. To this end, they must make arrangements with their employers and academic teachers, including, for example, receive lower remuneration in exchange for later starting work on Sunday (explorer 1, M, 30 years old, Maadi, 03.04.2021)<sup>273</sup>. At the same time, schools for migrant children are closed on Sundays, so parents were

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<sup>273</sup> All the interview are marked the same way, the number of the interview, sex, age, place and date. Here: interview no 1, male, 30 years old, Maadi, 03.04.2021.

forced to provide care for them (field note of April 3, 2021 - school for children from Sub-Saharan Africa). The practice of attending Holy Mass on Sunday was common to most African and Asian migrants who did not belong to the diplomatic corps. On Sunday morning, masses were held for: Koreans, Filipinos, Senegalese, Nigerians and South Sudanese. For the latter at 11 o'clock. A completely different approach prevailed among expatriates working in embassies or international companies. Those of them who practiced Catholicism usually participated in the Holy Mass on Friday or Saturday instead of Sunday. Only the Palm Sunday ceremony had to be carried out according to the Coptic calendar, which resulted from arrangements between the parish and the Egyptian government in connection with the reduction of the risk of Covid-19 infections. A month earlier, Palm Sunday, according to the Catholic calendar, a mass was celebrated for expatriates, including in French.

The Sunday mass for migrants from South Sudan has always enjoyed a high turnout - many times exceeding other masses. Usually about 500-1000 people appeared in the church. On May 9, 2021, in the mass, during which the sacrament of baptism was granted, according to my estimates, about 500-600 people took part (off -road note of 09.05.2021). Each time, most of the faithful, due to the lack of enough places in the middle, sat on the benches in front of the church. During the most important events, the crowd occupied almost the entire church garden and watched the

mass from specially set screens (field note of 25.04.2021 - Palm Sunday). For comparison, about 20 people usually participated in masses addressed to expats, despite convenient from the point of view of professional duties.

Sunday mass usually started at 11 a.m. and lasted about 2 hours. After the mass, for the next 2 hours the faithful stayed in the church garden, where they talked with their friends. At the same time, some of my interlocutors declared that they came to church even three times a week. Twice for Holy Masses and once for a Mass rehearsal. Rehearsals before the Holy Mass organized during the week consisted of church activists singing together the songs that were to be performed during the Sunday service. In my opinion and in the opinion of some of the people I interviewed, these events were primarily of a social, emotional and spiritual nature. People went there to experience positive emotions, meet friends, and forget about everyday worries for a moment. The standard mass liturgy was celebrated in English and Arabic and was shortened to the bare minimum. Most of the mass was devoted to singing and dancing religious songs performed in English or the languages of the South Sudanese ethnic groups. From the information I received from the person who was sitting next to me in church, I know that two masses are held every Sunday in South Sudan. First at 8 is celebrated in English and the second one at 9.30 in Arabic. The faithful usually participate in both. In Cairo, due to the need to share time with other migrant communities, one mass is held in both

languages (field note from May 9, 2021 - baptism). The liturgy enriched with local vocal and dance elements was the synthesis of the traditions of all ethnic groups developed by the South Sudan clergy. This is an element of inculturation, i.e. adaptation of local customs to the Christian Liturgy, described, among others through Klaudia Wilk. Anna Niedźwiedz also described similar practices in relation to the central population of Ghana.<sup>274</sup>

In South Sudan, especially in rural areas, each ethnic group performs different songs and dances during its mass (Ext. 26, M, 30 years old, Maadi (Cairo), May 30, 2021). Migrants from different regions and different ethnic groups combine different practices during one service in Egypt. Typically, mass begins with the priest entering the church. Right behind him are children dancing in folk costumes. Then, throughout the entire mass, the same children dance in front of the altar, and the rest of the faithful dance next to their pews. Nuns also dance. The musical pieces are performed by musicians standing next to the first row of benches playing synthesizers, guitars, drums and rattles (Field note of May 9, 2021 - baptism).

During the sermons delivered, priests usually established numerous interactions with the faithful. Often, the faithful reacted with the individual words of the priest with

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274A. Niedźwiedz, Tożsamości wśród katolickiej społeczności w centralnej części Ghany, In book: Problemy współczesnej Afryki. Szanse i wyzwania na przyszłość (pp.99-113)  
Publisher: Księgarnia Akademicka Editors: Katarzyna Jarecka-Stępień, Jakub Kościółek, Cracov 2012

enthusiastic laughter, clapping, stamping or shouts. It also happened that individuals approached the pulpit and gave short speeches (field note of 24.01.2021 - ordinary mass). Priests celebrating mass came from South Sudan. The parish priest was an Egyptian, and visitor during one of the masses of the Bishop - Italian parish. The sermon of the bishop, delivered in Arabic, during a mass combined with the sacrament of confirmation, was often interrupted by enthusiastic squeaks of the faithful (field note of 30.05.2021 - confirmation).

During most masses in which I participated, I was focused on prayer and observing the customs of the faithful. That is why I did not focus on the content of sermons, which I did not understand, because they were usually delivered in Arabic. I did it only twice: once when the sermon was delivered in English and the second time when the Akiir Delg sitting next to me explained the content of the sermon from Arabic to English. The sermon in English was devoted to the issue of love of neighbor. According to priest, refugees from Sudan south. It must be hard to believe in the love of his neighbor, because the question arises to them: "If people really loved each other, would we have to live in exile?" According to the priest, the leaders of the state, even those who are Christians, do not apply the commandment of love towards their neighbor. Many Christians suffer from persecution and unfortunately other Christians are often persecutors. However, if the southern Sudanians make love each other,

ethnic divisions disappear. They will see the image of God in people from other ethnic groups (field note of 06.06.2021 - sermon). In turn, the sermon translated by the deng, which the priest gave during a mass combined with the sacrament of baptism concerned the role of parents in raising children in the spirit of Christianity (field note of 09.05.2021 - baptism).

During the mass for migrants, money fundraisings on trays were organized in a different way than during exposure mass. The nuns did not approach the faithful with the tray, only stood at the altar waiting for people who voluntarily approach them. I suppose that this practice aims to avoid embarrassing people who cannot pay anything and distinguish those who do this (field note of 30.05.2021 - confirmation).

The congregations were generally dressed in a manner that did not deviate from typical European dress. Traditional African dress was seen only by some of the faithful during the most important events of the liturgical year. The nuns also wore special costumes for such occasions. These were usually tunics and scarves with the image of saints (e.g. the patron saint of Sudan and South Sudan, St. Josephine Bakhita). He is also a member of the National Assembly of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Despite the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, most worshippers were not wearing masks or maintaining physical distance. Persons wearing masks could only be seen during the most important events of the liturgical year (field note of

30.05.2021 ?? Confirmation), which indicates that they were mainly worn by less frequent practitioners. It was impossible to keep a distance during the liturgy, which consisted mainly of dancing. The attitude of the faithful may have been due, on the one hand, to the acceptance of the widespread occurrence of the epidemic in Africa and, on the other hand, to the widespread lack of observance and enforcement of anti-pandemic measures in Egypt.

It is worth noting that masses related to the reception of the sacraments enjoyed high attendance and a large number of people joining these sacraments. During one mass, about 150 people aged 15-60 joined the confirmation, with a visible dominance of 20-year-olds. About 800 faithful participated in that mass (field note of 30.05.2021 - confirmation). During another mass, 54 children were baptized, and the number of the faithful participating in it amounted to about 5,600 people (off -road note of 09.05.2021 - baptism). At the same time, however, during each Holy Mass, only a slight percentage of the faithful joined the sacrament of Holy Communion. According to one of my interlocutors, this was due to the fact that these people did not comply with Christian sexual morality through life in polygamy or non -sacramental relationship (explorement 26, m, 30 years old, Maadi (Cairo), 30.05.2021).

The parish announcements were made by church activists. Mostly by p. Silvia Gora, acting as secretary to the priest and director of a school for migrant children. As I mentioned earlier, she introduced me to the congregation as a researcher.

Unfortunately, I have not been able to gain the trust of the community to be invited to attend weddings and funerals. The vows made by South Sudanese in Egypt largely mirror the practices of the migrants' country of origin, both in terms of dress, music and dance. Thanks to the kindness of Edmond, one of my key interlocutors, with whom I became friends, I was able to follow his Facebook posts and make notes from them, under the commitment to maintain the anonymity of the young couple (field note from May 19-21, 2021 ?? Edmond's relatives' wedding and wedding). The bachelorette party, wedding, and reception described below have been described by my interviewer as traditional.

The bachelor party was held in a specially rented, elegant room. Both the groom and the bride attended. Participants wear colorful ethnic clothing. Men in gabbos, colorful patterned shirts and scarves. Young women in tight colored dresses matched to the figure. Older and obese women wore loose dresses in colorful, floral patterns. The dominant colors of clothing were white, yellow, bright green, and red. The music at the party was filled with the sounds of drums,

cymbals, guitars, and other instruments unfamiliar to me. Her style was reggae. I don't know any of the songs. It wasn't the universal Western hits or the popular so-called ethnic music from Africa. Some of the songs sounded like reggae or S-Ka. At the beginning of the event, the participants danced individually. Eventually, the dances began in pairs.

During the wedding, the bride was dressed in a white dress with a long veil (the same as worn in Europe), and the groom in a white suit. Many people in the church were also dressed in white. The bride and groom entered the church, holding together the closed Scriptures in a leathery and silver cover. The altar boy was incense. The faithful sang "Hallelujah" to the rhythm of the music played on electric guitar, rattles and drums. When the bride and groom came to the altar, the faithful changed the song. Just like at every Southeast Mass I know, the church was present in the church that everyone was making sure that everyone would play and sing in the right rhythm. The bridesmaid kept the bride's veil so that he would not fall to the ground.

During the wedding, men were dressed in dark suits, and women in colorful elegant evening dresses. Some dresses looked ethnic with a headgear reminiscent of a hijab. Other dresses, especially young women, were "typically European" and strongly emphasized their shapely figures. The dances took place in a circle and were a little different from the "rocked" dances from a bachelorette-bachelor party, even

though the music was similar. Organization of a traditional wedding and a wedding for the country of migrants originally indicates how important it is for them to attach to customary marriage. It is a logistic and financial challenge, but its continuation is important for maintaining their own cultural and religious identity.

Religion is very important to the people of southern Sudan. Two of the people I spoke to had religious refugee status. In one case, it was a girl who fled to Egypt with her parents in 1998. Her father was a catechist and was arrested three times by Sudanese police who tried to torture him into converting to Islam. After the third arrest, his wife, the mother of my interviewee, decided that the family had to leave the country. He is a member of the Taliban's National Security Council. The second person left Sudan in his early 20s in 2004. The repression that he faced was objectively less severe because it did not involve physical violence, but also effectively discouraged him from living in his country. During job interviews, my interviewer was asked about his religion and then formally rejected for being too incompetent. He says he later found out that the jobs were given to Muslims with lower qualifications than him. In addition, at the time, Sudan had prohibitions on the admission of non-Muslims to the military academy, Christian ceremonies, church charity work, and the screening of Christian-themed films. 8, M, 42 years old, Maadi. 26.03.2021).

The interlocutors often emphasized the pride of belonging to Christianity. Some emphasize that in their family from father to son, the profession of catechist was inherited (explored 2, m, 44 years old, Maadi, 06/03/2021, explosion 12, k, 45 years old, Maadi, 01.04.2021). Another interlocutor boasted that he accepted I. Holy Communion at the age of 7 and that he attended school John Paul II (explosion 4, m, 43 years old, Maadi, 09/03/2021). For another interlocutor, a special reason to be proud is that once in her life she was in Rome and participated in the Holy Mass celebrated by John Paul II (exploremment 4, m, 43 years old, Maadi, 09.03.2021).

Christianity is an important element of the identity of members of the examined community. One of the interlocutors even stated that it is more important to him than belonging to the ethnic community (exploremment 16, m, 28 years old, Maadi, 07.04.2021). Another respondent is named Bakhita in honor of the patron of Sudan (explosion 21, k, 21 years old, Maadi, 06.05.2021). Unmarried women claimed that their future husband must be a Christian, and mothers that their son -in -law/daughter -in -law must be of this confession. Importantly, he did not necessarily have to be a representative of the same ethnic group or nation. In the case of further emigration, they assume that the Church will be the first place they will visit in the new country (explored 27, K, 29 years old, Maadi, 06.06.2021). As noted by the eldest man with whom I interviewed, the above attitudes are the result of the work of priests to blur ethnic divisions (explosion 28, m,

57 years old, Maadi, 13.06.2021). Such a goal was, among others The priest's sermon described above, in which he argued that when the love of his neighbor wins, ethnic divisions disappear (field note of 06.06.2021 - sermon).

Despite the experience of religious persecution and manifested pride in Christianity present in the consciousness of the examined community, none of my interlocutors declared prejudices against Muslims, and only one person said that there were no friends professing Islam (explore 22, k, 30 years old, Maadi , 09.05.2021). The statements were widely repeated that it is not the fault of Sudan Muslims, that they had a government of religious radicals. The average Sudan Muslims in their opinion were to be tolerant of Christians, and all persecutions were implemented by the ruling elite of the country. The belief was also popular that in Egypt there is solidarity between the Sudanians from the north and of the south, and even between all black migrants. In fact, one of the women I spoke to told me that during the first month after her arrival in Cairo, she and her family lived free of charge in an apartment owned by Sudanese Muslims. Other information: (a) Member of the Taliban regime. The only time I've ever been confronted with a negative opinion of a black person of another nationality. However, marrying a Muslim is an insurmountable barrier, since it involves changing one's religion. A Muslim woman from South Sudan who worked as a cleaner at the Polish embassy confirmed these points in a conversation with me. She stated that although the relations

between Christians and Muslims are good, she would not agree that her son-in-law/son-in-law practice a religion other than Islam (excerpt with a Muslim woman from South Sudan, Zamalek, 11.04.2021).

Members of the community I research declared primarily the spiritual value of Catholicism. I often heard the opinion that faith helps them deal with sadness and frustration and gives hope. One of the interlocutors admits that thanks to faith and social activity, she survived the mourning after her brother's death, and also forgive his murderer and the ethnic group from which he came (explored 12, K, 45 years, Maadi, 01.04.2021). Another person said that he goes to church, because it calms her down (explored 15, k, 36 years old, Maadi, 04.04.2021). Still, she decided that she owed God the story of her life. She was born poor and thanks to faith, determination, patience and optimism she feels rich, because he can give advice and help other people (explore 18, k, 28 years old, Maadi, 25.04.2021).

Religious practice or simply "being in the Church" is also to provide entertainment and help in maintaining social contacts. For some participants, this is closely related to the spiritual aspect. One of my interlocutors stated that "dances and free behavior in the Church are needed for Sudanese to maintain mental health. Life is full of stress, and dance and music allow you to keep the serenity. You can pray at home, and the Sunday Holy Mass is to give the faithful renewal of the spirit

and brain, needed to survive the next week (explore 26, m, 30 years old, Maadi, 30.05.2021). Others, especially the youngest faithful, say that they simply go to church with boredom and to meet friends (explore 20, m, 19 years old, Maadi, 06.05.2021, 29, k, 22 years old, 23.06.2021). I was also given information that, for social reasons, Protestants of various denominations also come to the Holy Family Church for Sunday Masses. During the Catholic mass, they can meet relatives and friends (explore 28, m, 57 years old, Maadi, 13.06.2021). As I mentioned in section 4.3. In Egypt, luxury goods are access to space, green and entertainment. The church provides all this with migrants. In the extensive church garden, they can move freely, relax in the shade of trees and organize free classes for community members. In addition to masses and catechetical meetings, in the parish, among others Lessons of playing instruments and African dance for children (explore 2, m, 44 years old, Maadi, 06/03/2021).

Material support provided to migrants by the Church is not without significance. There are people who do not want to use it, recognizing that they need the Church for spiritual matters or that others need help more than them (explored 8, m, 42 years old, Maadi. 26.03.2021, explore 28 years old, Maadi, 07.04.2021). However, most of my interlocutors used the help of the parish to a greater or lesser extent. Priests gave them minor non -returnable cash donations. There was an employment agency in the church. Catholic Relief Society paid 50% of tuition fees for learning children. Migrants were

directed by priests for free treatment in the hospital Holy Rose. One of my interlocutors studied theology because the Church fully financed his studies in this field (explosion 11, m, 27 years old, Maadi, 31.03.2021). The community itself organizes money during the fundraiser to help widows or other people who need support, including for health reasons (explosion 18, k, 28 years old, Maadi, 25.04.2021).

According to the analyzed research material, it should be stated that the Church is not only a place of religious practice for migrants, but also entertainment and social gatherings. Religious practice may be different depending on the place of origin of the faithful, i.e. it can include rituals, customs and costumes occurring in local religions, constituting part of the wider phenomenon of inculturation, which I wrote above. In addition, as an institution of the Catholic Church, it gives migrants the opportunity to meet people from the same country and the same ethnic group and integrates these groups among themselves together. The Catholic Church provides migrants above all spiritual support, but also to some extent economic (financing of education and hospital stay, help in searching for work). In this way, churches in other countries also operate in relation to the migrance communities. Religious culture and religion experienced by my research partners are characterized by inculturation, but not syncretism. Traditional south-Sudan customs are included in the liturgy, but not local pre-Christian beliefs. To some extent, the mixing (mixing-up) phenomenon of people and

traditions from various cultural circles described by Susan Watson. First of all, the traditions of various ethnic groups are mixed in this case, but the traditions of the global culture of the North are also included, such as the wearing of a white dress by the bride. At the same time, it is worth pointing out that the Catholic Church has both binding (bonding) and bridge (Bridging) to the studied community. The bridge function in this case consists of building connections between people from various South Sudan ethnic groups. On the other hand, the binding function is manifested in strengthening the South Sudan national consciousness and the pursuit of it to displace tribalism.

#### **5.4. The daily lives of South Sudanese migrants**

The vast majority of migrants from South Sudan living in Egypt are people with low professional and material status. My interlocutors were dominated by people who did not have permanent employment, but persisted from occasional work. Most often it was cleaning, followed by child or disabilities, teacher or tutor's work. As one of my interviewees pointed out, women were more likely than men to find a job. This was due to the fact that the largest number of job vacancies, both in the church employment office and in external agencies, concerned employment as a domestic helper (interview no. 2, m, 44 years, Maadi, 06.03.2021). A large part of my

interlocutors were also pupils and students, kept by relatives and receiving scholarships from the Egyptian government or international organizations. One of my interlocutors studied theology because it was a direction fully financed by the Catholic Church, and thus did not have to pay tuition fees (Interview no 11, M, 27 years, Maadi, 31.03.2021). The income of those of migrants who had permanent employment was about 2000 EGP per month (approx. \$125). To illustrate the purchasing power, I would add that I spent more or less during the week on grocery shopping for my family of four.

I also talked to people who, due to their entrepreneurship or professional position, can be said to have been economical success. One of them worked as a chef before Pandemia Covid-19, and when he lost this job he became a small entrepreneur. First, he began to sell his products as part of catering, then founded the YouTube channel on cooking, and even a store with food products and clothes from South Sudan. He did not provide me with information about his earnings, but I know that he could afford to rent a flat for his family, food, having a car, going to the gym and from time to time to go to the pub (Interview no 4, M, 43 years, Maadi, 09.03.2021). Other interlocutor bought smartphones in Cairo, sent them to South Sudan using a Western Union -like agency, where his friends sold a three times higher price and sent him profit (Interview no 16, M, 28 years, Maadi, 11.04.2021). Another person who managed to succeed was a young girl

working as a manager at the Christian Stars Foundation (St. Andreas Refugee Service). She managed the work of 75 people there. The foundation dealt with, among others running a high school for approx. 85 people aged 17-21 as part of the Sudan Visa-International Exams program and conducted 4 support programs, including for single mothers and disabled children (Interview no 18, F, 28 years, Maadi, 25.04.2021). Finally, Mrs. Silvia Gore and Mr Longino, who managed the Innovation Academy school, should be considered as "successful people". Their earnings, although higher than the others, were not high (3500 EGP - about \$200). However, their work was stable, highly useful and gave them prestige among the migrance community.

The professional position of the men I interviewed was certainly not the result of low qualifications. Like many other migrant workers around the world, they were working below their skills. Most of my research partners were fluent in three languages: English, Arabic and the language of their ethnic group. In this respect, they were far superior to most working-class Egyptians, who usually knew only the Egyptian dialect of Arabic or used English only to communicate. Most of my interlocutors had secondary education or was in the middle of high school. I know their posts on Facebook that completing each subsequent class was a reason for them to be proud.

A supplement to the household budgets of persons with refugee status was a cash allowance of EGP 400 per month

per household member paid by the World Food Programme. The STARS Foundation, CARITAS and other Christian organizations also provided support to those in extremely difficult financial situations. Migrant children attended schools run by the UN and CRS (Catholic Relief Society) or specially created by community members. The tuition was about \$2,000. EGP 400 (\$25) /month, of which 50% and the cost of books and school supplies were covered by the UN or CRS (Interview No. 4, M, 43 years, Maadi, 09.03.2021).

The migrants lived in the construction slums mentioned in section 4.3 (Migrants in the social structure of Egypt). According to the statements of my interlocutors, there were between 3 and 15 people living in one apartment. Usually, these were people who were related to each other. On the night of August 9-10, 2021, I accidentally had the opportunity to spend a few hours in one of such apartments. I was surprised at the time that the entrance to the building was not guarded by the concierge, because in Egypt the standard is the 24 -hour presence of several concierges in front of the building and their permanent cooperation with the police. According to my Arabic teacher, the Egyptian, the concierge due to disrespect for migrants disregarded their duties in the buildings they inhabited. It has its advantages and its disadvantages. On the one hand, the concierges did not clean the building and ensure security, but on the other hand, they did not control the private lives of migrants as they did for

Egyptians and expats (field note – market place, May 2021). The apartment was about 50 m<sup>2</sup>. It was located on the ground floor, it consisted of a hallway, 2 rooms, a small kitchen and a bathroom. It has not been renovated for a long time. There were few furniture in it - those that were, they looked "self-made", the sofa and the armchair were very old. The walls were painted green and shabby. The door between the rooms barely closed. There was no window in the kitchen. The bathroom had an old bathtub with a "self-made" shower, compact toilet, an old washing machine and heavily bruised tiles. The apartment was occupied by a 50-year-old woman living alone, who earned money by selling hashish and dates to her guests, and by providing rooms and condoms for a fee (field note - Migrant's apartment, 10.08.2021).

During the interviews, I wondered how the migrants, but also the average Egyptian, were able to survive on their earnings when the prices in the shops I knew were similar to the ones I knew in Poland. I learned part of the answer to that question when a domestic worker I hired cooked dinner for my family. I did not give her detailed instructions. I just asked her to cook a typical south-Sudan dish, such as she does for her family, with the proviso that it was to be a meal for 4 people. The dinner was completely vegan (a bean, spinach and potato mush), and its amount was enough to meet the nutritional needs of me and my younger son.

Migrants and poor Egyptians made their purchases in the cheap bazaars. Below is a description of one such place that I had the opportunity to visit regularly (field note – market place, May 2021):

The bazaar was located on Hassanein Desouky Street, between unplastered blocks typical of the Cairo Landscape. The bazaar took place through the 9 street, on which there were fashionable cafes and restaurants visited by expats and rich Egyptians (it can be compared with Nowy Świat street in Warsaw). The mileage of the 9th street has naturally evolved from the exclusive enclave, through places for the middle class, cheap bars with tea and shisha, then shops and a block of flats, up to the bazaar. The exclusive part of the 9th street was located about 2 kilometers from the bazaar. Despite such a short distance, most of the regulars of fashionable premises were not aware of its existence. The stalls were between the blocks, on ground streets.

I found out about the bazaar from a Polish friend who was doing housework for a Sudanese lady. I was convinced this was a Sudanese bazaar. None of my interlocutors confirmed the existence of such a place, even though I met one of my research partners in its vicinity. I learned the location of the bazaar from an Egyptian woman who taught my wife Arabic. She, in turn, knew them because she had lost a significant part of her income at the beginning of the COVID-

19 pandemic and had to move to the lowest possible rent as part of her savings. That is why she decided to rent an apartment at ul. Hassanein Desouky, in one of the places where refugees and migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa live (Sudan, Sudan PD, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, etc.). At the same time, Egyptians from the workers' class lived in blocks of flats on the same street. Both groups, living in crowded, entered the conflicts, which I associated with fights between Warsaw housing estates in Grochów while I was a child (90s). However, during my visits in the bazaar, I did not notice any conflict event between these two groups. I had the impression that they tolerate each other - at least within the bazaar.

Most stalls in the bazaar belonged to the Egyptians, some to migrants from Sudan, Sudan south, Ethiopia, Eritrea or Somalia. The Egyptians have monopolized trade in fruit, vegetables, fish and meat. However, it happened that the meat sold by the Egyptians came from Sudan. Egyptian meat had characteristic red stamps meaning to pass through the sanitary department. Sudan meat did not have such stamps. The meat was stored in unsanitary conditions. Rarely was it in the fridge, more often it was a carcass of beef hanging on a hook in front of the store. Fish were kept in ice cubes. Prices were usually displayed next to each product (the figures used in Arab countries). During about 5 visits, no seller tried to cheat me by offering me a higher price (a practice I

encountered constantly in Egypt) than expatriates. According to the Egyptian woman who showed me the bazaar, traders in such places did not cheat, because they were not tourist destinations, and their services were aimed at loyal customer service. Cheating could ruin their reputation in the community, so they didn't want to risk it. At the same time, I've never seen another expat/tourist in the area during any of my visits. I was the only white European, and some of the vendors and passersby responded to my enthusiastic presence with kindness. The bazaar was crowded, comparable to large bazaars in Warsaw (e.g. Rondo Wiatroczna, Mirowska Hall) in the moments of their greatest number of customers. The bazaar was busiest every day in the evening hours (after 8 pm), but meat and fish were available until 6 pm. The bazaar was open all week except for religious holidays. At that time, only migrant stalls and shops were open. Vegetables in the bazaar cost about 5-10 EGP per kilo (\$0.25-0.5), fruit 15-30 EGP per kilo (\$1-2). Fish and meat approx. 40 EGP per kg (\$2.5), bread approx. 1 EGP per piece (\$0.06), and other pastries about 2-5 EGP per kilo (\$0.3). Dairy, milk and grocery products were also relatively cheap.

Migrants had stalls and stores with products typical of their origin countries, such as bread, cosmetics, honey, general -food products, clothes, spices, etc. The largest of such stores was called "Sudan Mall". It was about 100 m<sup>2</sup> (other stores were 20 m<sup>2</sup>, and the stalls even less. You could

buy women's clothes from Sudan and India, a wide range of cosmetics, oils, spices, coffee, peanut butter, honey and Sudan halva. Decorative Sudan dresses cost about 1000 EGP (\$60), 50-200 EGP cosmetics (\$2.5-12.5), Sudan halva 70 EGP per kilo (\$5), spices approx. 1 EGP/100 grams. The sellers were very nice, they had a lot of knowledge about the world (even about Poland), but they worked very slowly by European standards, including Because the chat was included in the working time. Making small purchases lasted at least half an hour, most of which passed the conversation. While serving more customers, they also often forgot what the previous ones were supposed to bring.

Most of the people I spoke to arrived in Egypt by plane from the South Sudanese capital of Juba. Migration by other routes has been hampered by the almost completely destroyed road infrastructure of the country. Often the greatest challenge was getting to the capital. One of my interviewees confessed that one of the things he did to do that was to take a boat (Interview no 28, M, 57 years, Maadi, 06.06.2021). However, there were cases of more complex migration stories. Many people tried to live in Sudan, some in Uganda before they went to Egypt for some time. Many people were born in the capital of Sudan Khartoum, after independence by South Sudan in 2011, they moved to the ground of their ancestors, and then in 2014 after the outbreak of the civil war they went to emigration. In two cases

(Interview no. 20, M, 19 years, Maadi, 06.05.2021 & Interview no. 18, F, 28 years, Maadi, 25.04.2021) the interlocutors mentioned that as children they got (in 1998 and 2006) from North Sudan to Egypt, a ship traveling up the Nile. The migration plans of research partners differed depending on their sex. Women usually declared their willingness to return to Sudan. when the situation is normalized there. If they assumed further migration, it is only for a specific time and and strictly financial purposes. They planned to be allocated to the opening of their own company in Sudan south, and if there are enough of them also to set up a charity in the form of e.g. a clinic for poor people (Interview no. 17, F, 24 years, Maadi, 14.04.2021). They justified their position mainly with patriotism and attachment to the family that stayed in the country. Men, in turn, usually dreamed of target migration to the countries of the global North. In this context, EU Member States (Germany, Italy), Canada, the USA, Great Britain and Australia exchanged. In their opinion, these are countries in which it is easy to get a well -paid job, get generous social benefits and provide children with high level education. It was also important that in these countries, unlike African countries, human rights are observed. Only one of my interviewees wanted to stay in Egypt for the rest of his life. He explained his decision by his advanced age, poor health, and exhaustion from years of wandering. (Interview no. 28, M, 57 years, Maadi, 06.06.2021). Most of the people declaring their willingness to further migrate took part in the visa

process implemented by the UN. Only one interlocutor in a rather vague way suggested that in the past he tried unregulated migration by Libya. In his opinion, the journey through this plunged in the civil war was not dangerous at all (Interview no. 1, M, 31 years, Maadi, 04.03.2021). Few months later I saw his Facebook post, in which he congratulated his friend to reach Italy and published his photo on the boat of an organization saving migrants from death at sea.

Regardless of the migration plans, the aspirations of my interlocutors were repeated. They dreamed of gaining any stable job providing them with maintenance, graduation, marriage and having children. Many men wanted to work as a catechist, due to the stable income and the prestige she gave among the migrant community. More original aspirations occurred among people under 30 years of age. One of the interlocutors dreamed of having time to teach children to African dance after work (Interview no. 3, M, 29 years, Maadi, 06.03.2021). One of the interlocutors had a planned trip to the USA to study health service management (Interview no. 18, F, 28 years, Maadi, 25.04.2021). One of the younger interlocutors wanted to study law in England (Interview no. 20, M, 19 years, Maadi, 06.05.2021).

The most difficult element of the life of the South Sudan migrants in Egypt was discrimination from the Egyptians. It is worth emphasizing that the allegations from my interlocutors

were directed against citizens, not the state. One of them emphasized that (Interview no. 4, M, 43 years, Maadi, 09.03.2021) the Egyptian authorities provided them with security that they did not have in Sudan. The presence of the army and the police on the streets prevented the attacks on their homes, which were common in South Sudan, and the racist attacks occurred only in places that were not guarded by the security forces at the time. From my own observation, the Egyptian government has also been effective in ensuring freedom of worship by stationing armed police outside Christian temples. Furthermore, manifesting one's religious beliefs in public by singing songs or wearing a cross around one's neck was not punished.

However, according to information I obtained from a conversation with an Egyptian working in the consulate of a European country, the discrimination against migrants by Egyptians was partly due to the inaction of the Egyptian services and consulates of their countries of origin. In his opinion, the abuses suffered by migrants from the Horn of Africa did not happen to the citizens of India or the Philippines, because the consulates of these countries intervened in their defense. The Nigerian Consulate also stood out from other Africans, so Nigerians were better off than other black people. The Egyptian police and intelligence services had a kind of "ranking" of countries on the basis of which they determined the degree of their commitment to help foreigners. In the first

place was the USA, then China, India, Germany, France, UK, Russia, Brazil. Matters regarding the citizens of these countries were treated by the services priority. However, in matters related to most Sub-Saharan African countries, the Egyptian services did not react or acted without much commitment, unless the case has become a media (a note from a conversation with an Egyptian employee of a consulate of one of the European countries about the situation of black people in Egypt, Zamalek - Cairo, August 2021).

As part of the interviews, I met with one case of a migrant discrimination by the Egyptian state. The woman with whom I interviewed was freshly visited with her brother in prison. The reason for his detention was that during police control he did not have documents confirming the refugee status, because UNHCR did not extend him. My interlocutor did not get information on how long her brother is to be detained and whether she would be deported to Sudan PD. (Interview no. 15, F, 36 years, Maadi, 04.04.2021).

Discrimination on the part of the Egyptians was not religious, but racial. Both black Christians and Muslims experienced it. My interlocutors often declared that all sub-Saharan African migrants are brothers in Cairo, and south-Sudan Christians are often friends with North Sudan Muslims. When in 2022 I was already in Algiers, I followed Facebook's relations of my south-Sudan friends who celebrated the victory of Senegal over Egypt in the final of the Football Cup

of the African Nations. They described this match even as a "historical triumph of a black man over Arab." Interestingly, this kind of phenomenon, in the context of this match, did not observe black people in Algiers. Perhaps because there were fewer of them there, and perhaps because, according to my cursory observation, the relationship between black migrants and Algerians was big better than in the case of the Egyptians. In Algiers, even if you could see social conversations of black people and Arabs or Berbers on the street. In Cairo it was something unimaginable. The only nation of Sub-Saharan Africa, which in the opinion of one of my interlocutors (Interview no 4, m, 43 years old, Maadi, 09.03.2021), did not fulfill the black solidarity, there were Nigerians. In his opinion, they were "worse than the Egyptians" because they cheated in mass, they conducted criminal activities and in the case of the police detained on their crime partners. However, another interlocutor (Interview no 16, M, 28 y.o., Maadi, 11.04.2021) denied the accusations against the Nigerians, while confirming the opinion of the Egyptian consular employee I cited earlier about their active defense by the Nigeria embassy.

The primary place of discrimination against Southern Sudanese was in the streets. My interlocutors cited countless examples of attacks by Egyptian working-class youth. The men would be provoked into fights, challenged by monkeys, or at the very least politely asked to pose for a photo to be seen a moment later in a Facebook post signed "Me and my

monkey". Women have been beaten, groped, called names, and splashed with dirty or hot water. One of the interviewees (Interview no. 18, F, 28 y.o., Maadi, 25.04.2021) admitted that she had friends who were raped. Even children and the elderly fell victims of Egyptian youth attacks. The oldest of my interlocutors told me that just a month before our conversation he was beaten and robbed from a mobile phone by 4 young Egyptians (Interview no. 28, M, 57 y.o., Maadi, 06.06.2021). Personally, I witnessed only one confrontation between Egyptian and African youth. It took place in one of the roundabouts in the Maadi district, which was temporarily not patrolled by the police. At that time I was a random pedestrian, and the fight was at the stage of the initial scuffles. The number of both groups was even and that's probably why I didn't try to inform about the police. Young men I spoke to also complained that the Egyptians reacted aggressively to their attempts to pick up the Egyptians, although they themselves accosted the girls from the Sudan PD.

Migrants also experienced discrimination at workplaces. Women working as home aid are exposed to the greatest abuse. They usually worked 6 days a week living with the employer. They fell victims of mental violence (screaming, hurrying) and physical. One of my interlocutors (Interview no. 6, F, 26 y.o., Maadi, 17.03.2021) She told me that her employers would let her go to bed at 1 a.m. and wake her up

at 5 a.m., and that she would be fed table scraps or ful (a cheap Egyptian bean dish that she often ate with every meal). Another claimed that her employers used the problems she told them about against her. (Interview no. 24, F, 32 y.o., Maadi, 09.05.2021). According to my interlocutors, it was also a common practice, after a month of release of home aid without remuneration, on a false charge of theft of an item from the employer's home. One of my interlocutors (Interview no 4, M, 43 y.o., Maadi, 09.03.2021) told me that he did not agree that his wife would work as a home help for the Egyptians, because he heard about cases of illegal organ harvesting from women working in this kind of job.

According to one of my interviewees (Interview no 18, F, 28 y.o., Maadi, 25.04.2021) Migrants were to fall victims of fraud on the part of Egyptian UN employees. In her opinion, they sold their friends decisions to relocate refugees to the countries of the global south. The interest was to be undetectable because the authorities of countries receiving refugees did not have sufficient competence to recognize that a person who had specific documents was actually an Egyptian and not a Sudan. This was largely due to the fact that in both countries no names have been introduced in the European sense to this day, only an ancient system is maintained in which identity determines its own name and names of the father, grandfather and great -grandfather (e.g. Mohamed Ahmed Sherif Kareem or John Richard Henry Frank).

According to my interlocutors, discrimination did not take place at universities. They considered Egyptian students and lecturers cultural and helpful. However, the contacts between the Egyptians and migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa were not of a social nature, but only a kinder coexistence in class.

Discrimination against migrant children in Egyptian public schools has led the UN, church organizations, and migrant foundations to run special schools for sub-Saharan African children. I visited one of these schools, called Innovation Academy, on 1 and 3 April 2021 and here are my observations (field note - school for children from sub-Saharan Africa, 01.04.2021 and 03.04.2021).

The school has existed since 2017. Its assumption is to enable children to study migrants. The vast majority of children came from Sub-Saharan Africa: Sudan, Sudan south, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, etc. However, there was one boy from the Philippines at school. He made the impression of relaxed and integrated with class. The school did not exclude children of other nations, including Egyptians, but in practice Egyptian/Arab children did not attend there. Teachers also came from various African countries, with the same founder of the school and the headmaster came from Sudan south. The bodyguards were old Egyptians (Egyptian law ordered each company to use a specific parity for the Egyptians in

employment). Their contact with the management seemed to be kind (they joked, they smiled to each other).

Annual tuition fees cost 5000 EGP (\$300). Children from poor families were exempt from part or all of the fees (% of the discount depended on the material situation of the family and the child's results in learning). According to the headmaster's declaration, the school only earned to pay for the rent, media and the salary of teachers. The director earned 3500 EGP per month (approx. \$210). The school did not receive any subsidies from the state or from the UN.

The school was located in a 4-story building. There were 4 classrooms on each floor, on the ground floor there were administrative rooms and rooms for preschoolers. Older children and young people, even twenty -year -olds, learned in the higher rooms. There was also a one -story building in the small yard, with several classrooms. The building was rather well -kept, although not renovated for a long time. In some rooms there were large holes in the floor. The school did not have a pitch or a playground. Some children sat in the benches outside.

The classes were up to a maximum of a dozen or so. In most rooms there were teachers conducting classes, but there was one class, in which the students themselves were unattended. One of the classes during my visits wrote a test in the subject of "Basics of technical education". The school

lent me a 1st test. It was a set of theoretical questions in the field of biology, agriculture, material science and economics. The curriculum in Sudan was generally implemented. At school, children studied in English and Arabic. During my short stay I had the feeling that there was a good atmosphere there, the teachers were calm and liked to joke, also with students. In the first week of April, students were to take exams. Just before the exams, a trip to Alexandria was to take place, which was founded by a reduction in students' exam stress. The children did not wear sanitary masks.

The school worked from Monday to Thursday and Saturday. Friday as a Holy Day for Muslims and Sunday as a Holy Day for Christians were days off. Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, children came to school rotationally (a few days a week one children, then others). Many children were late at school. However, late, they were not recorded or punished.

During the appeal, the students set up in ranks and listened to short speeches in English (of 2 teachers and director) about not to litter, wear masks (almost nobody wore them, including teachers) and behave politely. Teachers in one speech were able to alternately joke and speak seriously. During the appeal, the students read 2 short prayers - one in Arabic (maybe Muslim?) and the other one in English. The content of prayer in English was quite religiously universal - God was asked to look after school and students. Then the children sang twice the hymn of South Sudan. Both during the

prayers and singing the hymn, students focused, without the need for teachers' interference. It seemed that faith and patriotism were important for them. During the appeal, the director said that today children would receive information about the results of the exams that recently passed. Unfortunately, due to insufficient paper, the results were donated orally. After the appeal, the children spread to the classes to the rhythm of African music released from the tape recorder. Some took it with a dance step. At the entrance to the school, Flora working as a secretary and a person ensuring that the students reach the class to give a slap to one little boy. The child took a slap without protest or cry and went to the room. When I asked the director about this event, she downplayed it. She said that Flora is not a teacher, and the student may did not want to go in the right direction. This event, however, was the only violent incident that I saw at school during a 3-hour visit. It was all the more surprising, considering that teachers during this time did not raise their voice and did not enforce discipline from students in any way known to me from the Polish school. I suppose that the slap in the culture of South Sudan (and in general in African culture) is not perceived as violent behavior, as in Arab culture, violence is not considered gentle slap or child hitting in the hand.

In the classroom for the first grade (girls and boys aged 6-8-age difference caused by the fact that as a result of a civil

war of all ages began education) there was a whiteboard. The floor was unsuccessful and the walls were not painted for a long time. The children sat close to each other, even though they had a lot of space to keep a distance. It seemed that they liked to be close to each other. The children laughed a lot and joked with each other. They nailed Fridays. They didn't fight. During the day only at 11 am there was a break. The rest of the lesson lasted one after the other. There were no breaks typical of the Polish school. On the other hand, teachers accepted long -lasting moments of expansion during lessons, e.g. sitting down to benches, takes a long time, removing notebooks and textbooks, waiting for teachers to replace. Every moment when something changed was the moment when the children expanded and distracted. During the lesson, children could also drink and leave the class without asking the teacher for permission. Teachers did not read the attendance list, only at the end of the lesson, saying who is not present on the basis of their own observations.

During the visit I was presented to students in different classes. In one ten-person class of 5 girls and 5 boys (age 15-22 years) I had the opportunity to talk to students. All students came from Sudan south, although from various ethnic groups (Dinka, Bari, Lotiek, Szylluk). The most open and talkative boy came from Dink, but he referred to it with a distance. He joked that he was from the most famous "tribe" that nobody liked. Some of them were born in Egypt, some in

Sudan's capital Khartoum and have never lived in South Sudan, some have been in Egypt for 2 years. One girl was 10 days after arriving and after a two-year break from school caused by the civil war and the Covid-19 pandemic. In the interview, I asked them if they identified more with a nation or an ethnic group. All of them declared that they felt that they were South Sudanese first and foremost, and their ethnic identity was fading. Some were even critical of tribal culture. I also asked them about dreams and plans for the future. 4 boys declared their willingness to emigrate to Europe. They dreamed to become footballers and one of them actor. 1 boy and all girls declared that after graduation they want to return to Sudan PD. And do something good there for the country. The boy dreamed of becoming a doctor, the girls talked about improving agricultural performance (after studying in this area in Cairo) or opening his own business. The girl who was in Egypt on the tenth day dreamed of becoming a pilot in the South Sudanese army. Students were also interested in me. They listened carefully about the fact that I had a stable but boring job and I wrote a doctorate to provide myself with intellectual stimulation. They did not judge me negatively (first world problems, etc.), they tried to understand me. I got the boys' sympathy when I said that I came from the country of Robert Lewandowski. During my visit, I got the impression that the atmosphere in migrant schools is more informal and loose than in the education systems I know (Polish, English, French), which means that students are not afraid of school.

Many of my interlocutors associated high hopes for education. I have not heard of the phenomenon of "trucks". Often, twenty-year-olds, as soon as the material situation allowed them, resumed their education at school. At the same time, I got the impression that the education of migrants is largely theoretical, and a slightly practical degree. This may result, among others from the small funds at the disposal of schools.

The next issue that I dealt with during research was the sexual customs of migrants. They constituted a mixture of traditions of their ethnic groups from the so-called "Western lifestyle" and thus partly deviated from Christian morality. At the same time, they were far away from the Muslim customs, prevailing in Egypt, which was a source of conflicts between migrants and the local community. A serious problem for them was the Egyptian prudery. One of my interviewees said that she was suffering from not being able to show affection to her boyfriend in public. She claimed that in South Sudan kissing and hugging are normal, while Egyptians forbid it. (Interview no. 29, F, 22 y.o., Maadi, 13.06.2021). The role of 'guardians of good manners and other people's morality' in paying attention to young couples was often filled by men. For example, the Egyptian husband of a Polish woman I know, a wealthy man educated in the United States, used to call the police when he saw a young couple holding hands in the vicinity of his house. To me, that kind of attitude on the part of a man was incomprehensible. I once asked an Egyptian

friend if Egyptian men don't feel ridiculous when they behave like this. And he said no, because showing affection in public is wrong, because it makes lonely people suffer. At the same time, the same man boasted to me that he had used Russian sex workers, but of course he had done it in secret.

According to some of my interviewees, premarital sex was common in South Sudan. It was the same in the Egyptian exile. (Interview no. 16, M, 28 y.o., Maadi, 11.04.2021). Migrants living in overcrowded apartments did not have many opportunities for this, but they tried to help each other. One of my friends, after my departure from Cairo, confessed to me on Facebook that his new girl agreed with him. He could not afford to rent a hotel, but a older friend came to his aid who released his apartment in the morning, while the rest of the household members were at school or at work. Some people rented rooms in their apartments to couples, which I have already written about in section 5.1. In South Sudan, if the girl gets pregnant, the man who fertilized her is obliged to marry. According to one of my interlocutors, it leads to the fact that some girls do not intentionally protect themselves to force the boy they like to marry. By the way, this kind of practice is common in traditional patriarchal cultures where marriage is a contract and a guarantee of providing care for women and children. In the near past it was also used in Poland. My interlocutor admitted that he became a father in this way, but he did not eventually get involved with his child's

mother (Interview no 16, M, 28 y.o., Maadi, 11.04.2021). I suppose that in exile, enforcing a marriage from a man in this kind of situation can be much more difficult than in the homeland.

The more liberal manners of the migrant women caused them to have sexual relations with expatriates. Surely, many of them provided sexual services for money. Some may have done so purely out of curiosity and pleasure. The place where the migrant women had the opportunity to meet the expats was a bar called ACE Club in the Maadi district. It was a place that Egyptians could enter only if they were also citizens of another country. The justification for this solution was the widespread racism among Egyptians and the resulting aggressive behaviour towards black people and the attitude of the "guardians of other people's morality" I mentioned above. In the premises, however, it did not happen that guests, for example, kiss each other. Often, however, physically attractive black migrants went to expat tables and it happened that after the end of the evening they left them from the premises. During my three stays in this place, I was once attached by a migrant who invited me to the table at which she sat with her friend. They were both from South Sudan. The boy was gay, the girl was a heterosexual mother of three children, whom her husband abandoned some time ago. In a conversation with me, with a great sense of humor, the girl undertook sexual threads, e.g. saying that the Egyptians have

small penises. When I said that I was married, the conversation, however, went to a more neutral tone. In turn, she mentioned her colleague that in Egypt as a gay one he had a better life than in South Sudan, because among Egyptians homosexuality was frequent and tolerated, and in the South Sudan, in her opinion, one could even be killed. I am not able to clearly state whether the people I talked to provided with paid sexual services or just looking for sex for pleasure. However, from a conversation with my friend, I know that a large part of the Pub clientele was sexual employees (field note-Ace Club, March-July 2021). At the same time, from a conversation with an Egyptian employee of one of the embassies, I know that the situation of sexual workers from Sub-Saharan Africa was much more difficult than in the case of Egyptians. First of all, because, unlike them, they did not have protection from the maniacs, they only worked on their own. In addition, their services were three times cheaper. This was due to the following reasons. First of all, there were fewer Egyptians in this industry. Secondly, free sex with migrants was much easier to be available than with Egyptians. Thirdly, their economic situation was more difficult, so they were more desperate in acquiring customers. Fourthly, the Egyptians did not like black women, so the demand for their services was smaller (a note from the conversation with the Egyptian consulate of one of the European countries about the situation of black people in Egypt, Zamalek - Cairo, August 2021).

The institution of marriage among the Southern Sudanians was one of those phenomena in which culture and tradition did not get reconciled with Christian morality. . First of all, in their country there was polygamy among really affluent people, also among Catholics. However, it did not occur among my interlocutors. I suppose that polygamy is more difficult for economic reasons. Perhaps also migrants, living away from their traditional culture and being under the strong influence of the Catholic Church, begin to be critical of this practice. One of my interlocutors confessed that his father was a Catholic and at the same time he had 7 wives. He claimed, however, that the negative consequences of this state of affairs affected him, because as the eldest son, after the death of his father, he was obliged to help children all his wives (Interview no. 26, M, 30 y.o., Maadi, 30.05.2021).

Another interlocutor said that it happens that people get married to their first wife and then with subsequent wives contain traditional marriages that are contracts between families (Interview no. 19, F, 41 y.o., Maadi, 17.04.2021). However, none of my interlocutors was a polygamist and almost everyone criticized this solution as a relic of the past, which de facto takes off the man's responsibility for the well - being of his children. Only one of my interlocutors recognized the monogamy as a disadvantage of Christianity. In her opinion, polygamy is more consistent with human nature and

if a man is valuable, he can be shared with other women (Interview no. 29, F, 22 y.o., Maadi, 13.06.2021).

Contracting marriage was a great economic challenge for migrants, and at the same time their tradition and Egyptian law did not allow life in cohabitation. A traditional marriage was a contract between the parents of the bride and groom. A permanent element was the dowry brought by the groom. In his homeland, he was most often paid in a livestock, which made it easier for marriages to poor people, because everyone had someone in the family who had some cows, chickens or geese. In the case of migrants, money was required. My interviewees who were married paid their in-laws very different amounts. For one, EGP 18 500 (about \$1K) was enough, while another had to raise EGP 200 000 (\$12.5K). This was especially difficult for those from the dominant Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups, whose in-laws demanded full payment before the wedding. In other ethnic groups, e.g. Bari, the groom repaid the dowry in installments throughout his life, because the debt was to prevent him from abandoning his wife or breaking the relationship with his in-laws. The punishment for not paying off debts was to pick up children. In the case of Bari, however, it was not enforced in the case of debtors who did not abandon their wives. In addition, a man who married a wedding in South Sudan, and then with his wife was forced to emigrate, until he returned to his homeland he was released from repayment of the debt (Interview no. 13,

M, 47 y.o., 03.04.2021). It is also worth adding that the dowry was not required for widows and women abandoned by husbands. They also did not have to obtain parents' consent to get back again. Their value on the matrimonial market was small because the men did not want to raise their children (Interview no. 24, F, 32 y.o., Maadi, 09.05.2021).

A matter that hindered the marriage of many migrants was also the need to obtain approval from those living in the country, parents and in-laws. This particularly strong issue was emphasized by interlocutors from the Dinka ethnic group, in which only Dinka people accepted parents. In the case of Nuer, it could be someone from Chilluk and Dinka ethnic groups, which are related to them. At Chilluks, the man chooses his wife himself, at Bari the choice is made by a woman. Two of my interlocutors indicated, however, that the influence of parents on the choice of a child is more determined by their mentality than ethnic affiliation. Open-minded parents accept children's choices, and those close-minded want to interfere (wyw. 20, M, 19 lat, Maadi, 06.05.2021 oraz wyw. 21, K, 21 lat, Maadi, 06.05.2021).

## Conclusions

In Egypt, Christian migrants from South Sudan face discrimination on the streets and in the workplace. They are facing street discrimination from the poorest Egyptians who treat them as competitors for jobs and scapegoats to vent their frustration with the humiliation they suffer from the upper-class Egyptians. In Egypt's highly class-based society, relations between people of different social statuses are marked by open contempt. Migrants are victims of beatings, and in the case of women, sexual harassment and even rape. Discrimination at the workplace, in turn, is manifested by a psychic (scream, insults), physical (beating, prison, sometimes even theft of organs), economic (no payment for work, ensuring inhuman living conditions), and even sexual (harassment, rape ). These people are mainly experienced by women performing work at home aid. Due to their widespread, many young women decide to provide sexual services, considering that they are associated with the same scale, but with greater earnings. In turn, men are often excluded from the labor market. "Typical men's works" of unskilled workers are occupied by the Egyptians. In Egypt with a population of more than 100,000, unlike other North African states, they have little chance of performing simple physical work on a farm or construction. On the other hand, South Sudden children and other sub-Saharan African countries must go to special schools to

avoid physical violence from their Egyptian peers. Correct relationships only appear at universities. Therefore, it should be stated with all boldly that both the Egyptian state and the society do not provide migrant with worthy conditions for life. Egypt does not actually fulfill its role of transit state.

The discrimination against South Sudanese migrants is not based on their religion. Both Christians and Muslims are subject to it. In turn, expatriates from Europe and North America are privileged over the majority of Egyptians, despite the fact that they are mostly non-Muslims. Discrimination is partly ethnic. Black people have a low social status. Even diplomats from African countries are treated with arrogance. The exceptions are the people the Egyptians know to be wealthy citizens of the global north. The discrimination is therefore mainly due to economic factors. The sub-Saharan African migrants are the poorest of the poor, so they're also the least respected. Significant, too, is the fact that the ancestors of the Egyptians made their living by trading in black-skinned slaves from Sudan.

Discrimination prevents South Sudanese migrants from integrating into the local population. They live in their own enclaves, they don't intermarry, they don't befriend Egyptians. They celebrate their own customs and create their own enclaves, and they have the poorest of Egyptians as their neighbors. The integration of migrants is almost non-existent,

and the Catholic Church (and probably other Christian Churches) is becoming the key site for the formation and cultivation of a "Little South Sudan" within Egypt. The experience of discrimination, however, has resulted in ethnic differences disappearing and South Sudanese becoming more nationally aware. It thus fulfils the bonding function of the Catholic Church for migrants.

Are European countries, including Poland, able to avoid Egypt's mistakes against migrants from South Sudan? Probably yes, because European societies are much more egalitarian than Egyptian, and states provide greater social support. Are African migrants able to integrate with European societies? In the long run, probably, provided that in cooperation with social institutions will make an effort to identify differences and cultural similarities. Then it will be important to determine which differences can be enriched with European societies, and which can generate conflicts and how to level the latter. How culturally distant from Europeans are migrants from South Sudan? First of all, they are a tribal community. Identification with a given ethnic group is stronger than with the nation, which, however, can be even an advantage in the course of integration with a new and completely different society. Secondly, they have different sexual customs. The habit of polygamy can cause that African women will not have a problem with establishing relationships with married Europeans, which can obviously cause

antagonism from European women. Migrants from South Sudan also have material and living expectations much lower than Europeans, which means that they can be attractive to employers as a cheap labor force. This would be beneficial for European economies, especially the construction sector. However, in the event of an increase in unemployment, naturally antagonize Europeans from lower social groups, like the economic crisis of 2010 in Great Britain, caused the reluctance of British working class towards Poles. Issues of southern Sudan concentration on one activity and their tendency to be late may be difficult to tolerate for European employers, superiors and teachers. In this respect, it will be necessary to develop a kind of compromise between the parties. However, pay this problem to employers may be a lower level of aspirations of southern Sudanians in relation to Poles. As people dreaming mainly about survival, not professional self-realization, they can be very loyal to the employer. As people used to poor treatment, they can also assess European superiors as more "human".

What do Christian migrants from South Sudan have in common with Europeans ? South Sudanese migrants are strongly attached to Christianity and religious practices, as are some Central European nations. In the case of Western Europe, this Western connection seems to exist only in Italy. The rest of society is heavily secularized. For these reasons, paradoxically, their integration may be better in rural areas

than in secularized cities. Interestingly, once they've won the right to vote, they're more likely to vote for right-wing groups than they are for liberal and left-wing groups. Because their worldview is largely shaped by the social teachings of the Catholic Church, a Christian democratic party that combines support for the poor with respect for religion would be ideal for them. Paradoxically, these are liberal and left-wing circles that may be intolerant of the thinking and views of people from sub-Saharan Africa.

Can a common religion help Africans in Europe to adapt? Certainly, Christianity is the main link between Africans and Poles, Irish, Italians, and Romanians. Moreover, with their spirituality and joy in their religion, they can bring a life-giving spirit to European Christianity and attract young people to it, especially in rural areas. African dances and ceremonies, however, may be repulsive to some of the faithful who are accustomed to the seriousness of church life. The priests would have a lot of work to do in this regard. It would be up to them whether the vibrant African spirit would be allowed into the church to enrich it or whether it would be discarded as an affront to the dignity of the place.

To what extent can the Catholic Church help in this regard? The Catholic Church can be a key institution in promoting the integration of Africans in Europe, just as it is in Egypt. For them, religion is a source of hope and joy and a meeting place. The Church can act as a bonding and bridging

force between the migrant community and European societies, especially in Central Europe. Christianity for many Africans (as the example of South Sudanese shows) is more important than national identification and it is worth building their integration in a new society. Religion allows them to tame trauma and endure the hardships of life. The priest is the first authority and guide of life, he can also be a connector between them and the new society. The Church, like in Egypt, can organize language and vocational education, financial assistance and in search of work, as well as classes for children and entertainment. It can also explain to migrants cultural differences between them and Polish society, helping to avoid conflicts. He may also act as a conciliator in these conflicts, especially in rural environments. Generally, in the case of mass migration from Africa, this institution can play an invaluable role in Europe.

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## **Law Acts**

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Note from a conversation with Łukasz Streszewski - former volunteer from the Salesian Missionary Volunteer Service - about his stay in Sudan South, 25/05/2021

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## **List of photos:**

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Photo No. 2: Deng, a Dinka ethnic man, cousin of Duper.

Source: Private photo shared by the person being photographed

Photo No 3: Nyamale, a woman from the Nuer ethnic group.

Source: Private photo shared by the photographer

Photo No. 4: Simon, a man from the Nuer ethnic group.

Source: private photo shared by the person photographed

Photo No. 5: Women from the Azandi ethnic group,

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Photo No. 6: Women from the Bari ethnic group,

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<https://i.pinimg.com/originals/22/d0/5a/22d05a7f20a3aad2510da6884f11429d.jpg> 29.12.2021

Photo No. 7: Bakhita, a woman from the Shilluk ethnic group,

source: private photo shared by the person photographed

Photo No. 8: Peter, a man of the Aczoli ethnic group, source:

Private photo shared by the person being photographed

Photo No. 9: Betty, an Acholi woman Source: private photo provided by the subject

Photo No. 10: Sheikh Zayed Monument in Cairo,  
Source:<https://www.dubaipost.ae/en/short-n-eazy/around-the-world/cairo-pays-tribute-to-late-sheikh-zayed-2017-02-26-1.508>, 03.03.2023

## **List of maps:**

Map no 1: places of occurrence of individual ethnic groups of Southern Sudan. source:

[http://www.101lasttribes.com/countries/south\\_sudan\\_map.html](http://www.101lasttribes.com/countries/south_sudan_map.html), 22.01.2022

Map no 2: The oil field in South Sudan as of 2021.

Source:<https://www.southsudanlicensinground.com/>, 28.01.2022.

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Maciej Pawłowski's book "Christian migrants from South Sudan in Egypt" is a multidimensional analysis of the situation of Christian migrants from South Sudan in Egypt. The author, aiming to highlight the socio-cultural role of the Catholic Church in the integration of migrants, points to the basic problems and challenges facing the migrants themselves and the society of the receiving country. Pawłowski very reliably presents the historical and political background of both emigration from South Sudan and immigration to Egypt, showing the reasons for emigration and the problems that migrants face in the host country. The latter are primarily racism and related discrimination and marginalization on the labor market. One of the most important social institutions that supports and unites the South Sudanese community is the Catholic Church. Maciej Pawłowski analyzes - again broadly showing the cultural and social background in Southern Sudan and Egypt - what the activity of the Church looks like and what this support consists of. The micro scale presented by Maciej Pawłowski is unusual for political science studies and reports. The author spent many hours on interviews and casual conversations, and above all on observing and living with Catholics from South Sudan. He chose as his research area one Roman Catholic parish of the

Holy Family in the Maadi district in Cairo. The author regularly attended masses there, and also spent time with people in the church yard, went with them to the market or to restaurants. This unique insight into everyday and festive life allowed Pawłowski to understand the grassroots dimensions of religious commitment and practice, as well as everyday struggles with discrimination in the labor market. Combined with the broadly outlined migration policy of Egypt and the social and political context of migration from South Sudan, readers receive a reliable description of both the social situation of migrants and the challenges facing the receiving country. I recommend the book to anyone interested in migration, refugee issues, the social role of the Church and the multidimensional socio-political situation in Africa.